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ABSTRACT 
 
The thesis is concerned with how different forms of public participation have been conceived 
of, implemented and contested in the context of hydropower governance in the Lower Mekong River 
Basin, specifically in relation to dam development on the river’s mainstream. Through the case studies 
of Thailand and Cambodia, the thesis examines the public stakeholder consultations organised under 
the framework of the intergovernmental Mekong River Commission (MRC) in relation to the Xayaburi, 
Don Sahong and Pak Beng dams, and how this has come to be criticised as an unmeaningful process in 
contrast to participatory events organised by a regional transnational activist network known as the Save 
the Mekong Coalition (STM). First, this involves examining how an effective analysis of the public 
stakeholder consultations depends on a nuanced understanding of national institutional contexts, and 
how public participation has been framed by technical government agencies as domains for government 
intervention. Second, the thesis examines how technical discourses and actors have come to dominate 
stakeholder consultations. Through the use of event ethnography, the intimate spaces of the stakeholder 
consultations are studied both in terms of how power dynamics are generated through their physical 
and spatial dimensions, and the ‘performances’ of state and nonstate actors. The tensions arising from 
state attempts to render the stakeholder consultations ‘non-political’ and to contain challenges to the 
status quo are examined through this perspective. Third, the thesis considers the elements that constitute 
meaningful spaces of participation for local communities, and how these spaces are situated in wider 
power relations at the national and local level.   
  These discussions are situated in a conceptual framework that emphasises the notions of 1) 
rendering technical, 2) a co-produced, emergent and relational understanding of public participation, 
and 3) performativity. The thesis posits that the state-organised public stakeholder consultations have 
been rendered technical by state actors in ways that draw upon uncritical assumptions relating to publics, 
place, scale, and time, and legitimise technical discourses over the lived experiences and concerns of 
local communities. The public stakeholder consultations were found to be concerned with technical 
categorisations of the Mekong River and largely dislocated from the wider political-economic drivers 
of hydropower development in the Mekong Region. In contrast, the alternative participatory spaces 
organised by the STM Coalition emphasised the authority of community voices, the pursuit of 
accountability through multiple avenues, and a critical evaluation of the technical information relating 
to the proposed dam projects. The thesis argues that it is necessary to consider state and nonstate forms 
of public participation in relation to one another as the experiences of participants in one site influences 
their perceptions of another. Critically, this perspective creates a wider and more nuanced understanding 
of what public participation may encompass. By situating participatory spaces within their wider multi-
scalar political contexts, the thesis considers how this landscape of participation presents both 
opportunities and challenges for wider public participation in Mekong hydropower governance.    
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Preamble 
 On 24 February 2017 I found myself, quite unexpectedly, overlooking the Xayaburi Dam in 
Laos (see Figure 1.1). My first research project on the Mekong River dealt with the politics of 
knowledge around the proposed mainstream Don Sahong Dam in Laos. Later, during the time I was 
conducting fieldwork for my second project on community-level management of the Mekong River in 
northern Thailand in early 2012, a ‘Stop Xayaburi Dam [sic]’ banner was one that I walked past almost 
every day. Given the fierce contestation and high stakes around mainstream dam development at the 
time, little did I think that a mere five years later, I would be looking at the three quarters-complete 
Xayaburi Dam with my very own eyes. For this PhD project, I had embarked on fieldwork in the 
Mekong Region in early January 2017 with the broad goal of investigating and documenting Thai and 
Cambodian civil society and local community resistance to the Lao Mekong mainstream dams over the 
previous decade. Coincidentally, the Mekong River Commission’s (MRC) six-month Prior 
Consultation mechanism for the proposed mainstream Pak Beng Dam in Laos had recently begun in 
December 2016 and I jumped at the opportunity to attend the MRC’s regional stakeholder forum for 
the proposed dam and the MRC Council Study, which was held on 22-23 February 2017 in Luang 
Prabang.  
 Having only followed the events leading up to the construction of the Xayaburi and Don Sahong 
dams from afar, I was interested to experience the process of Prior Consultation for myself. While I had 
previously read reports made about the stakeholder consultations, these appeared to be extremely 
sanitised and ordered accounts of what had transpired during the meetings, void of emotion and tone. I 
felt that one had to read between the lines to discern where the lines of tension occurred. The regional 
stakeholder forum was an eye-opening experience, appearing to me to be a microcosm of what I had 
understood about the politics of mainstream hydropower development in the Lower Mekong Basin 
(LMB), especially in terms of the differentiated stakeholders present and the concerns they raised about 
the proposed dam. More importantly, the dynamics, passions, emotions and tensions that were 
generated through the space of the forum were stark. As the meeting progressed, I was struck by the 
technical nature of the discussions and found myself relating to some of the criticisms levelled at the 
stakeholder consultations held for the Xayaburi and Don Sahong dams, which were related to the 
difficulties of understanding technical information about the dams and their impacts and the inadequate 
amount of time for participants to make clarifications. I realised that these issues were generated within 
the specificities of the time-space of the event.  
 The implications of these observations will be discussed later in the chapter, but for now I 
would like to return to the scene that I opened the chapter with. The study trip to the Xayaburi Dam 
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construction site was unexpectedly announced by the Lao Minister of Environment and Natural 
Resources on the first day of the forum and took place the day after the forum concluded. Standing at 
the vantage point overlooking the Xayaburi Dam, there were various conversations that one could 
overhear. A Thai government official was explaining how their technical recommendations about the 
fish passage had been taken into account by the project developers. A group of Chinese engineers from 
the Pak Beng Dam’s project developer Datang were discussing the technical features of the dam. On 
the journey back from the dam construction site, I was seated next to a friendly Thai civil society 
representative from Nong Khai Province and asked him how he felt about seeing the dam. I could not 
fully understand what he said, but his demeanour turned solemn as he spoke. We met again the next 
month at the Thai stakeholder consultation for the Pak Beng Dam, and I asked him again through my 
interpreter how he felt when he saw the Xayaburi Dam. I will end this preamble with an excerpt of his 
reply, which stood in contrast with the technical discussions that took place at the forum:  
When I saw the Xayaburi Dam I felt that the life of people in 
Mekong communities will be changed a lot, and there is going to 
be a huge impact to the communities. Maybe the cost to 
communities will be more than the cost of building the dam. The 
social and cultural aspects of community lives are going to 
change too. The people who use the fisheries will disappear, and 
the ecosystem will totally change too. The relationship between 
the people along the Mekong River in Thailand and Laos is going 
to change too. Before, we consider ourselves relatives, we are 
sisters and brothers… Dams are the disaster of the Mekong 
River… the Mekong River is just like my mother, and I think that 
my mother is dying.  
 
 
Figure 1.1. The Xayaburi Dam, as seen during the study trip held on 24 February 2017  
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1.2. Key objectives and research questions 
 There are eleven dams planned for the mainstream of the Lower Mekong River. To date, the 
MRC’s process of Prior Consultation, under the Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation and 
Agreement (PNPCA), has been activated four times by the Lao government in relation to dams to be 
constructed on the mainstream of the Mekong River: the Xayaburi Dam (October 2010 – April 2011), 
the Don Sahong Dam (July 2014 – January 2015), the Pak Beng Dam (December 2016 – June 2017), 
and the Pak Lay Dam (August 2018 – March 2019). Prior Consultation is a six-month process of 
technical evaluation and consultation between Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, who are 
members of the MRC. The main objectives of this thesis are to examine how state and nonstate sites of 
public participation have emerged through mainstream hydropower governance in the LMB, how they 
relate to and contrast with one another through multiple interpretations of what public participation 
means, and how this has served as a source of contention between state and nonstate actors. Only the 
first three iterations of Prior Consultation for the Xayaburi, Don Sahong and Pak Beng dams are 
considered in this thesis. A focus is placed on Thailand and Cambodia to highlight the transboundary 
dynamics and challenges involved for MRC member states in implementing Prior Consultation within 
their respective national contexts, and nonstate actors in challenging a dam project belonging to another 
sovereign state. 
 Although this thesis focuses on the Xayaburi, Don Sahong and Pak Beng dams, the significance 
of this research can be situated within recent developments relating to the Pak Lay Dam. On 13 June 
2018, the Lao government informed the MRC of its intention to submit the proposed Pak Lay Dam 
project under Prior Consultation. Despite the Lao government’s call for new dam investments to be 
halted following the deadly collapse of a saddle dam of the Xe Pian Xe Namnoy hydropower project in 
July 2018 that killed 40 people and displaced thousands in Laos and Cambodia, the MRC eventually 
announced in early August 2018 that Prior Consultation for the Pak Lay Dam had begun (Gerin, 2018). 
The Save the Mekong (STM) Coalition, which is a regional activist network of civil society 
organisations and local communities that opposes Mekong mainstream dam development, announced 
that it would boycott the Pak Lay Prior Consultation as they ‘do not believe that the process can be 
conducted in  a way that is meaningful or effective, or ensure the trust and participation of dam-affected 
communities and the public’ unless their outstanding concerns relating to the Xayaburi, Don Sahong 
and Pak Beng dams were addressed (Save the Mekong, 2018, p. 1). While individual members of the 
STM Coalition had previously boycotted the public stakeholder consultations conducted under Prior 
Consultation, this is the first time that the coalition as a whole has boycotted the process.  
 This thesis therefore attempts to investigate how the public participation component of Prior 
Consultation has been implemented in Thailand and Cambodia, and how it has come to be perceived as 
an unmeaningful and ineffective process by the STM Coalition. While many studies have critiqued the 
4 
 
procedural and legal aspects of the PNPCA, especially in the landmark case of the Xayaburi Dam, few 
have paid substantial attention to the component of public participation. In this thesis, a focus is placed 
on how the PNPCA’s participatory processes and spaces have emerged, been experienced, and become 
distanced from decision making processes and the social, cultural and political-economic contexts 
relating to both hydropower development and the lived experiences of riparian communities. To 
understand what the STM Coalition considers to be meaningful participation, the PNPCA stakeholder 
consultations are contrasted with civil society-organised participatory events, which have more often 
been studied from the perspective of advocacy strategies and resistance rather than as forms of public 
participation. Attention is paid to the intimate spaces of public participation and the actions of 
participants within these spaces. These different forms of public participation are considered in relation 
to one another, as well as being situated in their particular socio-political contexts. Together, this sheds 
light on the wider challenges and implications for public participation in Mekong hydropower 
governance. Drawing upon a conceptual framework that emphasises the notions of 1) rendering 
technical, 2) a co-produced, emergent and relational understanding of public participation, and 3) 
performativity, this thesis is guided by the following research questions: 
1. How have the different national institutional contexts that frame public participation influenced 
the development of PNPCA public stakeholder consultations in Thailand and Cambodia?   
 
2. How have the PNPCA stakeholder consultations become distanced from the political-economic 
context of hydropower development and decision making, and how is this effect produced 
through the spaces of the stakeholder consultations and the actions of its state and nonstate 
participants?   
 
3. What do meaningful spaces of participation look like to the STM Coalition and in contrast to 
the PNPCA public stakeholder consultations, and what are the challenges for engaging a wider 
public in hydropower governance?  
1.3. Brief note on methods 
To answer these research questions, I carried out fieldwork between January and November 
2017 while mostly being based in Thailand and Cambodia. I conducted interviews with government 
officials in Thailand and Cambodia, MRC officials, civil society representatives, and local community 
members in Thailand (Chiang Rai Province and Nong Khai Province) and Cambodia (Siem Reap 
Province and Stung Treng Province). I also carried out ‘event ethnography’ as a novel approach to 
understand and generate an in-depth understanding of the intimate spaces and dynamics of participatory 
spaces within Mekong hydropower governance. I attended key PNPCA events including the two MRC 
regional stakeholder forums for the Pak Beng Dam that were held in Laos, and two Thai stakeholder 
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consultations in the provinces of Nong Khai and Chiang Rai. I also attended a STM Coalition event that 
was held in conjunction with their annual general meeting and the International Day of Action for Rivers. 
In addition to interviews and event ethnography, I also depended heavily on secondary sources relating 
to the Xayaburi and Don Sahong PNPCAs to reconstruct some of the events that had occurred at the 
time. These methods will be elaborated in Chapter 4.  
1.4. Outline of the thesis  
 Chapter 2 provides the context for the historical trajectory behind the emergence of the MRC 
and mainstream hydropower development in the LMB. The PNPCA, and, in particular, Prior 
Consultation will be explained and a summary of the key developments relating to the Xayaburi, Don 
Sahong and Pak Beng PNPCAs provided. Finally, attention is turned to social movements against 
hydropower development in the LMB, where the actions of the STM Coalition against mainstream dam 
development will be outlined, and a historical trajectory of social movements against hydropower 
development in Thailand and Cambodia provided. Chapter 3 provides the conceptual framework for 
this thesis, expanding on Tania Li's (2007) conceptualisation of rendering technical. In particular, the 
elements of problematisation and antipolitics will be examined in relation to the theory of 
governmentality, especially relating how regimes of truth are constructed by the actions of government. 
Next, the concept of public participation is examined in relation to the third element of rendering 
technical, the containment of challenges to the status quo. Critical perspectives critiquing the ‘tyranny’ 
of participation will be explored, and an argument made for a co-produced, emergent and relational 
understanding of public participation. Finally, the concept of performativity will be introduced, in 
considering how spaces of public participation are brought into being through the performative acts of 
state and nonstate actors. Chapter 4, as mentioned in the previous section, provides an elaboration on 
the methodology for this research project.  
 Chapters 5, 6, and 7 contain the empirical findings and analysis, and correlate to the three 
research questions that were set out in Section 1.2. Chapter 5 delves in detail into the inclusion of the 
public participation component in Prior Consultation and examines how the emergence of these 
participatory spaces in Thailand and Cambodia are situated within their specific national legal 
frameworks relating to public participation. Special attention is given to the Thai and Cambodia 
National Mekong Committee (NMC) Secretariats that are responsible for organising these stakeholder 
consultations, the institutional contexts in which these NMC Secretariat are located, and the value that 
these actors attach to the PNPCA and the stakeholder consultations. The considerations underlying the 
formation of these stakeholder consultations and the criticisms levelled at them will be considered from 
the multi-faceted dimensions of the public, place, scale, and time. Chapter 6 discusses how mainstream 
hydropower governance is rendered technical through the spaces of the PNPCA stakeholder 
consultations, which reveal how hydropower governance has been problematised as a technical field of 
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intelligibility. Drawing upon observations made through event ethnography, this chapter looks into how 
micro-geographies and the mundane tools of government tilt the balance of power towards state actors 
and scientific experts rather than communities. A performative lens is used to emphasise the antipolitics 
of public participation that renders hydropower governance non-political, and the resultant tensions that 
arise between state and nonstate actors through these participatory spaces. Through these perspectives, 
the chapter considers whether the PNPCA, which functions as a technical process, may have also 
operated as a deliberate measure to contain challenges to the status quo. 
 Chapter 7 turns its attention towards the spaces of public participation initiated by the STM 
Coalition, which are compared and contrasted with the PNPCA stakeholder consultations. It is through 
a recognition of their similarities that the differences between these spaces become stark, especially in 
terms of how the balance of power is tilted towards local communities. Attention is paid to how these 
spaces come to be perceived as meaningful forms of public participation, again in terms of their micro-
geographies and performative dimensions, which serve to re-centre not only local communities but also 
the Mekong River itself. These participatory events are then situated within national and local political 
contexts, which will reveal the challenges of strengthening local-level public participation and sustained 
community engagement. Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by reiterating its significance and key findings, 
drawing out the implications and limitations of the study, and proposing future research directions.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
CONTEXT  
2.1. Introduction 
 The pace of hydropower development in the Lower Mekong Basin comprising Laos, Thailand, 
Cambodia, and Vietnam, has quickened in the past decade due to increasing electricity demand and a 
rise in private investment in hydropower dams, providing the conditions required for mainstream dam 
construction to proceed (Hirsch, 2016). This chapter provides context to the debates and politics 
surrounding Mekong mainstream dams. First, an introduction to the Mekong River and the potential 
impacts of hydropower development on the river’s ecology are presented. Second, the historical and 
contemporary drivers of hydropower dam development in the LMB are discussed, set within grandiose 
visions in the 1950s to tame the Mekong River through technical and engineering prowess, the 
intersecting desires for regional integration, economic development and a seamless regional power grid, 
leading up to the formation of the Mekong River Commission. Third, a description of the current status 
of mainstream dam development in the LMB is provided. Fourth, this chapter discusses the governance 
arrangements of the MRC, its limitations, and how mainstream hydropower governance has taken place 
through the Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation and Agreement (PNPCA). Finally, the focus 
is turned towards social movements against hydropower development, first looking at how the Save the 
Mekong (STM) Coalition has contested mainstream dams and then turning to the historical roots and 
legacies of civil society movements against hydropower development in Thailand and Cambodia.  
2.2. The Mekong River and impacts of hydropower development 
 The name of the Mekong River is derived from its Thai and Lao name ‘Mae Nam Khong’, 
which translates into ‘mother of water’ (Carew-Reid, 2016). The Mekong River, with a length of about 
4,400 km, runs through six countries: China, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The 
river discharges 475 cubic kilometres of water into the South China Sea annually, of which Laos 
contributes about 35%, followed by Thailand and Cambodia with 18% each, China with 16%, Vietnam 
with 11%, and Myanmar with 2% (Osborne, 2004) (Figure 2.1). The source of the Mekong River is 
located in the Tibetan plateau, from which it flows into the steep, mountainous gorges of China’s 
Yunnan province. In China the river is known as the Lancang Jiang meaning ‘turbulent river’ (Carling, 
2009). From China, it carries on its journey into mainland Southeast Asia, forming a small part of the 
international border between Myanmar and Laos. The river then flows between Laos and Thailand, 
forming 850 km of the Lao-Thai international border in the northern and north-eastern provinces of 
Thailand (Carew-Reid, 2016). The river basin comprises a dominant part of Laos, as the river’s 
catchment area makes up 97 percent of Lao territory (ibid.) (see Table 2.1). The river then flows out 
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from Southern Laos into Cambodia, where 86 percent of the country’s territory falls into the river basin, 
and then into Vietnam, where the river branches and fans out into the Mekong Delta before flowing 
into the South China Sea (ibid.). As this thesis is about mainstream dam development in the LMB, the 
ecological characteristics of the LMB are the main focus of this section.  
 
Figure 2.1. Map of the Mekong River Basin (adapted from Ti et al., 2003) 
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Table 2.1. Territory within the catchment of the six Mekong River Basin countries (Source: MRC, 2003a) 
 
 The construction of hydropower dams on the tributaries and mainstream of the Mekong River 
will have impacts on the river’s hydrology, fisheries and sediment transport (Pukinsis & Gehab, 2012). 
As the three elements are interconnected, this will in turn impact the ecological productivity of the 
Mekong River Basin and the people who depend on the river’s resources for their livelihoods (ibid.). 
This will provide the basis for understanding discussions in the thesis about some of the technical 
debates about hydropower development. Hecht & Lacombe's (2014) compilation of the available 
scientific literature on hydropower development and its impacts on the Mekong River’s hydrology note 
that, in general, hydropower development is expected to modify the hydrology of the river system by 
decreasing and delaying wet season flows and increasing dry season flows. While the regulation of the 
river’s flow may aid irrigation, navigation, and hydropower production, the ecosystems and livelihoods 
adapted to the flood pulse of the Mekong River will be negatively impacted (ibid.). Issues of dam safety 
and the possibility of dam failure that may induce flooding also have to be taken into account, especially 
as a substantial portion of hydropower dams in the LMB are located within an earthquake source zone, 
if dam operators make large emergency releases of water in response to dam safety, or if the dams fail 
(ibid.). 
 One of the key concerns about hydropower development on the Mekong River and its 
tributaries relates to wild capture fisheries. First, dams obstruct fish passage both in terms of their small-
scale movements and large-scale migrations (Baran, 2010). The construction of dams will restrict or 
prevent fish passage, reduce spawning success, reduce the survival and growth of larval and juvenile 
fish, prevent fish from moving to refuge habitats, and thus reduce productivity and biodiversity across 
the national boundaries (Hortle & So, 2017). Dams will also reduce the magnitude of the Mekong 
River’s flood pulse, which is likely to reduce fisheries productivity due to knock-on impacts on fish 
migrations and breeding cycles that rely on hydrological triggers. This disruption will be exemplified 
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in Cambodia’s Tonle Sap Lake, where current fisheries production correlates with flood magnitudes 
(Pukinskis & Gehab, 2012). Cambodia and Laos would be hardest hit by the loss of fisheries and 
associated proteins, as up to 30% of their national protein supply would be at risk if all 11 mainstream 
dams were to be built (ICEM, 2010). In Cambodia, more than one million people who depend on 
fisheries are at risk from mainstream dam development. The degradation of wild capture fisheries is 
likely to disproportionately impact the poor in the region as fishers are overrepresented in poor and 
vulnerable LMB communities (ibid.).  
 Dams create a physical barrier that results in sediment trapping behind the dams. This is a key 
transboundary concern, as substantial reductions in sediment supply may cause massive changes to the 
shape, course and structure of a river, which will in turn have impacts on habitats, ecosystems and 
agricultural productivity (Baran & Myschowoda, 2009; ICEM, 2010; also see Baird et al., 2015 on the 
Nam Theun 2 Dam and Molle et al., 2009 on dams in Northeast Thailand). ‘Sediment hungry’ water 
released from dams may cause riverbed and riverbank erosion that may result in the alteration of river 
habitats, including the elimination of many fish spawning beds (Pukinskis, 2013). The reduction of 
nutrient-rich suspended sediment may decrease the biological productivity of the Mekong River, 
including fish and other aquatic species which may be unable to adapt to changes in their feeding and 
spawning grounds and the reduction in aquatic plant growth (Pukinskis, 2013; WCD, 2000). 
Agricultural productivity will also be negatively impacted by reduced sediment loads, which will cause 
the loss of agricultural land in inundated areas, riverbank gardens and floodplains. The floodplains of 
the Tonle Sap Lake and the Mekong Delta may bear the brunt of these losses (Lu et al., 2014; Pukinskis, 
2013). Sediment trapping behind the dam walls may also reduce the storage capacity of reservoirs 
(Kummu et al., 2010; Kummu & Varis, 2007), thus reducing the power generation potential of the dam 
itself (Pukinskis, 2013).  
2.3. The history and political economy of hydropower development in the LMB 
2.3.1. The Mekong Committee and the origins of hydropower development  
 The blueprints behind the Mekong mainstream dams are not new, and the technical nature of 
mainstream hydropower governance today that will be discussed in this thesis has its roots in the MRC’s 
origins. In the 1950s, the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (UNECAFE)1 
surveyed the LMB with the objectives of promoting irrigation, hydroelectric power, navigation, and 
fisheries development, in addition to forging transboundary cooperation between the four LMB 
countries (Hori, 2000). These goals, coupled with US Cold War interests in the region and the joint 
interest of riparian governments, led the UNECAFE to initiate and sponsor the formation of the 
                                                          
1 Known today as the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP).  
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Committee for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin in October 1957, which was 
also known as the Mekong Committee. The Mekong Committee comprised Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, 
and South Vietnam, and was also supported financially and technically by donor nations (ibid). The 
period between 1957 and 1969 was characterised by much optimism as the Mekong Committee would 
set a precedent for large-scale river basin development planning in Asia (Jacobs, 1995), driven by 
UNECAFE’s and the US Bureau of Reclamation’s vision to ‘tame the Mekong River’ for irrigation and 
hydropower development (Middleton, 2016, p. 210). The Mekong Committee Secretariat included 
American and European engineers who contributed expertise towards the Mekong Committee’s 
operational guidelines, studies, and projects (Boer et al., 2015; Jokinen, 2001).  
This climate of optimism was also driven by three influential studies and the belief that major 
developments could be achieved through engineering prowess (Boer et al., 2015; Hori, 2000). The first 
study by the UNECAFE in 1957 included proposals for four mainstream dams (Hori, 2000). The second 
study, the ‘Wheeler Report’, was published in 1958 and helped produce a road map that catalysed the 
enhancement of regional co-operation and the acceleration of the pace of work (Hori, 2000; Öjendal, 
1995). The resulting proposals for hydropower development comprised almost exclusively technical 
perspectives, leading to the commissioning of the ‘White Report’ that was published in 1962. The report 
incorporated socioeconomic considerations and helped in postponing mainstream dam construction 
until experience could be gained through tributary dam development (Hori, 2000; Jacobs, 1995). In 
1970, the Mekong Committee’s Indicative Basin Plan was initiated in order to address the piecemeal 
nature of previous studies and to consolidate major studies (Jacobs, 1995; Öjendal, 1995). The plan 
emphasised implementation over planning and proposed a cascade of seven mainstream multi-purpose 
dams for electricity generation, flood control and irrigation, along with approximately 170 tributary 
projects (Boer et al., 2015; Middleton, 2016; Middleton, et al., 2009). The basin plan also afforded more 
attention towards ecological and socioeconomic studies (Öjendal, 1995).  
 However, the beginning of the 1970s saw rising political tensions and conflict in the region and 
put a halt to the Mekong Committee’s activities and ambitions (Jacobs, 1995; Jokinen, 2001). With 
regional stability largely restored by the late 1980s and the onset of major geopolitical shifts caused by 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Mekong Region underwent major changes in its political 
and economic landscapes (Middleton et al., 2009). This period also saw the involvement of Western 
aid agencies, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), with the agenda of supporting 
hydropower development as part of aid and investment opportunities (ibid.). The Mekong Committee 
Secretariat also held hopes of moving forward with the mainstream development projects, and to expand 
its mandate and powers in order to coordinate the comprehensive development of the Mekong subregion 
(Jokinen, 2001). The Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong 
River Basin (henceforth known as the 1995 Mekong Agreement) was signed on 5 April 1995 by the 
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four LMB countries in Chiang Rai, Thailand, thus bringing the MRC into existence. China and 
Myanmar were invited to join but they had declined.  
2.3.2. The ‘battery’ of Southeast Asia and a new regional political economy  
Processes of economic regional integration and hydropower development since the early 1990s 
coincided with the period leading up to the formation of the MRC. In 1992, the ADB launched the 
Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Economic Cooperation Programme as a key prong of its post-Cold 
War global economic integrative agenda (Boer et al., 2015), which articulated former Thai Prime 
Minister Chatchai Choonhaven’s vision in 1989 to transform the region from a ‘battlefield to a 
marketplace’ (Glassman, 2010). The programme was endorsed by the governments of Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, and China’s Yunnan Province. Regional physical interconnectivity was 
emphasised through major cross-border infrastructural projects including hydropower dams and high-
voltage electricity transmission lines (ADB, 2004; Boer et al., 2015). The GMS was the ‘dominant 
geopolitical vision of the Mekong as an engine of regional development’ (Sneddon & Fox, 2006, p. 187) 
at the time, and came to replace the Mekong Committee as the principal framework for channelling 
economic development assistance into regional projects (Middleton et al., 2009). The integration of 
electricity through regional power trading and the establishment of a regional transmission grid, also 
known as the Mekong Power Grid, was one of the key features of the GMS Programme (Boer et al., 
2015; International Rivers, 2006).  
 A key impact of the GMS has been to facilitate Lao’s aspirations to become the ‘battery’ of 
Southeast Asia through exporting hydropower. Ninety-seven percent of the landlocked country lies 
within the Mekong River’s catchment area and its mountainous topography holds an estimated 18,000 
megawatts (MW) of hydropower potential out the 30,000MW in the LMB (Carew-Reid, 2016; ICEM, 
2010). Since the late 1980s, the ADB, World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and bilateral Western donors have consistently encouraged the Lao government to develop its 
hydropower potential as one of its few possible development options (Middleton et al., 2009). By 1995, 
the Lao government had signed memoranda of understanding (MOUs) on 23 feasibility studies for dams 
with a combined capacity of 6,676MW (Middleton et al., 2009). However, the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis halted these plans as electricity demand in Thailand went through a sudden decline (Lee & Scurrah, 
2009). Despite this, it is important to note that the introduction of the Chinese mainstream dam cascade 
on the Lancang River during this time, with the completion of the Manwan dam in 1995, drove the logic 
of dam building downstream by providing precedence for mainstream dam construction on the 
transboundary river (Hirsch, 2011a).  
Since 2007, large hydropower dam construction in the Mekong Region became situated within 
a new regional economy where a discernible shift has taken place away from the public financing of 
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hydropower dams towards private sector actors (Boer et al., 2015; Hirsch, 2016; Middleton, 2016). 
While the hydropower export projects of the 1990s in Laos were supported by Western capital and 
expertise, in the early 2000s the projects that were suspended with the onset of the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis were mostly taken on by Thai, Vietnamese, and Chinese companies (Middleton, 2016). This 
growing momentum has also been driven by support from Lao government policies and regional trends 
including the growth of electricity demand and the limited prospects for further exploitation of 
hydropower potential especially in Thailand and Vietnam (Boer et al., 2015; Middleton, 2016). These 
factors have facilitated the cross-border importation of hydropower generated by independent power 
producers from Thailand and Vietnam, who have become the leading hydropower investors in 
neighbouring countries (Middleton, 2016).  Of concern is that these private sector actors have not 
committed to international standards or social-environmental safeguards recommended by the ADB, 
World Bank, and the World Commission on Dams (WCD) (Middleton et al., 2009), and as this thesis 
will show, they are not obligated to participate in Prior Consultation for mainstream dam development2.    
2.4. The LMB mainstream dam cascade  
There are currently 11 run-of-river mainstream hydropower dams planned for LMB with a total 
installed capacity of 12,578 MW (Figure 2.2). Nine of the planned dams are located in Laos and two 
are in Cambodia (MRC, 2017). Compared to earlier versions of these mainstream dams that would have 
had large storage reservoirs, run-of-river dams have small or no reservoirs, and have limited storage 
capacity compared to traditional reservoir dams that store large quantities of water during the wet season 
to allow for year-round releases to generate power (Hirsch, 2011a; International Rivers, 2017a). When 
the MRC-commissioned Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) of Hydropower on the Mekong 
Mainstream was published in 2010, the report assessed that mainstream dams accounted for up to 28 
percent of the national hydropower potential of the four LMB countries and would bring substantial 
increases to the region’s power generated and generation capacity (see ICEM, 2010). However, there 
have been high levels of concern centred around their transboundary impacts, especially relating to the 
river’s hydrology, sediment levels, fisheries, and crucially, the livelihoods and food security of the 60 
million people who live in the LMB. About 40 percent of these people live and work within a 15-
kilometre corridor along the Mekong River, most within five kilometres of the river’s mainstream 
(MRC, n.d.a).  
                                                          
2 While private dam developers have their own internal standards and safeguards, this may vary from company 
to company. See http://www.hydroscorecard.org/ for an example of how policies and practices of Chinese 
hydropower developers have been benchmarked by International Rivers.  
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Figure 2.2. Map of mainstream dams on the Mekong River, including key tributary dams: the Pak Mun Dam in 
Thailand, the Lower Sesan 2 Dam in Cambodia, and the Yali Falls Dam in Vietnam (Adapted from 
International Rivers, 2017b) 
 
It was in the climate of renewed interest in the LMB mainstream dams, alongside the precedent 
set by the upstream China mainstream dams (Carew-Reid, 2016), and in light of donor concerns 
surrounding the mainstream hydropower development agenda of member states (Suhardiman et al., 
2015) that the SEA was launched in May 2009 to consider ‘the full range of social, environmental and 
cross-sector development impacts within the LMB’ (ICEM, 2010, p. 2), rather than on a project-by-
project basis. While acknowledging some of the benefits that mainstream hydropower dams would 
bring in terms of power generation and economic development, the SEA also identified potentially 
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devastating impacts in terms of ecosystem integrity, fisheries and food security, and social systems in 
the LMB if all mainstream dams were to be built. The SEA therefore recommended that decisions on 
mainstream dams should be deferred by 10 years to undertake comprehensive feasibility studies, and 
warned that ‘the Mekong mainstream should never be used as a test case for proving and improving full 
dam hydropower technologies’ (ICEM, 2010, p. 24). However, just as the SEA report was submitted, 
Laos submitted the Xayaburi Dam project under the PNPCA, diverting attention away from the SEA 
(Carew-Reid, 2016, p. 351). As of 2019, the recommendations for the deferment has largely been left 
behind and two LMB mainstream dams are already well under construction in Laos: the Xayaburi Dam 
and the Don Sahong Dam. The relationship between the SEA and the PNPCA will be further elaborated 
on in Section 2.5.3.   
2.5. The Mekong River Commission and the PNPCA  
2.5.1. The governance arrangements of the MRC 
The MRC today describes itself as ‘a regional facilitating and advisory body governed by water 
and environment ministers of the four countries’, and that is also governed by ‘a specific set of rules 
developed to coordinate technical cooperation among its members’ (MRC, n.d.b). It envisions itself as 
a facilitator of regional and transboundary cooperation that transcends differences in national interests 
as member states share the mutual benefits from the development of common water resources. It also 
perceives itself as ‘regional knowledge hub on water resources’ that would assist in informing decision-
making processes based on scientific evidence (ibid.). The MRC’s decision-making framework on 
water resources development is based on science and informed by technical studies, which are 
supported by investments in furthering scientific understandings of the river basin through various 
programme initiatives (ibid.) that cover a range of thematic areas including agriculture and irrigation, 
the basin development plan, flood management and mitigation, fisheries, integrated water resources 
management, and sustainable hydropower (MRC, n.d.c). While the previous sections have briefly 
described the MRC’s historical context it is necessary to also pay close attention to the ways in which 
decision making in the MRC is carried out.  
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Figure 2.3. Governance structure of the MRC (Adapted from MRC, 2018) 
 
Chapter IV of the 1995 Mekong Agreement sets out the institutional framework that establishes 
the MRC (Figure 2.3). The MRC comprises three permanent bodies: The Council, Joint Committee (JC) 
and the MRC Secretariat. The Council is the top decision-making body in the MRC and comprises one 
member from each riparian state at the Ministerial and Cabinet level (no less than Vice-Minister level), 
who would be ‘empowered to make policy decisions on behalf of his/her government’ (MRC, 1995, p. 
6). Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam are currently represented by their respective Ministers of Natural 
Resources and the Environment, while Cambodia is represented by the Minister of Water Resources 
and Meteorology. The ability of these ministers to make policy decisions on behalf of their governments 
is limited, as the ministries they represent tend to be less powerful compared to the key energy, finance 
and planning ministries in their countries that play a role in planning and approving key projects on the 
Mekong River and its tributaries (Boer et al., 2015).  
The second body making up the MRC is the JC, which implements initiatives from the Council 
and also supervises the activities of the MRC Secretariat (Lee & Scurrah, 2009). The JC comprises one 
member from each riparian state at Head of Department Level or higher. These members are currently 
the Secretary-Generals of the Cambodia National Mekong Committee (CNMC) and Lao NMC (LNMC), 
and the Director-Generals of the Vietnam NMC and the Thai Department of Water Resources (DWR), 
under which the Thai NMC (TNMC) Secretariat sits.  Decisions made by the Council and JC should be 
by unanimous vote, unless otherwise provided for in their respective Rules of Procedures. The MRC 
Secretariat is the technical and administrative arm of the MRC, rendering assistance to the Council and 
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JC and carrying out the day-to-day work of the MRC (Boer et al., 2015). The MRC Secretariat 
comprises an administrative division, a planning division, an environment management division, and a 
technical support division. The MRC Secretariat is headed by a Chief Executive Officer (CEO), who is 
appointed by the Council from a shortlist of candidates selected by the JC. One of the key functions of 
the MRC Secretariat has been to run key programmes listed at the beginning of this section.    
The MRC also works closely with actors who are not specifically mentioned in the 1995 
Mekong Agreement. The NMCs serve as a coordinating agency between the MRC and the relevant line 
governmental agencies in their respective countries. The NMCs are serviced by a Secretariat, who, like 
the MRC Secretariat, are the administrative and technical arm that carry out the day-to-day work.  The 
MRC also coordinates with a Donor Consultative Group, comprising what the MRC terms as 
‘development partners’ (DP). The work of the MRC Secretariat has largely been funded by these donors, 
comprising agencies who administer official development assistance from the governments of Europe, 
Australia, North America and Japan (Boer et al., 2015), and also international financial institutions or 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). In 2009, donor funding comprised 90 per cent of the MRC’s 
funding (Lee & Scurrah, 2009). However, in 2016 the MRC saw funding from DPs slashed by more 
than half, from US$115 million for 2011-2015 to just US$53 million for 2016-2020, due to perceptions 
of the MRC’s ineffectiveness to resolve pressing issues relating to development along the river (Kossov 
& Lay, 2016). As a result, the MRC reduced its staff numbers by almost 50 percent, delegated functions 
such as water monitoring to member states (ibid.), and downsized the MRC Secretariat from 12 
programmes to four core functions (Gerlak and Haefner, 2017).  
2.5.2. Criticisms of the MRC  
The MRC can be said to have a contested governance mandate to engage in the development 
of the LMB’s water resources on the river’s mainstream, tributaries, and lands (Dore & Lazarus, 2009). 
It has come under much criticism for its ineffectiveness in governing the Mekong River Basin, 
especially in terms of its marginalisation from state decision making processes and resolving disputes 
over hydropower development (see Dore & Lazarus, 2009; Dore & Lebel, 2010; Lee & Scurrah, 2009; 
Suhardiman et al., 2012). Certain tensions have been identified in analyses of the MRC’s 
responsibilities, such the MRC’s neglect of developments on the Mekong River’s tributaries as 
compared to its mainstream and whether it should play the role of a knowledge broker or an investment 
promoter (Molle et al., 2009).  It is worth emphasising that the MRC is characterised by a heterogeneous 
group of actors from different nation-states and levels that participate in its governance arrangements 
(ibid.). The relations between the five parts of the MRC are therefore necessarily underlain by political 
dynamics, with constant negotiation between one another to reach a consensus or position (ibid.). This 
heterogeneity of interests is especially pronounced as national interests have been perceived to trump 
the transboundary river basin interest that the MRC purports to represent.  Due to the ambiguity of the 
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1995 Mekong Agreement as ‘soft’ law (Boer et al., 2015), the role and mandate of the MRC has become 
subject to multiple understandings and interpretations by multiple stakeholders (Lee & Scurrah, 2009).  
While it is acknowledged that the MRC is not 1) a supranational organisation with regulatory 
power, 2) an organisation that can make decisions or intervene in its own right, or 3) one that is directly 
accountable to the broader public, there are still grey areas in which the MRC can exert authority (Lee 
& Scurrah, 2009). These areas relate to the allowable extent of public engagement and accountability, 
its role as a proactive knowledge-based river basin organisation, its responsiveness to knowledge 
requests by the public and its capacity to influence development decisions in the Mekong River Basin 
(ibid.). In the case of the Mekong mainstream dams, Suhardiman et al. (2015) have noted that although 
the MRC operates in a constrained political environment, it has used the SEA as a way of opening up 
political space and discussion on dams to the wider public. The authors argue that the events relating to 
the SEA have demonstrated that scientific assessments can shape multi-level governance alliances, and 
to some degree democratise decision making processes. This politics of the technical will be further 
discussed in Chapter 6. It is also necessary to acknowledge how the MRC as an institution plays a key 
role in influencing the nature of water governance in the Mekong Region, through shaping powerful 
discursive imaginations of the Mekong River and interactions between state and nonstate actors (see 
Chapter 3, Section 3.2 for discussions on environmental governance and political ecology relating to 
the Mekong River). 
2.5.3. The PNPCA and Prior Consultation 
Article 5 of the 1995 Mekong Agreement emphasises the principle of ‘reasonable and equitable’ 
utilisation, and is supplemented by five procedures developed under the MRC’s Water Utilisation 
Programme which ran from 2000 to 2008. The set of five procedures for water utilisation in the LMB 
are: The Procedures for Data and Information Exchange and Sharing, the Procedures for Water Use 
Monitoring, the PNPCA, the Procedures for Maintenance of Flows on the Mainstream, and the 
Procedures of Water Quality. The PNPCA in particular has become one of the key arenas in which 
mainstream hydropower dam construction has been contested, as the proposed mainstream dam projects 
have to be submitted under Prior Consultation (Middleton & Pritchard, 2016). The PNPCA was adopted 
in November 2003 and sets out three processes (Notification, Prior Consultation, or Specific Agreement) 
that MRC member countries have to undertake for proposed development projects depending on the 
type of river (mainstream or tributary), the season (dry or wet), and the scope of water use (inter-basin 
or intra-basin) (MRC, 2016a) (see Table 2.2).  
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Table 2.2. Determining factors and corresponding processes under the PNPCA (adapted from MRC, 2016a)  
 
There are only two fields in which Prior Consultation is carried out: 1) mainstream development 
projects that would involve intra-basin use during the dry season and 2) inter-basin use during the wet 
season. While hydropower dams constructed on the river’s tributaries would only require the proposing 
member country to notify the MRC and member countries of the project’s details before commencing 
its proposed use, mainstream dams come under Prior Consultation, which refers to: 
…timely notification plus additional data and information to the 
Joint Committee… that would allow the other member riparians 
to discuss and evaluate the impact of the proposed used upon 
their uses of water and any other affects, which is the basis for 
arriving at an agreement. Prior consultation is neither a right to 
veto the use nor unilateral right to use water by any riparian 
without taking into account other riparians’ rights’ (MRC, 1995, 
p. 3, emphasis added).  
Prior Consultation is a six-month process of formal consultations and technical evaluation, 
‘where notified member states have an opportunity to assess any potential transboundary impact on eco-
systems and livelihoods, and to recommend measures to address those issues before water is used’ 
(MRC, 2016a, p. 3). The role of the MRC, as an intergovernmental advisory body, is to ‘advise on the 
project proposal’s risks and opportunities and to facilitate common views for basin development that 
minimise any adverse impacts and scope for conflict’ (MRC, n.d.c). Prior Consultation comprises three 
main parts: 1) submission of documents, 2) evaluation and reply to proposed use, and 3) a decision by 
the MRC JC. The submission of documents includes a summary of impact assessment documents and 
‘additional available technical data [emphasis added]’ that will enable the other member states to 
evaluate the project and reply to the proposing country. This is meant to be a ‘timely submission’ by 
the proposing NMC, carried out ‘at least 6 months prior to commencement of project implementation’ 
(MRC, 2005a, p. 5). The MRC Secretariat is then responsible for checking the documents for 
completeness, and then circulating the documents to the MRC JC and the other NMCs (MRC, 2003b). 
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In the evaluation phase, the MRC Secretariat plays a key technical role as its responsibilities include 
having to ‘review, analyse and provide technical advice to the MRC JC’ and to ‘provide available 
technical support for evaluation’ (MRC, 2003b, p. 8). Once member states have evaluated the proposed 
use, they are to relay their concerns to the MRC JC through a reply form.  
One of the major outcomes of Prior Consultation for the Xayaburi, Don Sahong, and Pak Beng 
dams has been a technical review of the proposed projects. The technical review sets out to ‘determine 
compliance with the MRC procedures on flow regime and water quality, assesses any possible impact 
on environment and livelihoods, and suggests measures to address those concerns’ (MRC, 2016a, p. 4). 
This is done through a series of working groups. First, the MRC JC sets up a PNPCA Joint Committee 
Working Group (JCWG) that comprises up to four representatives from their respective countries, and  
functions as an advisory body that ‘will meet to guide the [MRC] Secretariat in facilitating the process 
and discuss emerging issues’ (MRC, n.d.d). An MRC Secretariat PNPCA Task Group (TG) is set up to 
assist the JCWG and is the technical body that is mainly responsible for the technical review. Its main 
task being to ‘synthesise the results of their analysis and assessment for reporting to the PNPCW JCWG, 
and the Joint Committee for consideration’ (ibid.). The MRC Secretariat TG is supported by Sector 
Expert Groups that cover topics requiring expert and special consideration such as fisheries and 
sediments, and comprise senior international experts and regional specialists (ibid.).  
It is necessary to highlight that the PNPCA is not a stand-alone procedure in the evaluation of 
Mekong mainstream hydropower projects. It must be considered in relation to the other MRC 
procedures, and governance arrangements and dynamics discussed in Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2. The 
PNPCA is driven by multiple groups of stakeholders not only within the MRC, but also by member 
state governments and international donors. It should also be emphasised that the PNPCA is strongly 
interlinked with the SEA (introduced in Section 2.4). The SEA, as a cumulative impact study of all the 
planned mainstream hydropower dams, was designed to provide input to the PNPCA by serving two 
main purposes: 1) to overcome the weakness of the PNPCA, which would have only studied mainstream 
dams on a project-by-project basis without reference to their cumulative impacts, and 2) to not only 
encourage member states to comply with the PNPCA while they planned dam construction, but to 
reinforce the MRC’s power and legitimacy to ensure that member states did so (Suhardiman et al., 
2015). Intentionally released as a consultant report (ibid.), the SEA was never formally adopted by the 
MRC – while Vietnam and Cambodia welcomed the SEA’s recommendations, Laos did not (Carew-
Reid, 2016). This is an important development to note as it reflects the Lao government’s resistance 
towards the SEA’s recommendation to postpone mainstream dam development, which would be 
reflected in their attitudes and actions towards the PNPCA.   
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2.5.4. Prior Consultation: Xayaburi Dam  
The Xayaburi Dam is located 150 km downstream from Luang Prabang (see Figure 2.2) and 
will have an installed capacity of 1,285 MW; the dam will be 32 metres high and 820 metres long 
(ICEM, 2010; MRC Secretariat, 2011). The $3.5 billion dam is being constructed with significant Thai 
involvement. It is financed by six Thai banks 3 , developed by Thai construction company CH. 
Karnchang, and 95 percent of the electricity generated from the dam will be sold to Thai state utility 
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) (International Rivers, n.d.). Being the first 
mainstream dam to undergo Prior Consultation and be constructed on the Mekong River, the Xayaburi 
Dam was fiercely debated and contested by multiple stakeholders, and perceived as a potential trigger 
of a domino effect that would lead to the construction of other mainstream dams in the LMB (Osborne, 
2013). Prior Consultation was initiated for the first time on 20 September 2010 when the LNMC 
submitted the project documents to the MRC Secretariat (Rieu-Clarke, 2015), and officially began on 
22 October 2010 (MRC, n.d.e). The MRC Secretariat’s technical review of the key project documents, 
which was released on 24 March 2011, noted that there were many areas of uncertainty relating to the 
dam’s transboundary impacts and the required mitigation measures, and also identified negative impacts 
to fish migration and hydrology (MRC Secretariat, 2011).  
At the special MRC JC meeting that took place on 19 April 2011, Laos insisted that the concerns 
raised would be taken into consideration and that Prior Consultation should be over, while Thailand, 
Cambodia, and Vietnam suggested that further impact assessments and wider consultations should be 
carried out (Rieu-Clarke, 2015; Yasuda, 2015). The final decision was to defer and elevate the decision 
on the Xayaburi Dam to the ministerial level (International Rivers, 2011a) of the MRC Council. At the 
MRC Council meeting held in December 2011, the four ministers were still unable to reach a 
compromise and a decision was made to commission a study to further investigate the sustainable 
development and management of the Mekong River, which would include the impact of mainstream 
hydropower dam projects (MRC, 2011a)4. However, Laos proceeded with construction on the Xayaburi 
Dam despite disagreements that continued to resurface with MRC member countries such as Cambodia 
(Rieu-Clarke, 2015), and eventually held a ground breaking ceremony for the dam in November 2012 
(Chenaphun, 2012). (See Appendix A for a timeline of the Xayaburi Dam.) 
 
 
                                                          
3 Siam Commercial Bank, Kasikorn Bank, Bangkok Bank, Krung Thai Bank, TISCO and the Export-Import 
Bank of Thailand. 
4 This study, known as the MRC Council Study, was only completed in December 2017 – half a year after the 
Pak Beng PNPCA had concluded. See http://www.mrcmekong.org/highlights/the-study-on-sustainable-
management-and-development-of-the-mekong-river-including-impacts-of-mainstream-hydropower-projects/ .  
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2.5.5. Prior Consultation: Don Sahong Dam 
The Don Sahong Dam is currently under construction in Siphandon in Southern Laos (see 
Figure 2.2) and built across the Hou Sahong channel, one of the more than 10 rocky channels that the 
Mekong mainstream is split into in that section of the river, which is the only channel through which 
fish can easily pass through all year round, including the dry season (Baird, 2011). It will have an 
installed capacity of 260 MW and be 25 metres in height (Don Sahong Power Company Ltd, 2019). It 
is located less than two kilometres upstream from the Lao-Cambodia border, and in close proximity to 
Cambodia’s Stung Treng Ramsar site5 (International Rivers, 2015). The Don Sahong Dam is developed 
by Malaysian company Mega First Corporation Berhad (MFCB) and the power generated will be mostly 
headed to Thailand (ICEM, 2010). MFCB disputed Baird’s finding that the Hou Sahong channel was 
the only channel through which fish could easily migrate all year round and planned to develop 
surrounding channels to further facilitate fish migration (Barron, 2013a). The Lao government initially 
submitted the project documents in September 2013 under the PNPCA process of Notification (MRC, 
n.d.f), based on the justification that the Don Sahong Dam was situated in one of the many channels of 
the Mekong River and does not block the entire river mainstream (Boer et al., 2015). However, Laos 
came under pressure from the remaining MRC states to submit the project under Prior Consultation 
(Barron, 2013b) and during the MRC Council meeting on 26 June 2014, Laos reluctantly agreed to 
submit the project under Prior Consultation (Boer et al., 2015). While the official start date of Prior 
Consultation was on 25 July 2014, this date was only publicly confirmed almost two months into the 
process, during a meeting of the MRC JC in early October 2014 (International Rivers, 2014a).  
 The path that the Don Sahong PNPCA took was similar to that of the Xayaburi PNPCA. The 
MRC’s technical review of the dam identified ‘significant gaps’ in the project information submitted, 
particularly in relation to the dam’s transboundary impacts (MRC Secretariat, 2015, p. 46), and 
highlighted ambiguity surrounding the proposed mitigation measures (International Rivers, 2016). The 
technical review also made a recommendation to the MRC JC to consider extending the Prior 
Consultation period for additional data to be analysed and to provide opportunity for a further round of 
public consultations (MRC Secretariat, 2015). Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam also recommended in 
their submitted reply forms for an extension of Prior Consultation for further studies to be conducted 
(CNMC, 2015; TNMC, 2015; VNMC, 2015). However, Laos announced that it considered the process 
to be complete (Boer et al., 2015). The issue was once again deferred upwards to the MRC Council 
(ibid.). In early January 2016, the Lao government held a ground breaking ceremony for the Don Sahong 
Dam, following what Vietnamese media Thanh Nien News noted as ‘months of silence’ on the status 
                                                          
5 The Ramsar Convention’s mission relates to the conservation and wise use of wetlands, and Ramsar sites are 
wetlands of international importance. See https://rsis.ramsar.org/ris/999 for information on the Stung Treng 
Ramsar site.  
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of the prior consultation process, and by June 2016 construction had rapidly progressed to the point 
where the Hou Sahong Channel had been completely blocked (Thanh Nien News, 2016). (See Appendix 
B for a timeline of the Don Sahong Dam.) 
2.5.6. Prior Consultation: Pak Beng Dam 
 The Pak Beng Dam is the northernmost dam in the LMB mainstream dam cascade (see Figure 
2.2), and its proposed site is about 174 kilometres upstream from Luang Prabang and 258 kilometres 
upstream from the Xayaburi Dam (MRC Secretariat, 2017a). Construction on the dam has not yet begun 
at the time of writing. The dam will have an installed capacity of 912 MW and will be about 64 metres 
high and 896 metres in length (ibid.). The dam is developed by the Chinese hydropower company 
Datang International Power Generation Co. Ltd., which signed an MoU with the Lao government in 
2007 (International Rivers, 2017c). About 10 percent of the power produced by the dam will be made 
available to Lao state utility Électricité du Laos (EDL) while the remaining 90 percent would be sold 
to Thailand (MRC Secretariat, 2017a), although Thai state utility EGAT announced in mid-February 
2018 that it had delayed a decision to purchase power from the dam until an ongoing review of 
Thailand’s power development plan was complete (Southerland, 2018). The Pak Beng Dam is located 
less than 100 kilometres downstream of the Thai-Lao border, and will have transboundary effects on 
Thailand as its reservoir will extend into Wiang Kaen District in Chiang Rai Province (International 
Rivers, 2017d).  
 The project documents for the Pak Beng Dam were submitted to the MRC Secretariat on 4 
November 2016, and the official start date of Prior Consultation was on 20 December 2016 (MRC, 
2016b). Compared to the Xayaburi and Don Sahong PNPCAs, the Pak Beng PNPCA was relatively 
uncontroversial at the level of state-to-state relations. While the reply forms from Thailand, Cambodia 
and Vietnam all called for more studies to be conducted, they did not carry recommendations for the 
prior consultation process to be extended (CNMC, 2017; TNMC, 2017; VNMC, 2017). After the special 
session of the MRC JC held at the end of the six-month prior consultation period on 19 June 2017, the 
JC released a statement calling on the Lao government to ‘make every effort to address any potential 
adverse transboundary impacts’ of the Pak Beng Dam (MRC Joint Committee, 2017, p. 2). The main 
concerns were listed, the MRC Secretariat was requested to support preparation of a Joint Action Plan 
(JAP) that would outline a post prior consultation process (ibid.).  
2.5.7. Controversies over the PNPCA  
The cases of the Xayaburi and Don Sahong PNPCAs resulted in tensions over the ambiguity of 
the legal status of the PNPCA and its guidelines, which were not ratified at the national level and thus 
were not legally binding as a ‘Treaty’ according to international law (Rieu-Clarke, 2015). The 1995 
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Mekong Agreement and PNPCA fall into the realm of ‘soft’ rather than ‘hard’ law (Boer et al., 2015). 
In contrast to ‘hard’ law where legal norms ‘are relatively clear and binding’, such as in legislation and 
treaties, ‘soft’ law operates in a realm where the obligations imposed through the agreement are weak 
and subject to the discretion of decision-makers, although still exerting ‘quasi-legal force in the sense 
that they shape conduct and induce some “compliance pull”’ (Boer et al., 2015, p. 45). This has 
compromised the ability of the Agreement and PNPCA to be enforced effectively (Armstrong, 2015; 
Bearden, 2010). Prior Consultation for the Xayaburi and Don Sahong dams represented another area 
where the mandate of the MRC has been severely tested, as member countries sought to impose and 
test their interpretations of the PNPCA and the 1995 Mekong Agreement according to their interests.  
Rieu-Clarke (2015) identified several areas of ambiguity and contention in his analysis of the 
Xayaburi PNPCA, although some of these issues also persisted in the Don Sahong and Pak Beng 
PNPCAs. These relate to disagreements over what ‘timely’ notification meant, divergent expectations 
around the collection and exchange of ‘available’ and ‘relevant’ data and the information required to 
evaluate the proposed project, the difficulty of adhering to the six-month timeframe, and the lack of 
recourse following disputes over whether or not Prior Consultation had been concluded. This thesis 
treats the public stakeholder consultation component in the PNPCA as another key area of ambiguity 
and contestation. This section has outlined the key events that have occurred in relation to the Xayaburi, 
Don Sahong and Pak Beng dams to provide the broader context in which the public stakeholder 
consultations were situated in, and Chapters 5,6 and 7 will examine the Thai and Cambodian stakeholder 
consultations in greater detail.  
2.6. Social movements against hydropower development in the Mekong Region  
 The mainstream hydropower dams have been strongly contested by the Save the Mekong (STM) 
Coalition, a transnational activism network that was officially launched in 2009 when plans for the Don 
Sahong Dam were progressing (Yasuda, 2015). The STM Coalition is a regional network of local, 
national, regional and international NGOs, and includes community groups, academics, artists and 
ordinary citizens who share concerns about the future of the Mekong River system (Save the Mekong, 
n.d.). The coalition does not have a formal structure and is informally coordinated by two Bangkok-
based organisations (Yasuda, 2015). The first is the International Rivers, an international NGO 
headquartered in the USA that runs campaigns against large-scale hydropower development around the 
world (see https://www.internationalrivers.org/). The campaign is coordinated by its Southeast Asia 
Program, which has its office in Bangkok. The second is Thai environmental NGO Towards Ecological 
Recovery and Regional Alliance (TERRA) (see http://www.terraper.org/web/en). The STM Coalition 
comprises coalitions of NGOs and local communities from Mekong countries: the Network of Thai 
People in Eight Mekong Provinces (henceforth known as the Thai Mekong People’s Network), the 
Rivers Coalition of Cambodia (RCC), and the Vietnam Rivers Network. The trajectories through which 
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these national-level coalitions have emerged are the result of the different ways in which state-society 
relations had evolved in relation to large-scale development projects and their impacts to the 
environment. This thesis considers social movements against hydropower as a form of public 
participation, and this section discusses such movements in relation to the mainstream hydropower 
dams and also hydropower development in Thailand and Cambodia.  
2.6.1. Contesting the Xayaburi and Don Sahong dams  
 Before, during and after the Xayaburi and Don Sahong PNPCAs, the STM Coalition utilised a 
variety of strategies targeted at a range of stakeholders, especially regional decision makers, national 
decision makers, stakeholders in affected areas, and the general public (Yasuda, 2015). These included 
letter-writing campaigns to decision makers, the holding of workshops and public forums, and 
community awareness-raising events (ibid.). In Thailand, protests were organised by the Thai Mekong 
People’s Network both in Bangkok, outside the headquarters of CH. Karnchang and one of the Thai 
banks financing the Xayaburi Dam (Ganjanakhundee, 2012), and on the Mekong River, notably in Nong 
Khai during the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) that took place in November 2012 on the opposite banks 
of the river in Vientiane, Laos (Herbertson, 2012). In Cambodia, community thumbprint petitions were 
organised against the Xayaburi Dam (Yasuda, 2015) and a wider international petition campaign was 
organised by the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) Cambodia against the Don Sahong Dam (WWF, 
2014). Protests were also held along the Mekong River in Cambodia against the Don Sahong Dam 
(Crothers & Hul, 2014; WWF, 2015). Several international NGOs have also engaged in a science-based 
approach. For example, International Rivers had commissioned independent technical reviews that 
critiqued the EIAs for the Xayaburi, Don Sahong and Pak Beng dams (International Rivers, 2011b, 
2014b, 2017e), and the WorldFish Centre and the WWF contributed scientific studies on the Don 
Sahong Dam (Yong & Grundy-Warr, 2012).  
Another important strategy that has emerged from civil society has been the use of legal and 
complaint mechanisms to target the myriad proponents of mainstream dam development. In Thailand, 
Thai villagers filed a landmark lawsuit against the Thai government in August 2012 to challenge the 
government’s extra-territorial obligations relating to the Xayaburi Dam (Middleton & Pritchard, 2016), 
and once again in June 2017 over the poor quality of public consultation carried out for the Pak Beng 
Dam (Rujivanarom, 2017a). A complaint was also submitted by EarthRights International (ERI) and 
other members of the STM Coalition under the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises mediation process, against the Austrian 
manufacturer of the Xayaburi Dam’s turbines, which had denied negative impacts of the dam despite 
the existence of scientific data stating the contrary (Kinna, 2017). For the Don Sahong Dam, a complaint 
was filed against the dam’s Malaysian project developer MFCB through the Human Rights Commission 
of Malaysia (SUHAKAM) in October 2014, alleging that MFCB had done little to understand and 
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minimise the impacts of the dam and had not consulted with affected communities (Community 
Resource Centre et al., 2014). While the STM Coalition ultimately has not been able to stop the Lao 
government from proceeding with the construction of the mainstream dams, they have had some degree 
of success in terms of putting pressure on the Lao government to seriously take action on mitigation, 
and putting pressure on the MRC and NMCs to improve the PNPCA stakeholder consultations.  
2.6.2. History and legacy of contested hydropower in Thailand 
 The development of large water infrastructure projects in Thailand was closely intertwined with 
the establishment of the Mekong Committee, and led by Thai government agencies that play a role in 
the national management of water, such as EGAT and the Royal Irrigation Department (Mirumachi, 
2012). The Thai hydraulic mission of modernisation (Middleton, 2016) was undergirded not just by the 
international and regional drivers for large-scale hydropower development in the region, but also nation-
building imperatives to both bring natural sources and local populations under state control (Mirumachi, 
2012) and to bolster the political and ideological authority of the monarchy (Blake, 2015). The Thai 
government was focused on developing its relatively arid northeast Isan region where agricultural 
productivity lagged behind the central Chao Phraya region, in order to improve food security for a 
growing rural population and to secure the region against the communist insurgency taking place in 
Laos (ibid.). In the 1960s the Thai government undertook extensive water infrastructure planning and 
construction with aid and technical support from US agencies such as USAID, the Bureau of 
Reclamation, and the US-aligned World Bank (Middleton, 2016; Molle et al., 2009).  Large dams in 
Thailand were mixed use dams that were constructed primarily for hydropower generation, and then 
irrigation as a secondary concern (Middleton, 2016). 
While the growth of NGOs and increasing public space to engage state decision making took 
place in the 1970s (Foran & Manorom, 2009), it was in the late 1980s that civil society in Thailand 
started voicing concerns over environmental issues, contributing towards a climate of increasing public 
opposition towards damaging environmental projects (Mirumachi, 2012). Growing economic 
disparities between urban and rural areas, environmental degradation and conflict over natural resources 
that came with Thailand’s economic boom, and the concurrent changes in NGO compositions gave rise 
to a dramatic increase in environmental protests and mass mobilisations (Phatharathananunth, 2006). 
The grand vision of successive Thai governments to irrigate Isan through medium- and large-scale dam 
and diversion schemes were exemplified in the ‘Green Isan’ project initiated in 1987 and the Khong-
Chi-Mun water diversion project approved in 1989 (Missingham, 2003). The central role of rural people 
in political activism and protests during the 1990s was unprecedented in Thai history and could be seen 
as a result of three intersecting trends: a rural crisis resulting from uneven economic development, the 
long history of rural struggle and opposition, and middle-class activism pushing for social and political 
reform against elite power (ibid.). The Thai government’s developmentalist visions involving large 
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water infrastructural projects became a source of heated contestation, and Isan would become a focal 
point for several large-scale and successful protests against dam development in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Mirumachi, 2012).   
This had implications for Thailand’s dam-building programme, which would go on to face 
strong challenges from civil society (Middleton, 2016). The first publicised dispute and successful 
opposition to a large dam in Thailand was over the Nam Choan Project that was proposed in 1982 by 
EGAT, which would have flooded part of a wildlife sanctuary in Kanchanaburi Province, northwest of 
Bangkok (Foran & Manorom, 2009). The dam project was eventually shelved by the government in 
1988 due to civil society’s success in applying pressure to the central government. The Nam Choan 
Dam campaign was coordinated by Thai NGO Project for Ecological Recovery, which was established 
in 1986 and would go on to play a key role in the campaign against the Pak Mun Dam in Ubon 
Ratchathani Province (see Figure 2.2) (Foran & Manorom, 2009). Its sister organisation TERRA was 
established in 1991. The Nam Choan Dam campaign was deemed as a watershed in Thai environmental 
politics that encouraged resistance to other dam projects and increased the legitimacy of environmental 
discourses mobilised in opposition to state development projects (Missingham, 2003).  
The Assembly of the Poor (AOP) was established amidst this political climate in 1995, 
comprising a loosely structured network that provided villagers’ organisations country-wide with a 
platform to exchange information and resources, and to leverage on their collective bargaining power 
as part of a larger umbrella organisation (Missingham, 2003). The long-standing contestation around 
the Pak Mun Dam was one of the core movements within the AOP. The 136 MW dam is situated on 
the Mun River and located 5.5 km upstream of the confluence between the Mun and Mekong rivers. 
The state’s determination to proceed with the Pak Mun Dam in 1989 has been interpreted by some as a 
reaction to the setback experienced by EGAT with the Nam Choan case (Foran & Manorom, 2009). 
The dam was built primarily for power generation rather than as a development project for local 
communities or Isan (TDRI, 2000). The Pak Mun Dam was selected as one of the eight in-depth studies 
carried out by the WCD, which was part of a multi-stakeholder process that would attempt to undertake 
participatory studies relating to the performance of large dams worldwide (Foran & Manorom, 2009). 
The study found that the dam caused 1,700 households to be resettled, at least 6,200 households to 
suffer loss of livelihoods, a 44 percent loss in pre-dam fish biodiversity, and up to an 80 percent drop 
in fishery yields upstream of the dam (Middleton, 2012).  
The movement against the Pak Mun Dam took place over the course of more than two decades 
and successive Thai governments. Protests were carried out through occupying the dam site, extended 
rallies in Bangkok and encampments outside government houses (Middleton, 2012). Such mass 
mobilisation posed direct challenges towards EGAT and state agencies. Apart from demonstrations, the 
campaign also engaged in a politics of knowledge. The WCD study was carried out a time when 
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Thailand had limited experience with ‘formalised knowledge-building multi-stakeholder processes’ 
(Foran & Manorom, 2009, p. 67). Its criticism of the EIA, resettlement and consultations processes and 
the overestimation of the dam’s economic and power benefits were contested by EGAT and the World 
Bank (ibid.). Thai villager-led research, known as Thai Baan Research, was carried out for the first time 
in Thailand in tandem with Thai NGO Living River Siam (the then-Southeast Asia River Network) and 
Thai academics, and would later be replicated in other parts of Thailand and Cambodia (Käkönen & 
Hirsch, 2009). Despite some incidents of government repression, violent confrontation, and the 
continued operation of the dam, the social movement secured concessions from state agencies such as 
the opening of the dam gates from 2001 to 2002, and the Thaksin government’s decision to keep the 
gates open four months a year (Middleton, 2012).  
Overall, this legacy of the Pak Mun Dam played a significant role in restructuring Thai state-
society relationships and in influencing the current trajectory of hydropower development not just in 
Thailand, but in the region (Middleton, 2012). Faced with opposition to large domestic hydropower 
projects, the Thai government has invested in power projects in neighbouring Laos and Myanmar where 
there has been less political space for opposition to such projects (ibid.). The movement helped to 
socialise Thai society to tolerate and participate in street demonstrations, opened up new spaces for 
deliberative politics, such as the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) set up under the 1997 
Constitution, and helped civil society to mobilise in multi-scalar coalitions, re-politicise knowledge and 
capture public arenas of deliberations (Foran & Manorom, 2009). However, there has also been a 
polarisation of debate and distrust between the state and civil society (Molle et al., 2009). Because of 
the international prominence of the Pak Mun Dam case, advocates not just in Thailand, have learned to 
question all project studies from the start, including the project’s feasibility (Foran & Manorom, 2009). 
This legacy can be seen from the STM Coalition’s strategy of delegitimising dam project EIAs 
mentioned in Section 2.6.1. It is also worth mentioning that the WCD’s legacy in terms of promoting a 
participatory and process-oriented agenda has also been reflected in MRC initiatives such as the SEA 
and its Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Forum (Hirsch, 2010).    
 Although the Thai government no longer builds large-scale hydropower dams in Thailand, there 
is still strong civil society opposition towards the LMB mainstream dams. The environmental 
movement against the LMB mainstream dams today comprises of several key organisations. While 
TERRA informally coordinates the STM Coalition, the Mekong Community Institute (formerly Living 
River Siam) coordinates and supports the Thai civil society network comprising local NGOs and 
communities. The Thai Mekong People’s Network is the umbrella network comprising two major 
groups: first the Rak Chiang Khong environmental group based in Chiang Khong, Chiang Rai Province 
in northern Thailand, which arose in opposition to a China-led navigation project to blast ecologically 
and culturally significant rapids in the area, and a network that covers the seven Mekong provinces in 
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Isan. As the rest of the thesis will show, these groups would come to play prominent roles in opposing 
mainstream hydropower development in the LMB.  
2.6.3. History and legacy of contested hydropower in Cambodia  
 While the prior section has noted that hydropower development in Thailand has been driven by 
national security, nation-building and irrigation, hydropower development in Cambodia has been driven 
by a desire for cheap electricity to sustain its economic growth and to improve the country’s energy 
security (Weatherby & Eyler, 2017). Because of political instability beginning with the Khmer Rouge 
period (1975-1979) and later, problematic governance and transparency issues, the development of 
Cambodia’s power sector had been held back (ibid.). Only about 58 percent of Cambodia’s population 
has secure access to electricity, and electricity prices in Cambodia are among the region’s highest due 
to a high reliance on imported diesel fuel (ibid). In order to improve reliable access to electricity and to 
bring down electricity prices, the development of the energy sector and hydropower has been a key 
priority for the Cambodian government (Grimsditch, 2012). A 2003 National Sector Review for 
Hydropower estimated that Cambodia holds a hydropower potential of 10,000 MW, of which 50 percent 
is from the mainstream of the Mekong River, 40 percent on its tributaries and 10 percent in southwestern 
Cambodia (Beck, 2014).   
Hydropower development in Cambodia has taken place within the new regional political 
economy where private financing was more readily available. China has been a key player in 
Cambodia’s hydropower development, with its investments in hydropower reaching US$2.4 billion in 
2016 (Pheakdey, 2017). The Cambodian government has welcomed China’s ‘unconditional’ 
development assistance and investments that provide a preferable alternative to Western aid and 
assistance, which often come with conditions that have become increasingly frustrating for the 
Cambodian government (Grimsditch, 2012), especially in relation to those concerning social-
environmental standards and safeguards (see Section 2.3.2). The proposed Sambor and Stung Treng 
mainstream dams are also to be developed by Chinese hydropower companies. There has been growing 
concern within civil society about the socioeconomic and environmental impacts of such dam 
development, especially as the Chinese companies are perceived to be exploiting Cambodia’s natural 
resources with little regard for environmental safeguards and human rights (Pheakdey, 2017).  
It was not domestic dam building, but the Yali Falls Dam in Vietnam built on the transboundary 
Sesan tributary that laid the foundations for the present-day Cambodian civil society movement 
opposing hydropower dams. Following the unexpected floods of 2000 in Cambodia’s north-eastern 
Ratanakiri Province caused by the unexpected release of water from the Yali Falls Dam, a loosely bound 
coalition of local community, local NGOs and international NGOs formed the Sesan Working Group 
(SWG) to coordinate investigative work on the local reports of widespread flooding; key international 
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supporters included TERRA and International Rivers (Hirsch & Wyatt, 2004; Yasuda, 2015). The 
formation of the SWG was driven by both the needs of affected communities and interests of external 
partners (Yasuda, 2015). Subsequently, the Sesan Protection Network (SPN) spanning the northeastern 
provinces of Ratanakiri and Stung Treng was set up in December 2001, with the aim to assist with the 
formation of a community network and to build a multi-scalar coalition (Hirsch & Wyatt, 2004). The 
SPN was the first local grassroots civil society group created in response to hydropower dam impacts 
in Cambodia, and played an instrumental role in mobilising grassroots community support for advocacy 
initiatives (Thim, 2013). It was with the establishment of the SPN that the development and 
strengthening of a community network began to gain momentum. (Hirsch & Wyatt, 2004) 
The SPN utilised strategies to influence policy-makers at national and international levels. One 
key strategy was to build the capacity of the local network such that community members could 
understand issues related to hydropower development and represent themselves in negotiations (Hirsch 
& Wyatt, 2004; Thim, 2013). According to Thim’s (2013) account of this issue, the capacity-building 
programme included opportunities for local network members to access training, workshops, study 
tours and meetings that would enhance their ability to advocate and articulate their concerns towards 
government officials and policy makers. The SPN also created spaces for transboundary dialogue 
through organising a national workshop on issues relating to the Sesan River in November 2002, where 
findings of an impact study were discussed and affected communities given the opportunity to voice 
their concerns and suggestions. While the SPN served to create a strong local-level network, it also 
became part of a broader NGO coalition including Phnom Penh-based NGOs: the NGO Forum of 
Cambodia (henceforth known as NGO Forum), which would coordinate advocacy efforts at the national 
level, and the Culture and Environment Preservation Association (CEPA) which supported local-level 
networks in Stung Treng Province.  
The multi-scalar nature of this movement against hydropower reflected the unique 
circumstances under which civil society developed in Cambodia. Unlike Thailand, the emergence of 
Cambodian civil society in the 1990s was driven by international organisations and donors rather than 
attributable to local initiatives or an opening up of democratic space in the country (Öjendal, 2013). The 
‘explosion’ of NGO numbers in the early 1990s stood in contrast to the almost non-existent civil society 
landscape before, and can be contextualised within the country’s path towards political stability during 
the same period that was heavily driven by international intervention, notably the signing of the 1991 
Paris Peace Agreements and then the UN-sponsored elections of 1993 (Ou & Kim, 2013). The early 
2000s saw the growth of community-based organisations (CBOs) such as community fisheries, but 
these were not organic processes of local mobilisation (Öjendal, 2013). In other words, these processes 
were not grounded in local relations and institutions. Rather these foundations of self-mobilisation were 
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introduced through the influence of basic recovery processes in rural areas, growing acceptance of 
participatory political pluralism, and role-modelling by existing NGOs (ibid.). 
The SPN eventually extended its coverage from the Sesan River to include the Srepok and 
Sekong rivers, and was renamed as 3SPN in 2005. Similar to the use of Thai Baan Research in the case 
of the Pak Mun Dam, 3SPN has also promoted community-based research as one way to strengthen 
capacity building efforts among local networks and produce formal documents that could function as 
tools for advocacy, wider dissemination, and empowerment (Thim, 2013). The SWG served as the basis 
for the establishment of the RCC in 2007, an umbrella NGO group created in response to expanding 
efforts to manage hydropower dam development issues country-wide (Thim, 2013; Yasuda, 2015). The 
RCC today includes 3SPN, NGO Forum and CEPA, and other Cambodian NGOs such as the Fisheries 
Action Coalition Team (FACT) that coordinates CBOs around the Tonle Sap Lake, and international 
NGOs Oxfam America and Oxfam Australia (NGO Forum, 2016). The RCC also engages with the 
NGO Forum’s working group on river protection, providing member organisations with multiple 
channels to connect with one another (Wells-Dang, 2013). The RCC has been an active member in the 
STM Coalition and has opposed the mainstream Mekong hydropower dams in Laos, although the stance 
of RCC members towards proposed hydropower dams in Cambodia has generally been more ambiguous 
(Baird, 2016).  
Around the same time that the STM campaign was underway, there was also heated opposition 
to hydropower dam development in Cambodia. The contested dams were the proposed 108 MW Cheay 
Areng Dam in Koh Kong Province, southwestern Cambodia and the 400 MW Lower Sesan 2 (LS2) 
Dam on the Sesan River in Stung Treng Province (Hensengerth, 2017). In particular, there were high 
levels of concern directed towards the LS2 Dam, which would be the largest hydropower project ever 
initiated in Cambodia and estimated to be the single most destructive tributary dam on the Mekong 
River system (Baird, 2016). There were concerns about its effects on the environment and food security 
in Cambodia’s Tonle Sap Lake, and also its transboundary impacts on Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos 
(Baird, 2016; Hensengerth, 2017). Moreover, concern among local communities also stemmed from 
negative experiences with the impacts of the Yali Falls Dam (Baird, 2016). Despite protests carried out 
by local communities and the refusal of 118 households from two affected villages to relocate, the LS2 
Dam was inaugurated in September 2017 (Denton, 2017; Phak & Chen, 2017) and opened in December 
2018 (Soth, 2018). However, it is possible that the combined opposition towards domestic and Lao 
dams led to an announcement by the Minister of Mines and Energy in January 2016 that the Cambodian 
government would not allow the construction of any new dams until 2020 (Chea, 2016).  
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2.7. Conclusion 
 This chapter has largely dealt with 1) the history and political economy in which hydropower 
development had emerged in the LMB, 2) the MRC’s governance arrangements and the PNPCA, and 
3) civil society movements against hydropower development in the Mekong Region. The ecological, 
historical, social, political, and economic contexts underlying the current phase of mainstream dam 
development along the Mekong River cannot be understated, as strands of these varied trajectories 
remain embedded in the debates and politics to come. In considering how mainstream hydropower 
governance and public participation are rendered technical, it is pertinent to consider how the mission 
of the MRC and its predecessors had been driven from the start by engineering perspectives, expertise, 
and goals, laying the ground for the entrenchment and stickiness of technical discourses that form the 
basis of decision-making today. An examination of Prior Consultation, which has taken place for the 
Xayaburi, Don Sahong and Pak Beng dams demonstrates how a technical process is embedded within 
a politics of knowledge and divergent national interests. The thesis’s attention to the rendering technical 
of mainstream hydropower governance and public participation (Chapters 5 and 6) has to be situated 
within this context, and the theoretical foundations of rendering technical will be discussed in Chapter 
3. 
 This chapter has also outlined how hydropower development has been contested by the STM 
Coalition and the historical legacies of hydropower contestation in Thailand and Cambodia, which are 
considered as forms of public participation. The historical circumstances driving hydropower 
development in Thailand and Cambodia have influenced the respective state stances towards 
mainstream hydropower development today and the ways in which they have engaged with civil society 
over these issues, with some degree of congruence across time and space. The unique trajectories 
through which state-civil society relations in each country have developed are also significant, which 
may be situated within the notion of public participation being emergent, co-produced and relational, 
which will be elucidated in Chapter 3. While the STM Coalition operates on a regional level, the 
networks, organisations, and communities within each country also seek to influence decision-making 
at the national level, especially as the impacts of the proposed projects on each country varies. The 
state-civil society dynamics continue to play out as these heterogeneous groups of actors encounter, 
cooperate with, or challenge one another when brought together within the spaces of public participation 
of the PNPCA. These dynamics will be especially pertinent to Chapter 7, which examines how 
alternative participatory spaces emerge outside of the PNPCA when the limitations of the PNPCA 
stakeholder consultations in influencing decision-making come to light.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: RENDERING TECHNICAL, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
AND PERFORMATIVITY 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 This chapter examines three major themes that form the conceptual basis for this thesis. First, 
the concept of rendering technical is introduced. One of its major elements is that of problematisation, 
which is closely linked to the Foucauldian notion of governmentality. Drawing on the work of 
governmentality scholars, the notion of problematisation is used to understand how the LMB and 
mainstream hydropower development have been framed as an intelligible field for intervention. The 
second element, antipolitics, is discussed in relation to other aspects of governmentality including the 
relationship between power and knowledge. Second, this chapter examines the concept of public 
participation, while also identifying some of the assumptions that have been associated with the concept 
when applied in development or environmental governance. This is discussed in relation to the third 
element of rendering technical, the containment of challenges to the status quo. An argument is made 
for a relational, co-produced and emergent understanding of public participation, and its implications 
for understanding public participation in the LMB. Third, the concept of performativity is introduced, 
along with its relevance for furthering an understanding of public participation and rendering technical. 
This chapter also touches on how these concepts are interwoven with geographical concepts relating to 
environmental governance, political ecology, scale, and place.  
3.2. Geographies of governmentality: Rendering technical  
This section draws heavily on the notion of rendering technical introduced in Tania Li's (2007) 
book, which interrogated governmental interventions aimed at improving landscapes and livelihoods in 
Indonesia. Li (2007) identifies two practices necessary in translating this will to improve into explicit 
programmes, the first being problematisation and the second being a practice she calls rendering 
technical. First, Li notes that the two practices of problematisation and rendering technical are not 
mutually exclusive. The practice of problematisation, where ‘the bounding and characterisation of an 
“intelligible field” appropriate for intervention anticipates the kinds of interventions that experts have 
to offer’, and the practice of rendering technical maintains the boundaries between the experts who 
diagnose the problems and those who are subject to receiving the interventions (ibid., p. 7). The second 
dimension has to do with the emergence of an antipolitics, whereby Li (ibid., p. 7) argues that ‘questions 
that are rendered technical are simultaneously rendered nonpolitical’. This is especially so because, she 
argues, some experts tend to frame interventions in technical terms rather than situating issues in their 
wider political-economic contexts. The third dimension that Li (ibid., p. 8) identifies is an extension of 
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antipolitics, as she contends that programmes are designed as ‘deliberate measures to contain a 
challenge to the status quo’. This section pays close attention to the emergence of problematisation and 
antipolitics, while the third element will be further discussed in Section 3.3 in relation to public 
participation.  
3.2.1. Governmentality and an analytics of government  
 Before delving into the notion of problematisation, it is necessary to introduce the notion of 
governmentality on which these concepts are based. The perspective of governmentality involves 
paying attention to the shifting targets of government, as ‘one never governs a state, a territory, or a 
political structure’, but rather people, individuals, or groups (Foucault, 2007, p. 122). Government is 
not defined by adherence to a common good, but rather, has as its objective, a ‘whole series of specific 
finalities’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 95). Government has come to be defined as the conduct of conduct, which 
could be thought of as an activity, or practices, aimed at shaping, guiding, or affecting the behaviours 
or actions of persons (Gordon, 1991). Dean (2010, p. 18) explains that government comprises a plurality 
of agencies and authorities, behaviours to be governed, norms, purposes, and outcomes, and has defined 
government as:  
…any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken 
by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety 
of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape 
conduct by working through the desires, aspirations, interests and 
beliefs of various actors, for definite but shifting ends and with a 
diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and 
outcomes.  
 An analytics of government views government as a heterogeneous field of thought and action 
comprising a plurality of ‘authorities, knowledges, strategies and devices’ (Inda, 2008, p. 7) and 
involves close examination of the conditions through which governmental practices emerge, are 
sustained and transformed (Dean, 2010). These governmental practices may be seen as a regime of 
practices, which are fairly coherent sets of ways of doing things, including institutional practices (Dean, 
2010). As Rose (1999, p. 57) argues, an analytics of government is an empirical project where the aim 
is not to locate an essence of government but to diagnose, isolate, group, and organise the ‘symptoms’ 
of government. This involves the non-hermeneutic analysis of arguments, strategies and tactics on their 
own terms, moving beyond assigning motives, strategies, and interests to actors where they may not 
actually exist, and not essentialising the interests of different groups based on the strategies or tactics 
they employ (ibid). This is especially important for this thesis as the participatory spaces initiated by 
state and nonstate actors may be structured similarly.  
‘How to govern oneself, how to be governed, how to govern others, by whom the people will 
accept being governed’ – these are questions that Foucault posed in relation to governmentality 
(Foucault, 1991, p. 87). An analytics of government prioritises the questions of ‘how’ (Dean, 2010), 
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which may be helpful in disentangling the heterogeneous encounters involved within the complex 
processes of governmentality in the LMB. This involves understanding how particular locales come to 
be endowed with authority, how plural actors are assembled with specific powers, and how differing 
domains are constituted as governable or administrable (Dean, 2010). The spaces of participation that 
have emerged as part of LMB mainstream hydropower governance may function as key arenas in which 
these dynamics of power and government can be observed.  
3.2.2. Problematisation  
Problematisation is a key component of the analytics of government and closely linked to the 
notion of political rationalities. Political rationalities can be conceptualised as ‘intellectual machineries 
that render reality thinkable in such a manner as to make it calculable and governable’ (Inda, 2008, p. 
7). Political rationalities are a problem-oriented field, and Dean (2010) notes that that a key starting 
point in the analytics of government is identifying specific situations where the activity of ‘conduct of 
conduct’ is called into question or becomes a problem; thus a ‘problematisation’. Inda (2008, p. 8) notes 
that government is innately ‘a problematising sphere of activity’, and its practices are directed with the 
goal of articulating the nature of the problems identified and to formulate strategies to resolve them. 
Governmentality is thus concerned with how events, processes, and phenomena come to be framed as 
problems (ibid). Thus, in studying hydropower governance and public participation in the LMB, it will 
be important to understand how both dimensions come to be framed through the political rationalities 
underpinning the governance of a transnational river basin.  
Problematisation is also related to the technologies of government that constitute another key 
component within the analytics of government. This refers to the domain of ‘practical mechanisms, 
devices, calculations, procedures, apparatuses, and documents’ (Inda, 2008, p. 9). Rose (1999, p. 52) 
notes that technology refers to ‘an assembly of forms of knowledge with a variety of mechanical devices 
and an assortment of little techniques oriented to produce certain practical outcomes’, related to the 
shaping of conduct towards the desired ends of government. Inda (2008) identifies two main 
components in the technological domain studied by scholars on governmentality. The first major 
component is that of specific technical instruments: these are mundane, prosaic instruments or tools 
that render things ‘visible’ and into calculable, knowable and programmable forms:  
These are all the mundane tools – surveys, reports, statistical 
methodologies, pamphlets, manuals, architectural plans, 
written reports, drawings, pictures, numbers, bureaucratic 
rules and guidelines, charts, graphs, statistics, and so forth – 
that represent events and phenomena as information, data, 
and knowledge. (Inda, 2008, p. 9) 
The second major concern that Inda (2008) identifies is with the programmatic and problem-oriented 
character of government. Government interventions, such as those Li (2007) is concerned with, are 
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based on the underlying assumption that that issues are ‘amenable to diagnosis, reform, and 
improvement’ (Inda, 2008, p. 10). Governments then devise specific programmes that are constituted 
by practical strategies targeted at reforming reality, pursuing varied but specific aims and reflecting the 
‘eternally optimistic disposition of government’ in its unceasing belief that the effective management 
of reality can always be improved (ibid.).  
 These technologies also enable government at a distance as they travel between different 
contexts and spaces, such as between the micro-spaces of participatory events and broader spaces of 
government. Scholars of governmentality have sought to bridge the gap between micro- and macro-
physical spaces of government by drawing upon actor-network theory (ANT), which highlights the 
plurality of materials, practices and discourses ‘in which power relations are both embedded and 
transported [original emphasis]’ (Murdoch, 2006, p. 58). Both Murdoch (2006) and Rose (1999) 
identify translation as a key mechanism that makes government possible by connecting actors and 
interests, or ‘enrolling’ entities into the actor-network. Translation suggests that the spatial-temporal 
extension of networks is dependent on the ‘interest’ of natural and social actors in a network, and 
translation is successful if an actor is persuaded to ‘identify’ with the network either through consensus 
or coercion (Murdoch, 2006). This is important in order to establish governmental interventions across 
space. Rutland & Aylett (2008, p. 633) argue that ANT provides a complementary toolset to 
governmentality, by uncovering ‘how political priorities and the capacity to achieve them emerge over 
time from the dispersed energies of diverse actants, both human and non-human’, therefore directing 
attention to the socio-material conditions that make environmental governance possible.  
Space is very much implicated within processes of translation as the extension and 
consolidation of these actor networks are dependent on the transformation of spaces, especially in 
establishing relations between a centre of authority and other micro-locales that are enrolled into the 
network (Murdoch, 2006). Material artefacts and technologies play a key role in the consolidation of a 
network, as they become ‘delegates’ within a mutually dependent relationship between the centre and 
enrolled localities (Murdoch, 2006, p. 65). Latour (1986, p. 7) argued that to mobilise the process of 
translation, ‘you have to invent objects which have the properties of being mobile, but also immutable, 
presentable, readable, and combinable with one another [original emphasis]’. Also known as 
immutable mobiles, these delegates carry political rationalities outwards from the centre to the enrolled 
localities, and also in turn carry aspects of these localities inwards such that the centre can then exert 
and maintain control over the network (Latour, 1986; Murdoch, 2006). Technologies of government 
such as documents, for example, are not only critical immutable mobiles that enable the enrolling of 
entities into actor-networks but are also the product of multiple practices (Müller, 2015), and Chapter 
5 will elaborate on how the 1995 Mekong Agreement functions as a key immutable mobile. 
Technologies may also be thought of in terms of boundary objects, which are standardised forms which 
can be abstract or concrete, and are ‘plastic enough to adapt to local needs and constraints of the several 
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parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites’ (Star & 
Griesemer, 1989, p. 393). This will be elaborated on in Chapter 7, in understanding how similar 
participatory formats used by state and nonstate actors can produce very different effects, reflecting 
different problematisations.  
Technologies of government are integral elements for establishing regimes of intelligibility and 
truth (see Section 3.2.3 to follow) in processes of rendering technical. These tangible technologies also 
function as useful empirical tools that can be traced within the complex webs of relationships 
comprising power, knowledge, truth, and multiple participatory spatialities. The governance of the 
LMB and its resources is very much constituted by the technologies, as later chapters in this thesis will 
show – from the 1995 Mekong Agreement and the PNPCA, the technical project documents that 
circulate within hydropower governance, and participatory formats. These technologies of government 
also co-produce the spaces of public participation within the PNPCA, and will thus constitute a key 
diagnostic tool for understanding the regime of practices that render technical hydropower governance 
and public participation in the LMB.  
3.2.3. Antipolitics: creating a regime of truth  
 The second element in rendering technical is the emergence of an antipolitics. The notion of 
antipolitics can be traced to Ferguson’s (1994) influential book The Anti-Politics Machine. Ferguson 
argued that high-profile development projects taking place under the innocuous guise of neutral and 
technical missions may in reality provide a vehicle for politically sensitive operations to establish and 
extend the reach of institutional state power. This illusion of neutrality is created through the worldwide 
uniformity and institutionalisation of development interventions, achieved through the standardisation 
of 1) personnel comprising a relatively small network of development ‘experts’, 2) program elements, 
and 3) state-centred development discourse (ibid.). Ferguson noted that the characteristic of 
governmentality is widespread in such interventions, and observed that the entrenched discourse of 
development allows justification for the state-centred notion that developmental interventions can only 
take place through the agency of state actors and experts. It is in this vein that Li (2007) has theorised 
how rendering technical played a key role in governmental development interventions to ‘improve’ 
landscapes and livelihoods in Indonesia.  
To understand how an antipolitics emerges, it is first necessary to acknowledge that a power-
knowledge nexus is implicated in the act of government. The act of governing necessarily takes place 
within what Rose (1999) calls a particular regime of intelligibility, and an analytics of government is 
concerned with knowledge and regimes of truth. A regime of truth is tied up with the aims and 
aspirations of government (Huxley, 2007). Key in this project is questioning the self-evident nature of 
what comes to count as ‘truth’, and the circulatory nature of power within the regime of truth:  
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It is thus a matter of analysing what counts as truth, who has 
the power to define truth, the role of different authorities of 
truth, and the epistemological, institutional and technical 
conditions for the production and circulation of truths. (Rose, 
1999, p. 30) 
 In the case of Mekong hydropower governance, this thesis argues that it is technical knowledge 
that constitutes the regime of truth established by state actors and mediated through experts of truth 
who legitimise the technical narrative underlying the PNPCA (discussed in Chapter 6). The practices 
of rendering technical take place within these regimes of intelligibility and truth and they become part 
of the political rationalities of government. For example, Rose (1999, p. 231) notes how numbers 
function as an indispensable element within complex technologies of government as governments seek 
to exercise and justify power. It is therefore within the mundane technical practices and knowledge that 
the analytics of government must turn to, in order to destabilise assumptions around the neutrality of 
technical knowledge that have come to dominate Mekong hydropower governance. Paraphrasing 
Rose’s (1993, p. 232) mission to locate a ‘morality of numbers within its own politico-ethical matrix’, 
there is also perhaps a need to locate a ‘morality of the technical’ within the politico-ethical matrix of 
hydropower governance in the LMB.  
The movement against mainstream hydropower development in the LMB may be seen as an 
attempt to challenge state-centred regimes of truth. It is worth reiterating that a regime of truth is not 
only established discursively but also through practices, materials, and technologies. In particular, the 
discussion on technologies of government in Section 3.2.2 above demonstrates that materials and 
technologies can also be political. Barry (2001, p. 9) cautions against a simplistic conflation of 
technology with politics, noting that ‘technical designs and devices are bound up with the constitution 
of the human and the social’. As such, an attempt to challenge a social order is likely to also involve a 
contestation of the development and deployment of technology, technical designs, and practices, which 
may in turn open up new objects and sites of politics (ibid).  
This perspective demonstrates a need to rethink power as a productive rather than repressive 
force, and to refocus attention from the contents of a powerful, centralising discourse to how it functions 
and what its effects are. Foucault cautions against a totalising conceptualisation of power, emphasising 
the productive, circulatory and networked nature of power in which ‘individuals are the vehicles of 
power, not its points of application’ (Foucault, 1980, p. 98). A bottom-up analysis of power is 
emphasised in this approach, paying attention to localised techniques, tactics and mechanisms of power 
and how these trajectories are influenced by wider processes. Such a view will have implications for 
understanding the wider settings in which discourses circulating within participatory spaces gain 
legitimacy and authority. It is therefore important to investigate the techniques of the state that have led 
to a particular regime of truth being established, legitimised, and contested in the field of Mekong 
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hydropower governance, and the productive effects of such a regime on discourses and subject 
formation.  
These concepts raised in relation to governmentality, power, and knowledge should also be 
recognised as some of the key tenets of a political ecology approach. Political ecology is broadly defined 
as the ‘welding together of ecology and political economy’ (Watts & Peet, 2004, p. 7). Poststructuralist 
political ecology has demonstrated a concern with the power-knowledge nexus that underlies unequal 
power relations in contestations over the environment, paying attention to the discourses and practices 
through which nature has been historically produced and known (Escobar, 1996), a politics of 
knowledge examining how scientific and local knowledge are framed in relation to one another (Bryant, 
1998), and how such issues arise from the problematisation of environmental knowledges (Watts & 
Peet, 2004). Political ecology also pays attention to the different meanings of environmental governance 
(see Section 3.2.4 to follow), which incorporates ideas of ‘green governmentality’ based on Rose's 
(1999) notion of ‘governable spaces’ (Watts & Peet, 2004), and the formation of environmental subjects 
and identity through social struggles (Robbins, 2012). Political ecology is also concerned with how 
state, nonstate, and biophysical processes are implicated in the interactions between power, agency and 
a scalar politics (Neumann, 2009). Elements of political ecology have strongly characterised the 
existing literature on water governance in the LMB (see Section 3.2.5), and while this thesis draws upon 
this tradition, it also moves beyond a political ecology approach to study public participation in the 
LMB.  
3.2.4. Possibilities for a counter-politics  
Understanding government through the perspectives discussed thus far reveals the conditions 
for counter-politics to emerge. The attempt to govern through a field of heterogeneity provides 
opportunities for the ‘strategic reversibility’ of power relations relating to the ‘ways in which the terms 
of governmental practice can be turned around into focuses of resistance’ (Gordon, 1991, p. 5). The 
implication of having to govern through Foucault's (1991, p. 95) notion of ‘a whole series of specific 
finalities’, is that these diverse ends may be incompatible, leading to governmental interventions and 
practices that produce tensions or contradictions (Li, 2007). Li (2007, p. 11) notes that this intimate 
linking of opening and closures lends itself towards a situation where governance struggles are 
characterised by what Foucault calls ‘permanent provocation’:  
At the very heart of the power relationship, and constantly 
provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the 
intransigence of freedom. Rather than speaking of an essential 
freedom, it would be better to speak of an ‘agonism’ – of a 
relationship which is at the same time reciprocal incitation and 
struggle; less of a face-to-face confrontation which paralyses 
both sides than a permanent provocation (Foucault, 1983, pp. 
221–222).  
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In thinking about contested hydropower governance in the LMB, it will be important to 
destabilise notions of state power as totalising, instead drawing upon Sharp et al.'s (2000) recognition 
of the entangled spatialities of power, which views power in both its positive and negative dimensions 
that operate within moments of both domination and resistance. This relates to Agnew's (1994) 
conceptualisation of the ‘territorial trap’ which argues against a geographical assumption that a 
territorial state exists prior to, and as a container of society. The dangers of the territorial trap lie in its 
assumption that power is territorialised at the scale of a rigidly-bounded nation-state, thus denying 
power to alternative spatial configurations which involve place-making and spatial interaction (Agnew, 
2010). This perspective is in line with Foucault’s early conceptualisations of governmentality, which 
appeared to emphasise how the exercise of power is not undertaken in relation to territorial boundaries, 
but rather in terms of diverse strategies to govern people and populations (Elden, 2007). This is not to 
say that territorial boundaries no longer matter, but rather that there is a need to develop a more nuanced 
understanding of how power is exercised in relation to space. This would involve drawing upon Elden’s 
(2007) argument that Foucault’s formulations of governmentality extended the notion of territory 
beyond land itself, and brought into being a concept of ‘space’ as a political category subject to multiple 
forms of societal control.    
There is therefore a more fundamental need to employ a dynamic understanding of space 
drawing upon Massey's (1992, p. 81) notion of a ‘power-geometry’, which conceptualises space to be 
created from social relations and ‘by its very nature full of power and symbolism, a complex web of 
relations of domination and subordination, of solidarity and cooperation’. The notion of a permanent 
provocation may therefore be situated within a power-geometry. The tools used in carrying out an 
analytics of government, such as that of problematisation, may also be applied to what I propose may 
be called an analytics of resistance, which draws upon Cresswell's (2000) argument that resistance does 
not occur in opposition to power; rather, the notion of resistance diagnoses the deployment of power. 
These perspectives relating to the entanglements of domination and resistance will resonate throughout 
the thesis, demonstrating how power relations are generated both within and beyond the spaces of public 
participation that emerge through mainstream hydropower governance in the LMB.   
Understanding such complex power dynamics becomes even more important when 
contextualised in environmental governance. The concept of governance draws attention beyond formal 
state institutions and structures, to the ways in which state and non-state actors work together (Goodwin, 
2009) and play a variety of roles (Bulkeley, 2005). These networked interactions of state and nonstate 
actors take place at multiple sites and scales (Himley, 2008), whereby the domination and subjugation 
of particular scales are intrinsic to processes of scaling and rescaling (Bulkeley, 2005). The practices 
emerging through the dynamics of power relationships work to produce spaces of governance (Griffin, 
2012). Environmental governance draws attention to the biophysical properties of ecological systems 
that ‘impinge on and shape the organisational and institutional systems through which they are governed’ 
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(Himley, 2008, p. 440). A relevant example in the context of the Mekong would be to understand how 
Bakker’s (2003) conceptualisation of water, as an ‘uncooperative’ commodity, comes to be governed. 
This interaction of state, nonstate, and nonhuman actors in Mekong hydropower governance will be 
further discussed in the later sections.  
3.2.5 Influence of political ecology scholarship and the LMB  
While this section has discussed a range of concepts, it is largely from the perspective of 
political ecology that contested hydropower development in the Mekong Region has been studied. 
Elements of a critical geopolitical and political ecology approach can be found in the works of Bakker 
(1999) and Sneddon & Fox (2006), which share a common goal of de-naturalising the ecological and 
political boundaries through which the Mekong River Basin has been problematised as a watershed. 
Bakker (1999) demonstrates how the Mekong River Basin has been discursively framed through 
powerful discourses of development that legitimate resource exploitation along the river. Sneddon & 
Fox (2006) similarly advocate for a ‘critical hydropolitics’ that considers how the Mekong River Basin 
is discursively carved out by powerful actors through strategies such as the 1995 Mekong Agreement, 
the ecological ramifications of a discursively simplified river basin, and alternative imaginings of the 
river basin that may emerge from nonstate actors and the river itself. More recently, Hirsch (2016) has 
argued that shifting regional geopolitics have contributed towards a resurgence of mainstream 
hydropower along the Mekong River, which was met with responses that elaborated on the need to 
understand China as a multiplicity of entities (Ptak, 2017), the importance of re-centring local struggles 
and voices (Dean, 2017), a consideration of the biophysical and ecological elements embedded within 
the geopolitics of hydropower development (Grundy-Warr, 2017), and China’s multifaceted 
relationships with Cambodia and Vietnam that involve differing geopolitical attitudes, ethnic Chinese 
populations and national identities (Sithirith & Gillen, 2017).  
 Another major theme in the Mekong literature relates to how issues of scale and power are 
inextricably linked to environmental conflict and transboundary water governance in the Mekong River 
Basin. Hydropower development in the Mekong Region has always involved actors from the levels of 
the community to the international, and a critical hydropolitics demonstrated how the discursive 
simplification of the natural environment ‘both generates and sustains the power of states to carve out 
and favour certain political scales’, that ‘ultimately confers benefits upon specific kinds of transnational 
and national actors’ (Sneddon & Fox, 2006, p. 192). The power relations underlying the contradictions 
and reconfiguration of scale has been studied in the context of Isan through examining the scalar effects 
of water infrastructure projects in the Nam Phong and Khong-Chi-Mun river basins (Sneddon, 2002, 
2003). This has triggered the ‘scaling-up’ of civil society responses to contest hydropower dam projects 
such as the Pak Mun, Rasi Salai and Yali Falls dams in terms of targeting dam proponents at the national, 
regional, and international levels (Glassman, 2001; Hirsch, 2001; Hirsch & Wyatt, 2004; Sneddon, 
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2003). The scalar challenges and issues associated with the governance of the Mekong River Basin 
have also been studied in relation to a politics of scale, position and place (Lebel et al., 2005), 
deliberative forms and engagement between different scales and levels (Dore & Lebel, 2010), and a 
scalar disconnect between national and regional levels in relation to the MRC (Suhardiman et al., 2012).  
  A common thread that binds these themes together is the construction of powerful discourses 
that have created particular imaginaries and scales through which the resources of the Mekong River 
are perceived, exploited, and legitimated. Implicit within the power of such discursive-material 
framings is the power-knowledge nexus. This politics of knowledge has been examined in relation to a 
politics of legitimacy, and the process of rendering technical has been studied especially in terms of 
how scientific knowledge has come to dominate processes of decision-making. The hydrological 
models of the MRC have been shown to create an ‘anti-politics’ of knowledge production that obscure 
the politics behind decision-making and exclude more participatory forms of knowledge production 
taking place at the local level (Käkönen & Hirsch, 2009). Such a selective isolation of knowledge, for 
example in the case of Mekong fisheries, contributes to the construction of a larger truth regime 
(Goldman, 2005). A diverse range of anti-dam actors also play a key role within such a politics of 
legitimacy and negotiate the power-knowledge nexus produced by producing counter-narratives that 
converge and diverge in a fluid manner (Yong & Grundy-Warr, 2012). All these perspectives set the 
wider context for the ways in which a critical regime of truth emerges in the participatory spaces of the 
LMB.  
 However, in the Mekong literature less attention has been paid to the specific, mundane, 
technical instruments that comprise technologies of government, and their performative dimensions 
(see Section 3.4 on performativity). One exception is Singh’s (2014) ethnographic work on ritual 
governance in Laos, which described in detail how state-sponsored rituals were carried out in tandem 
with, and in contrast to, a village meeting discussing the Nam Theun 2 hydropower project. The spaces 
of public participation that have emerged in relation to the Xayaburi, Don Sahong, and Pak Beng dams 
provide a useful arena to examine how such technologies, including those specific to participation, 
circulate between different actors and sites and constitute a key dimension of their performative 
practices. While elements of governmentality such as discourse, power-knowledge, and 
problematisation have been applied to hydropower governance in the Mekong Region, this has not so 
much been the case for elements of ANT. One example of an application of ANT to the Mekong River 
is in Sneddon's (2003) study of the reconfiguration of scale and power in the Khong-Chi-Mun river 
basin in Isan, Thailand. Sneddon argues that one of the strengths of an actor-network approach lies in 
its inclusion of ecological entities that are key to understanding the relations that contribute towards the 
production of power, and that the approach provides a useful framework that might show how the 
Khong-Chi-Mun project actively recruited and enrolled social entities over a distance.  
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3.3. Public participation  
 The thesis is concerned with how multiple and varied processes of public participation have 
unfolded through mainstream hydropower governance in the LMB. The public participation component 
within Prior Consultation came under fierce criticism from civil society, leading some representatives 
to label the PNPCA as a ‘rubber-stamping’ procedure rather than one that meaningfully incorporates 
input from riverine communities and civil society. This dissatisfaction with the PNPCA stakeholder 
consultations can be contextualised in the ways that mainstream hydropower governance is rendered 
technical through these participatory spaces. This will be explored in detail in Chapters 5 and 6. In this 
context, there is a need to interrogate the normative and conceptual underpinnings of public 
participation in relation to environmental governance and development, which is often assumed to be a 
positive phenomenon. However, public participation is a contested concept in practice, not just in its 
procedural but also its substantive forms. It is through understanding the conceptual framing 
underpinning public participation that its incompatibilities with grounded political realities becomes 
especially apparent.  
3.3.1. Critical perspectives on public participation 
The idea of citizen participation is a little like eating spinach: 
no one is against it in principle because it is good for you. 
(Arnstein, 1969, p. 216) 
 The shifting relations between state and nonstate actors in environmental governance have laid 
the ground for a ‘participative turn’ to take place in environmental governance where a wider range of 
‘publics’ exert an influence on decision making (Bulkeley & Mol, 2003). Participation has been 
described as a ‘mantra’ in environmental governance, reinforced by international legal frameworks such 
as the Aarhus Convention (Wesselink et al., 2011). While drawing upon the literature on public 
participation and environmental governance, this section also examines public participation in 
development discourse and practice. The World Bank defined participation as ‘a process through which 
stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources 
which affect them’ (Berry & Mollard, 2010, p. xx). Hickey & Kothari (2009) explain that the 
mainstreaming of participatory approaches took place in the 1980s and 1990s within the aid industry, 
with the dominant understanding of participation within a specific set of interventions such as projects. 
This approach ostensibly aimed to re-centre socially and economically marginal people within the 
projects of development and is also associated with a re-centring of local knowledge that would check 
the supremacy of expert knowledge (ibid.). Participatory development would therefore deliver benefits 
such as better-informed analyses, a higher sense of commitment among all parties involved, the 
empowerment of marginalised people as they develop a self-awareness of their position within power 
dynamics, and the production of more ‘truthful’ information and knowledge (ibid.).  
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 However, there is vagueness around what exactly ‘participation’ means to different actors 
(Cornwall, 2008). ‘Participation’, as a ‘buzzword’ in development discourse that can be simultaneously 
aspirational yet ambiguous, risks being appropriated by powerful actors (Cornwall, 2007). In one of the 
earliest and most well-known typologies of participation developed by Arnstein (1969), participation is 
conceptualised as a ‘ladder’ that represents a spectrum with non-participation at one end, degrees of 
tokenism in the middle, and degrees of citizen power at the other end. As such, participation may 
function as an empty ritual rather than a redistribution of power that would have a real impact on the 
outcome of issues (ibid). Pretty's (1995) typology of participation similarly lays out a spectrum from 
manipulative participation to self-mobilisation, while White's (1996) framework disaggregates 
participation by their forms (from nominal to transformative), interests, and functions. Cornwall (2008) 
notes that these typologies are implicitly normative as they identify progression towards more ‘genuine’ 
participatory forms, but also cautions that when contextualised in practice, these participatory forms 
become more ambiguous and the boundaries between each participatory ‘type’ may become indistinct. 
Nonetheless, these typologies serve to question the often unchallenged assumptions tied to participatory 
development, which Cleaver (1999) identifies as: 1) participation is inherently good; 2) the success of 
such approaches would depend on ‘getting the techniques right’; and 3) any consideration of power and 
politics was divisive and should therefore be avoided. 
3.3.2. Rendering participation technical: containing challenges to the status quo  
 This section delves into the third element of rendering technical: the containment of challenges 
to the status quo. This may be seen in criticisms levelled at the mainstreaming of participation, of which 
one particular form focuses primarily on ‘definition differences, debates over the objectives of 
participation and the applicability and appropriateness of the methodologies and techniques’ (Hickey 
& Kothari, 2009, p. 87) and contributes towards what Cleaver (1999, p. 599) calls ‘the tyranny of 
techniques’. Also described as ‘technologised procedures’ by Chilvers & Kearnes (2016a), this 
approach places a focus on the development and standardisation of techniques, instruments or tool-
based procedures which form the basis for ‘best practices’ that may be uncritically applied across 
different contexts. A preoccupation with technologised procedures runs the risk of downplaying, or 
even ignoring power relationships and complexities that perpetuate inequalities and stand in the way of 
enacting meaningful social change (see Braun & Könninger, 2017; Cleaver, 1999; Hickey & Mohan, 
2005).  
 This relates closely to what Cooke & Kothari (2001) have described as the ‘tyranny’ of 
participation, whereby participation may function as an unjust exercise of power that results in political 
co-option. Public participation often forms an appendage to already-institutionalised procedures which 
are ‘too rare, too small, too brief, and too late’, and remains disconnected from exerting any meaningful 
influence on governance processes (Braun & Könninger, 2017, p. 3). Participatory approaches may 
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actually conceal and sustain inequalities and injustices ‘by co-opting and thus reducing potential spaces 
of conflict and dissent’ (Hickey & Kothari, 2009, p. 88). In the context of Southeast Asia, Rodan (2018) 
questions the permissible boundaries of public participation where political regimes do not conform to 
ideals of democracy. In doing so, Rodan seeks to understand the paradox of participation, where more 
public participation often occurs in tandem with lower levels of political contestation, indicating that 
participation may instead function as a strategy to contain political conflict.  
It is important to situate public participation in LMB mainstream hydropower governance in 
this Southeast Asian context, especially in considering how such a context may be (in)compatible with 
the ideals of public participation that have emerged from a Western tradition of deliberative democracy. 
These ideals are characterised by assumptions that disputes may be solved through reasoning and 
mutual respect (Braun & Könninger, 2017), the inclusion of different interests and equality (Michels & 
Graaf, 2010), the existence of unbiased citizens and an exclusion of self-interest (Wehling, 2012), and 
the privileging of consensus in decision making as a desirable outcome (Hickey & Kothari, 2009; Rydin 
& Pennington, 2000). This scrutiny on deliberative participatory approaches has also been seen in the 
emergence of a body of work that has pointed out how public participation has the potential to ‘exclude, 
disempower and oppress’ (Chilvers & Kearnes, 2016a, p. 9): 
Many scholars writing from this standpoint view the rise of 
public participation methods as an extension of modes of 
social control – particularly through the instantiation of 
relatively prescriptive subject positions evident in 
deliberative democratic practice – that maintain a distinction 
between, for example, ‘publics’ and ‘experts’ in ways that 
circumscribe and delimit ‘public input’ to participatory 
processes within technocratic discursive formations… More 
broadly, this work has pointed to the often profoundly anti-
democratic implications of public participation… (ibid.) 
The quote above relates to the elements of rendering technical that were discussed in Section 
3.2, whereby participatory spaces are problematised as ‘governable spaces’ in which a regime of truth 
and desired subjectivities are established through participatory processes. It has also been argued that 
the ideals of deliberative democracy have the potential to serve as a catalyst for reflexive environmental 
governance by managing the tensions that arise within multiple dimensions, including between public 
participation and expertise (Dryzek & Pickering, 2017). This distinction and tension between the public 
and expert will be further discussed in Chapters 6. In the context of water governance in the LMB, it 
will be important to critically examine the normative dimensions of public participation that lend 
legitimacy and moral authority to publics that are based on ideas of consensus (Braun & Schultz, 2010), 
whereby public opinions that support policy-makers are preferred over those of ‘mobilised 
counterpublics’ (Wehling, 2012, p. 46).  
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3.3.3. The relational spaces of public participation  
 This thesis argues for an understanding of public participation as co-produced, relational, and 
emergent, as Chilvers & Kearnes (2016a) have proposed. Framed as ‘ecologies of participation’, publics 
engage in participation through collective participatory practices, forming the foundation for 
understanding how all participatory forms emerge as ‘heterogeneous socio-material collectives 
comprising the mutual interweaving of social, normative, cognitive and material elements’ (Chilvers et 
al., 2018, p. 201). Collective participatory practices are co-produced through three key elements: 1) 
subjects (publics), 2) objects (issues or material devices) and 3) models (political ontologies or formats) 
of participation; these three elements are in turn actively co-produced through collective participatory 
practices (ibid). This perspective emphasises the emergence of participatory practices and experiences 
through contingent and situated pathways, rather than falling into assumptions underlying the notion of 
public participation. This approach seeks to explain how participatory practices and social-political 
orders mutually shape one another in a multiplicity of ways (ibid.).  
The differences between what Chilvers & Kearnes (2016a) call a ‘residual realist’ approach, 
which corresponds to the technologised and procedural approach discussed above in Section 3.3.2, and 
a co-productionist approach, are summarised in Table 3.1. Nonetheless, the boundaries between these 
two approaches may not always be clearly defined. The emergence of a residual realist approach may 
be co-produced, relational and emergent as well. In considering how public participation is rendered 
technical in LMB mainstream hydropower governance, it is also important to understand the procedural 
elements of public participation, what their limitations are, and how they have been challenged. The 
‘tyranny’ of participation cannot be easily erased, but can be contextualised within a relational approach 
that pays attention to the conditions in which such forms of participation arise.  
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Table 3.1. Comparison between the key elements of Chilvers & Kearne’s (2016a) conceptions of residual realist 
and co-produced participation  
 
 For this thesis, a relational understanding of public participation is important for three reasons. 
First, there is a need to contextualise public participation within the wider socio-political and power 
relations that extend beyond the participatory spaces themselves. For example, Wesselink et al. (2011) 
stress the importance of accounting for institutional and political contexts, and Hickey & Mohan (2005) 
argue for a participatory politics of cultural identity, material redistribution and social justice. Braun & 
Könninger (2017, p. 3) note that issues are often framed as risks which are ‘endlessly debated’ while 
shifting the focus away from power and justice, and Oakley (1991) calls for a recognition of the 
powerful, multi-dimensional and anti-participatory forces that stand in the way of an uncritical 
application of the concept of participation. It is clear that public participation needs to be situated in the 
power dynamics between state and nonstate actors that were described in Section 3.2.  
 Second, a relational understanding of public participation is needed to appreciate the 
multiplicity of forms that public participation can take and how they relate to one another. Cornwall 
(2004, 2008) makes a distinction between invited and popular spaces of public participation, stressing 
that both the contrast and relationships between them are important. Invited spaces may be made 
available by governments or civil society and are ‘often structured and owned by those who provide 
them, no matter how participatory they may seek to be’ (Cornwall, 2008, p. 275). Popular spaces are 
arenas that people create for themselves and could take the form of protests or social movements 
(Cornwall, 2004). Compared to invited spaces, popular spaces are often ‘marked less by the 
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considerable differences of status and power’ (Cornwall, 2008, p. 275). Importantly, the boundaries 
between both categories are mutable, as popular spaces may become institutionalised, and invited 
spaces may become sites of dissent (Cornwall, 2004). Similarly, Gaventa (2006) distinguishes between 
1) closed spaces, where decision making takes place behind closed doors, 2) invited spaces, where 
authorities invite others to participate, and 3) claimed spaces that correspond to the notion of popular 
spaces described above. Rodan (2018) has also proposed a modes of participation (MOP) framework 
that distinguishes between not only between sites of participation (akin to invited and popular spaces), 
but also levels of inclusion (individual; collective). This may be applied to the LMB (see Table 3.2). 
While deliberative approaches perhaps do not quite provide the language to capture ‘popular’ spaces of 
participation that may be characterised by dissent, these conceptualisations expand understandings of 
public participation beyond state-sponsored sites.  
 
Table 3.2. MOP framework for the mainstream hydropower governance and the LMB (Adapted from Rodan, 
2018) 
 
This leads to the third reason: a relational understanding of public participation, critically, has 
to be more broadly situated within a relational understanding of space. Massey (2005) argues that the 
notion of global/space is just as concrete as that of the local/place, and calls for a relational 
understanding of how the local and global are mutually constituted:  
One cannot seriously posit space as the outside of place as lived, 
or simply equate ‘the everyday’ with the local. If we really think 
space relationally, then it is the sum of all our connections, and 
in that sense utterly grounded, and those connections may go 
round the world. (Massey, 2005, p. 185) 
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This is a critical perspective to take especially in considering how public participation engages with 
notions of the ‘community’ or the ‘local’. Public participation often assumes a homogeneous notion of 
community that share common interests (Cleaver, 1999; Cooke & Kothari, 2001). This is problematic 
as such simplistic understandings conceal power relations within the ‘community’ and also conceal 
biases in interests and needs based on categories such as age, class, ethnicity, or gender (Cooke & 
Kothari, 2001). In particular, Chapter 7 will draw upon Mohan & Stokke's (2000) interrogation of the 
‘dangers of localism’ in participatory development, and Bosca & Gillespie's (2018) discussion on the 
implications of differentiated constructions of the ‘local’ by different stakeholders. These perspectives 
also engage with a reconceptualisation of ‘scale’ as a category brought into being through practices as 
opposed to a pre-existing entity (Moore, 2008). Such a politics of place that emerges from these 
participatory spaces are also closely intertwined with a scalar politics taking place at multiple levels 
from the local to the international, and this will be explored in Chapters 5 and 7.  
3.3.4. Public participation, water governance and the LMB 
 Studies on water governance in the Mekong Region have always demonstrated a keen awareness 
of the complexities that have arisen from the sheer multitude of multi-scalar stakeholders involved and 
have recognised the multi-scalar sites in which participation intersects with water governance. Dore's 
(2007) work on the potential of multi-stakeholder platforms to facilitate dialogue in the context of water 
governance in the Mekong Region identified four types of governance forums: 1) Track 1 relating to 
formal and informal processes of governments; 2) Track 2 relating to governance processes involving 
the state, donors, and civil society but still led by actors closely aligned with states; 3) Track 3 relating 
to research, dialogue and advocacy efforts led by civil society; and 4) Track 4 comprising civil society 
organisations that support locally-led governance processes. Hirsch (2011b) questions the effectiveness 
of utilising Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) as a participatory governance framework 
in the Mekong Region, suggesting that there is a need to understand participation and IWRM as 
essentially political rather than technical, and that participation and IWRM must incorporate ‘bottom 
up’ approaches that emphasise the perspectives of riverine communities and their lived experiences. 
These perspectives recognise ‘popular’ spaces of participation that emerge as part of civil society or 
community-led initiatives, and all four elements in the MOP framework discussed in the prior subsection. 
Deliberative approaches to water governance have been proposed as a constructive way forward 
in relation to multi-stakeholder engagement in the Mekong Region. Dore & Lebel (2010) acknowledge 
that water governance in the Mekong Region is complicated by a politics of scale, where actors must 
navigate (dis)connections between institutions, ad-hoc arrangements, and issues that take place and 
move between different levels. However, they see deliberative engagement as a potentially helpful way 
to encourage stakeholders to ‘articulate assumptions and reasoning about the different opportunities and 
risks associated with alternative options’, and in the process enabling ‘higher-quality conversations 
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within and across scales and within and between levels’ (Dore & Lebel, 2010, p. 60). Dore (2014, p. 
195) also furthers an agenda for deliberative water governance, which he defines as:  
…constructive engagement in water governance arenas through 
promotion of inclusive, deliberative processes that emphasise 
different perspectives, critical analysis, learning and institution-
building whilst respecting rights, accounting for risks, 
acknowledging responsibilities and fairly distributing rewards. 
This may take place through multi-track arenas that a complex array of stakeholders can engage 
in, and Dore (2014, p. 210) observes that a ‘patchy, systemic deliberative turn’ has been occurring 
within the politics of water governance in the Mekong Region. Dore (ibid.) also noted that such multi-
track pressure, arising from sources such as the MRC-commissioned SEA and civil society engagement, 
have led to more open scrutiny of the LMB mainstream dams. Nonetheless, lying somewhere in between 
perspectives on deliberative participation and Rodan's (2018) perspectives through the MOP framework, 
the literature on participation and water governance in the Mekong Region acknowledges that it is 
unrealistic to expect the ideals of deliberative democracy to be fully taken on in the region. Sneddon & 
Fox (2008) point out that notions of democracy take on particular forms and constructions in specific 
contexts, while Dore & Lebel (2010) recognise that deliberative engagement will be impacted by the 
absence of deliberative norms in the region and put forth a more grounded proposal:  
Deliberative engagement among diverse stakeholders cannot be 
expected to reach consensus or address all the challenges in 
making policy and institutional changes. However, it should at 
least improve mutual understanding among actors, allow 
exploration of alternative options, help define rights, risks, and 
responsibilities, and have some constructive influence on future 
behaviour (Dore & Lebel, 2010, p. 78).  
 Dore (2014) also identifies how deliberative processes that have been inserted into multi-track 
arenas have improved water governance, by recalibrating power imbalances and helping negotiations 
to be more transparent. The intersections between multi-track arenas are shown to influence one another, 
providing a greater range of options through which marginalised people and civil society may be able 
to influence decision-making. On one hand, the literature on the Mekong River Basin recognises that 
participation is conceived, implemented and contested in relation to the contingent political, socio-
ecological and institutional conditions of the Mekong Region (Sneddon & Fox, 2007). There is also a 
recognition that public participation can take on many forms. On the other hand, the literature on 
deliberation in the Mekong Region still retains strands of a residual realist approach, especially in terms 
of viewing participation from the perspective of deliberation, procedural matters, and in terms of 
achieving more inclusion. The Xayaburi PNPCA for example, has largely been analysed through the 
lenses of procedural and legal frameworks (Boer et al., 2015; Gao, 2014; Middleton & Pritchard, 2016; 
Rieu-Clarke, 2015) or deliberative engagement (Dore, 2014). This discussion does not mean to discount 
the value of such studies, which still make very important points about the limitations of such 
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procedures and the need for more meaningful and sustained forms of stakeholder engagement to deliver 
social and environmental justice.  
3.4. Performativity and spaces of public participation   
3.4.1. Performance, performativity and subjectivity 
 The co-productionist approach advocated by Chilvers & Kearnes (2016a, p. 13) is one that aims 
to provide a performative account of participation that highlights the ‘active and contingent processes 
involved in the enactment or performance of participation’. However, there is more that can be done to 
foreground the relational and productive role of space in such a conceptualisation of participation. The 
concept of performativity has been an important one within the field of critical human geography, and 
therefore considering the enactment of public participation through a performative lens provides a key 
opportunity to expand a conceptualisation about the spatialities of public participation. This section 
draws upon the argument of Gregson & Rose (2000, p. 434), who stress that critical human geography 
needs to draw upon the notions of performance and performativity in order to understand the linkages 
between social identities, differences, and power relations, and how they are articulated through space: 
Specifically, our argument is that performance – what 
individual subjects do, say, ‘act out’ – and performativity – 
the citational practices which reproduce and/or subvert 
discourse and which enable and discipline subjects and their 
performances, – are intrinsically connected, through the 
saturation of performers with power. Furthermore, we 
suggest that similar arguments need to be extended to space. 
Space too needs to be thought of as brought into being 
through performances and as a performative articulation of 
power. [Emphasis added]   
 The notion of performativity is inseparable from a consideration of power relations and may 
shed light on how spaces of public participation are entangled with issues of political authority and 
legitimacy. Rose-Redwood & Glass (2014, p. 7) argue for a theory of political performativity that 
‘views sovereignty as a material-discursive effect of reiterative and citational practices that attempt to 
call forth the very political “realities” that they claim to merely describe or represent [emphasis added]’. 
The performative force of authority is therefore not absolute but lies in its continuous reassertion and 
re-enactment (ibid.). Performativity may also be used to consider how particular subjectivities, or the 
conduct of conduct, are demonstrated or produced in participatory spaces. As Rose-Redwood & Glass 
(2014, p. 9) explain, performativity demonstrates how political agency is ‘both produced and 
constrained by social norms’. It is this consideration of the underlying conditions and limitations of 
agency that distinguishes the notion of performativity from that of performance, as the former is not 
reducible to the latter (Butler, 2004). A relational understanding of public participation will consider 
how participatory spaces are constituted by performativity, both in terms of the power relations that 
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underlie the performances in these spaces, and what their performative effects may be in terms of 
enacting and challenging state authority.   
Rose-Redwood & Glass (2014, p. 8) argue that Butler’s notion of performativity ‘opens up the 
radical possibility for political agency by illustrating how social norms can be challenged through 
performative acts of material-discursive rearticulation’, through a disruption of the reiterative processes 
and practices inherent in the exercise of power. This also creates the possibility that such normalising 
practices ‘can indeed be rearticulated and transformed by the very “agency” that such norms have 
produced in the first place’ (ibid., p. 9). Gregson & Rose (2000) point out that Butler conceptualises 
discourses as having both productive and disciplinary effects, and that it is precisely in the iterative 
nature of its productivity that one can find possibilities for disruption. Therefore, a critical account of 
performativity must insist on the possibility of performative slippages occurring within such reiterations 
and re-articulations of performative, citational acts (ibid), although care should be taken not to prioritise 
the discursive realm over the material (Rose-Redwood & Glass, 2014). This relates back to the 
discussion in Section 3.2.4 that emphasises the entanglements of domination and resistance. Paying 
attention to performative slippages within the participatory spaces of the PNPCA will reveal the gaps 
through which state authority may be destabilised and challenged.  
3.4.2. Spatialising performativity and public participation 
 Gregson & Rose (2000, p. 433) demonstrate the need to consider spaces as performative, and 
to make more of the ‘complexity and instability of performances and performed spaces’. In their view, 
space is not merely a container in which performance unfolds:  
These ‘stages’ do not pre-exist their performances, waiting in 
some sense to be mapped out by performances; rather, 
specific performances bring these spaces into being. And, 
since these performances are themselves articulations of 
power, of particular subject positions, then we maintain that 
we need to think of spaces too as performative of power 
relations. (Gregson & Rose, 2000, p. 441) 
This has implications for the way we think about the formation of diverse participatory spaces, 
especially in terms of examining how state authority is constituted through performative practices and 
overcoming assumptions tied to that of the territorial trap (Agnew, 1995; Section 3.2.4). Rose-Redwood 
& Glass (2014, p. 22) argue that ‘it is through the assertions of sovereign power that the structural effect 
of “the state” is performed [original emphasis]’. The notion of performativity destabilises the notion of 
a unitary state, by revealing the ‘the gaps, fissures, and misfiring that rupture the boundaries stabilising 
nation and state as pre-existing, reified things’ (Kaiser, 2014, p. 122). Such a perspective is potentially 
useful even when applied to an analysis of authoritarian states in the Mekong Region (for example, see 
Creak and Barney, 2018 for an analysis on the Lao nation-state’s central state apparatus). Based on the 
discussion in Section 3.2 that pays attention to both the human and nonhuman entities that constitute 
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rendering technical, there is therefore a need to examine how the performative practices of the sovereign 
state are constituted and challenged by technologies of government and the materiality of the Mekong 
River. This will be further discussed in Chapter 6 which pays attention to the performative effects of 
technologies of government and participation, and in Chapter 7, where the nonhuman elements of the 
Mekong River will be shown to be critical entities in bringing participatory spaces into being.  
 Political participation has also been described as a ‘special form of “theatre”’, that comes into 
being through the deployment of very particular instruments and props in specific settings (Marres, 
2012, p. 4). Instances of public participation can therefore be understood as a performance. It is worth 
reiterating that participatory events occupy distinctive spatialities, especially from the perspective of a 
co-productionist approach that considers how these spaces are assembled in contingent and emergent 
ways. This thesis will include an examination of how participatory spaces are constituted by their spatial 
layouts and specific technologies of participation. In particular, attention will be drawn towards the 
productive dimensions of power that are generated from the spatial layouts of micro-spaces (Allen, 
2003), such as Foucault had done in his study of Bentham’s panopticon by providing a diagrammatic 
representation of how power was institutionalised in a particular space (Allen, 2003; Dean, 2010). 
Paying attention to how participatory spaces are constituted by objects (material devices) and models 
(formats) (Chilvers et al., 2018) also provides opportunities to observe how state authority is enacted in 
relation to these distinctive participatory spatialities.  
The performative dimensions of participatory events also reveal how both state and nonstate 
actors establish alliances or challenge one another. These tensions that emerge may represent politically 
productive potentialities. Kaiser (2014) notes that the performative nature of states is made visible 
through events and draws upon the work of Dewsbury (2000) to show that events are immanent to 
performativity. These perspectives demonstrate how socio-spatial norms may be challenged or 
destabilised as ‘performativity remains a situated convergence of human and nonhuman elements and 
force relations through which people, places, and things emerge or become’ Kaiser (2014, p. 123).  
Dewsbury (2000, pp. 475–476) argues that it is within these specific sites of the event where 
performativity reveals the potential for ‘refusal, fracture, and torsion’, and exposes ‘the ruptures, folds, 
fissures, and ephemeral alliances’. This relates to the idea of how reiterative processes hold both the 
potential for the disruption of state authority and the containment of challenges to the status quo, and 
participatory spaces represent an ideal space within which these complex dynamics of performativity 
can be observed. These perspectives will be especially important in discussing how the events of public 
participation in the LMB may serve as sites in which state authority and processes of rendering technical 
can be challenged.  
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3.4.3. Potential of a performative account of participation for the LMB 
A relational and performative account of participation will be able to provide a ‘thicker’ 
description of how the limitations of the PNPCA stakeholder consultations arise and persist, especially 
across successive iterations. A good example of such an account is in Singh's (2009) study of public 
participation and the World Bank-funded Nam Theun 2 Dam in Laos, which draws upon ethnographic 
observations of multi-level stakeholder workshops. Singh pays particular attention to the practices 
emerging from the ground and argues that ‘participation is a negotiated performance whereby 
competing representations emerge through the interaction between village, state and international actors’ 
(ibid., p. 487). In Singh’s (2014) paper on ritual governance (mentioned in Section 3.2.5), the 
performative dimensions of participation are implicit in Singh’s in-depth ethnographic descriptions of 
the grounded, ‘micro’ ritual practices carried out by lower-level government representatives in a Lao 
village, which were also contextualised within authoritarian state governance.  Apart from Singh’s work 
in relation to the Nam Theun 2 Dam, the contested development of the Mekong River has not been 
studied in detail from a performative perspective, although Boer et al., (2015) do make mention of the 
performative dimension of legal action. There is potential to explore contested hydropower 
development and public participation through a performative lens, whether through the calculated 
performances exhibited in protests, or the mundane performances enacted by state actors in the public 
consultations of the PNPCA. The dynamics that are produced through the contingent nature of such 
participatory spaces provide a useful starting point to observe or diagnose how state authority and 
regimes of truth are instituted or contested. Through this perspective, it will also be possible to also 
understand what genuine and meaningful participation may mean to affected communities and civil 
society, beyond the constraints of residual realist frameworks.   
Overall, there is also more room to consider the heterogeneous associations through which 
differentiated state and non-state actors are constituted as subjects. A consideration of the materiality 
of nature has been emphasised in some studies of the Mekong River (see Grundy-Warr et al., 2015; 
Sneddon, 2003, 2007), in the sense that the material biophysical and ecological elements of the Mekong 
River should be considered key drivers in the ways that water governance in the Mekong Region have 
been established and contested. However, as mentioned in Section 3.2.5, less attention has been paid to 
the materiality of other non-natural actors such as the technologies of government. Incorporating these 
elements through the perspective of performativity potentially provides a more robust picture of how 
participatory spaces are brought into being through objects and issues, procedural formats, and 
facilitators. This also provides an opportunity to understand how state and nonstate participatory spaces 
relate to one another. The role of civil society in contesting damaging hydropower projects has been 
studied through perspectives such as an examination of scalar strategies and a politics of legitimacy 
(Yong & Grundy-Warr, 2012), or how advocacy strategies are influenced by regional and national-level 
rules and norms (Yasuda, 2015). However, there is room to examine how a regime of truth is also 
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generated and contested through multiple spaces of public participation. This includes paying attention 
to the agency of various actors and their shifting performativity within different participatory spaces, 
the heterogeneous associations that enable these performances, and the performative slippages through 
which state authority is challenged. Such a perspective has the potential not only to understand how 
participatory processes may be controlled by state actors, but also to develop new ways of understanding 
how meaningful and genuine participation may be conceived of in the LMB.  
3.5. Conclusion  
 This chapter has laid down the conceptual foundations for this thesis. Three major concepts 
were discussed, in relation to rendering technical, public participation, and performativity. Li's (2007) 
notion of rendering technical can be understood through its three elements. The first two elements, 
comprising problematisation and an antipolitics, have been discussed in relation to the concept of 
governmentality. These elements will be integral in this thesis in terms of understanding how 
mainstream hydropower governance and public participation in the LMB have been problematised and 
rendered intelligible as a governable space, and how participatory spaces are constituted by the 
establishment and contestation of a regime of truth characterised by technical knowledge. The contested 
concept of public participation was discussed in its relation to the third dimension of rendering 
technical: the containment of challenges to the status quo. A co-produced, relational, and emergent 
approach towards understanding public participation (Chilvers & Kearnes, 2016a) is instead advocated. 
This perspective opens up avenues for understanding how participatory spaces are situated in wider 
socio-political contexts and how novel forms of participatory spatialities might be articulated in relation 
to state authority. The concept of performativity has been discussed in relation to how participatory 
spaces and subjectivities are produced through the performance of state authority and rendering 
technical, yet also creating openings for state authority to be challenged, although these challenges may 
result in varying degrees of impact. Weaving through these major conceptual themes are also the notions 
of power relations, relational space, and heterogeneous associations.  
This provides a novel approach with which to examine the contingent pathways that have given 
rise to very particular forms and experiences of public participation in relation to the Xayaburi, Don 
Sahong, and Pak Beng dams. The following chapters will discuss how participatory spaces relating to 
the Mekong mainstream dams are politicised spaces. It is through understanding how dynamics and 
tensions differ between multiple sites of participation that a bottom-up understanding of meaningful or 
genuine participation can be constructed, especially as what counts as ‘good’ public participation differs 
from stakeholder to stakeholder. The friction found between these interactions serves as a reminder that 
‘heterogeneous and unequal encounters can lead to new arrangements of culture and power’ (Tsing, 
2005, p. 5), and such a perspective may help to explain how shifts in participatory arrangements occur 
and their implications for broader processes of decision making.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Introduction 
What constitutes ‘the field’ is contentious: Is it merely a 
physical location, conveniently cordoned off from the life of 
the researcher? That conception is insufficient. ‘The “field” 
is not naturalised in terms of “a place” or “a people”; it is 
instead located and defined in terms of specific political 
objectives that (as such) cut across time and space’ [Nast, 
1994:57] (Hyndman, 2001, p. 263) 
 When multi-sited and multi-event fieldwork was conducted for this research, it became 
apparent that the field was much more than just a physical location determined by the researcher. These 
multiple ‘fields’ were infused with differentiated spatial-temporal rhythms, cultures, power relations, 
political objectives, non-human elements, and the situated identities of both the researcher and the 
researched. In this chapter, I will first discuss the key sites and events in which data collection was 
undertaken. This will be followed by the methodological considerations underlying my choice to carry 
out semi-structured interviews, event ethnography, and discourse analysis, and how these methods were 
employed to generate data from the field. The chapter will then conclude with reflections on self-
reflexivity and how my positionality in the field was unavoidably caught up in shifting the power 
dynamics of the field, and the implications of this for situating the knowledge produced in this thesis.   
4.2. Key field sites  
 The main phase of the multi-sited fieldwork took place during January – November 2017, when 
I was based in Bangkok, Thailand, and Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Village-based fieldwork was also 
conducted with the assistance of a translator in a total of four provinces across Thailand and Cambodia, 
for a duration of 1-2 weeks each time:  
1) Chiang Rai Province, Thailand (May 2017) 
2) Nong Khai Province, Thailand (June 2017)  
3) Stung Treng Province, Cambodia (October 2017) 
4) The Tonle Sap Lake in Siem Reap Province, Cambodia (November 2017)  
The sites in Chiang Rai Province (districts of Chiang Saen, Chiang Khong and Wiang Kaen) 
and Stung Treng Province (Preah Rumkel Commune) were selected for their proximity to the Pak Beng 
and the Don Sahong dams respectively (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2). Nong Khai Province and the Tonle 
Sap Lake (Kampong Phluk and Kampong Khleang communes in Siem Reap Province) were selected 
as sites of prominent community activism around mainstream hydropower projects despite being 
located a greater distance away from the mainstream Mekong. I also attended meetings in various 
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locations throughout Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar that related to hydropower development 
along the Mekong River (see Section 4.4.3). In the following sections, I will discuss the key methods 
used for data collection: in-depth semi-structured interviews, participant observation in relation to event 
ethnography, and discourse analysis.   
Figure 4.1. Village-based field sites in Thailand 
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Figure 4.2. Village-based field sites in Cambodia 
4.3. In-depth semi-structured interviews 
The semi-structured interview was one of the key methods used. Interviews have been 
described as conversations with a purpose (Phillips & Johns, 2012; Valentine, 2005) where the 
researcher and interviewee engage in a constructive dialogue. Semi-structured interviews fall in the 
middle of the qualitative interview spectrum, with structured interviews and unstructured interviews on 
either end. While structured interviews utilise a standardised set of questions and unstructured 
interviews are led by the interviewee, semi-structured interviews allow for flexibility while following 
certain predetermined questions and themes (Dunn, 2005). The aim of conducting semi-structured 
interviews was to allow interviewees to construct their own individual accounts of their experiences, 
knowledge and opinions, and the meanings attached to these (see Dunn, 2005; Longhurst, 2003; 
Valentine, 2005). The major strengths of qualitative interviewing include the generation of ‘rich, 
detailed and multi-layered’ accounts, allowing the interviewee to raise unanticipated issues, and 
drawing the researcher’s attention to the issues that interviewees deem relevant (Valentine, 2005, p. 
111). The subjectivity inherent in this approach has the potential to challenge established truth claims 
circulating within a given phenomenon, in this case relating to the regime of truth established through 
public participation and mainstream hydropower governance in the LMB.  
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4.3.1. Utilising the semi-structured interview  
A total of 107 semi-structured interviews were conducted. Four major groups of interviewees 
were identified to gather a range of stakeholder perspectives. The first group comprised key community 
or civil society representatives residing by the Mekong River, although it should be noted that these two 
categories may overlap. In Thailand, interviews were conducted with community members who 
belonged to or were affiliated with the Thai Mekong People’s Network, which is a part of the Save the 
Mekong (STM) Coalition, and community members who were part of a volunteer network working 
with the Thai Department of Water Resources. These community members mostly lived in cities, towns, 
or villages adjacent to the Mekong River. In Cambodia, interviews were conducted with community 
members from Preah Rumkel Commune in Stung Treng Province, including members of its eco-tourism 
committee. Interviewees from Preah Rumkel were mostly engaged in fishing and/or farming as their 
primary occupations, and the residents of Preah Rumkel are mostly ethnic Lao. Community members 
from the Tonle Sap Lake comprised community fishery leaders from the provinces of Siem Reap, 
Kampong Thom, Kampong Cham, Kampong Chnang, and Battambang, all of whom I had interviewed 
at a workshop, and the rest were villagers from Kampong Khleang and Kampong Phluk communes in 
Siem Reap Province. Interviewees from Kampong Khleang and Kampong Phluk were mostly engaged 
in fishing as their primary occupation, and were ethnic Khmer. Interviews were conducted with the 
assistance of interpreters (see Section 4.7.1 for a more detailed reflection on working with interpreters).  
The second group comprised civil society representatives from the STM Coalition, representing 
local, national, regional, and international NGOs based in Thailand and Cambodia. The third group 
comprised government and MRC officials. This included officials and advisors from the Thai National 
Mekong Committee (TNMC) Secretariat, the Cambodia National Mekong Committee (CNMC) 
Secretariat, Thailand’s Department of Fisheries, Cambodia’s Fisheries Administration, and local 
government officials in Thailand and Cambodia. Local government officials included village headmen 
(Thailand and Cambodia), and commune officials (Cambodia). It should be noted that village headmen 
also represented community interests despite being classified as local government officials. MRC 
officials and consultants to the MRC were also interviewed. The fourth group was academics or 
researchers who had knowledge and experience in researching and writing on Mekong River 
hydropower development. I also met informally with various academics, civil society representatives, 
and development practitioners who provided helpful and insightful perspectives into the wider 
dynamics of Mekong hydropower governance.  
An overview of the research participants is provided in Table 4.1 and a full list can be found in 
Appendix C. In this thesis, all respondents are anonymised and referred to by a code and number. The 
code will refer to: 1) country – ‘T’ for Thailand, ‘C’ for Cambodia, and ‘I’ for International; and 2) 
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categories of respondents – ‘C’ for community members, ‘N’ for NGOs, and ‘G’ for government. These 
codes are listed in the ‘category’ column in Table 4.1.  
Table 4.1. Summary of interviewees by country and category 
Interviewees were recruited mainly through snowballing where existing contacts and 
interviewees assisted in providing access to potential participants with relevant experiences and 
backgrounds (Dunn, 2005; Valentine, 2005). Snowballing did not take place just within each of the five 
groups, but sometimes across groups (e.g. between civil society representatives and government 
officials), thus reducing the risk that recruitment was taking place within a ‘narrow circle of like-minded 
people’ (Valentine, 2005, p. 117). Contacts and introductions provided by former students and staff of 
the University of Sydney’s Mekong Research Group (AMRC) were invaluable to this process. In rural 
settings in Thailand and Cambodia, my interpreters and I depended on key community representatives 
to introduce others to us. This also involved ‘purposeful sampling’ (Longhurst, 2003, p. 122) where 
interviewees were selected based on their experiences that were relevant to this research project’s aims 
and objectives. In addition to snowballing, potential interviewees were also identified from news 
articles and documents relating to the research topic, or from the meetings I attended. Interview 
invitations were carried out in line with ethics protocol approved by the University of Sydney Human 
Research Ethics Committee in November 2016 (see Appendix D). Where possible, an invitation to 
participate in an interview was emailed to potential participants. However, in rural Thailand and in 
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Cambodia, phone numbers were usually provided by contacts and this was the accepted and most 
effective mode of communication. 
Interview guides containing a list of themes and questions were tailored to each interviewee 
prior to the interview. Every interview began with an introduction of the university-approved ethics 
protocol, with an emphasis on participant confidentiality and consent. While interviewing, I generally 
employed a hybrid of funnel and pyramid structures of questioning beginning with simple questions 
relating to their occupations, roles, and responsibilities, followed by general and more abstract questions, 
and then eventually progressing to specific and potentially sensitive issues (Dunn, 2005). Each 
interview lasted between 20 minutes and two hours and was audio-recorded with the interviewee’s 
permission. While I preferred the use of audio-recordings to concentrate on the interview and to 
maintain accurate records of what was said, there were instances where participants declined to be 
recorded. This could be because they were unsure of my intentions in interviewing them, especially in 
Cambodia which was facing heightened political tension at the time due to crackdowns on press 
freedom, opposition elements, and tightened regulations on NGOs (Croissant, 2018; Curley, 2018). In 
these cases, I would reiterate the purpose of my research and the measures I would take to maintain 
confidentiality. Verbatim notes were taken on my laptop or notebook, or notes were written from 
memory after the interview.  
4.4. Participant observation and event ethnography 
4.4.1. Participant observation  
While interviews remain a cornerstone of qualitative methods, they are increasingly 
complemented and enriched by other qualitative methods (Dowling et al., 2015), especially since the 
relatively formal and structured format of an interview remains detached from the spatial-temporal 
flows of everyday life (Kearns, 2005; Phillips & Johns, 2012). In contrast, participant observation, 
which is another key method in qualitative research, provides the researcher with direct access to 
phenomena (Laurier, 2003) and to personally watch activities unfold (Cook, 2005). This goes beyond 
making observations as the researcher becomes an active participant in the phenomena being studied. 
Kearns (2005, p. 196) notes that this involves ‘strategically placing oneself in situations in which 
systematic understandings of place are most likely to arise’ either for the purposes of counting, 
providing complementary evidence, or contextual understanding. While these purposes are not mutually 
exclusive, this research project focused on developing a contextual understanding of participatory 
spaces. This had the aim of constructing in-depth interpretations of specific time-spaces through direct 
experience and where first-hand observations also feature as a main source of data (Kearns, 2005). 
Importantly, participant observation also provides a key opportunity to capture nonhuman elements in 
the field by allowing ‘the place of invisible beings [nonhuman elements] in social life to be apprehended 
and recorded’ (Dowling et al., 2017, p. 826). This method thus complements the project’s conceptual 
62 
 
framework (see Chapter 3) that places an emphasis on the nonhuman elements that enable rendering 
technical and the emergence of participatory spaces.  
4.4.2. Event ethnography 
 Participant observation is commonly associated with immersing oneself in community life, 
although the settings often vary vastly in their spatial-temporal compositions (Cook, 2005; Laurier, 
2003). As opposed to conducting participant observation in sites defined by a community bounded in 
space, I carried out participant observation at events where a wide range of stakeholders involved in the 
governance of the Mekong River converged for public consultations, stakeholder forums, and 
conferences. Event ethnography recognises that temporary sites such as meetings are as important as 
spatially-bounded sites for understanding the ‘unfolding of professional and organisational practices’ 
(Delgado & Cruz, 2014, p. 44), and the politics of translation in environmental governance (Campbell 
et al., 2014) (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2 on translation and ANT). Corson et al. (2014) and Delgado 
& Cruz (2014) emphasise the importance of carrying out not just multi-sited, but multi-event studies to 
capture the complex multi-scalar relations between actors and processes across time and space. This 
stems from a need to rethink translocal environmental governance as being increasingly characterised 
by contingent trajectories, alongside translocal, dispersed, and multi-scalar decision-making processes 
involving a diverse range of actors (Campbell et al., 2014).  
 To study environmental governance ethnographically, ephemeral settings such as meetings and 
conferences can be considered as nodes (Campbell et al., 2014) within which dispersed and multi-scalar 
actors converge temporally and spatially. These can be referred to as field-configuring events, which 
are critical nodes functioning both as outcomes and drivers of evolution of the field (Lampel & Meyer, 
2008, p. 1028). These nodes are further linked through actors that move across time-spaces in 
connection with past decisions, other meeting sites, or future meetings (Campbell et al., 2014). 
Campbell et al. (2014, p. 7) note that these political spaces can be understood as ‘social devices subject 
to orchestration through which institutional and organisational ends can be achieved, legitimised, and 
contested’, and are infused with a politics of knowledge, scale, and performance. Such a politics relates 
to the discussions on knowledge, scale, and performativity in Chapter 3. Corson et al. (2014) move 
beyond the analysis of negotiations themselves as an ethnographic object, by capturing the multiplicity 
of actor configurations that continuously (re)align themselves around particular concepts at particular 
moments. This may illuminate how hegemonic discourse is constructed over time in its intersections 
with informal relationships, individual agency, and situated knowledge (Duffy, 2014).  
The multi-event approach is especially suited to addressing the methodological challenges of 
studying translocal organisations, where difficulties arise from the tracing of flows within and between 
these organisations and across ‘discontinuous time and space’ (Delgado & Cruz, 2014, p. 46). One of 
the difficulties in conducting multi-sited fieldwork is in ‘bounding the empirical field’, which inevitably 
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raises questions about the extent to which the ethnographer can understand the ‘life-worlds’ of research 
participants who are spatially and temporally dispersed (ibid., p. 47). This is especially the case for 
research on hydropower governance in the Mekong Region, where multi-sited and multi-scalar 
stakeholders are spread across the region. Through multi-event ethnography, it is the actors themselves, 
rather than the researcher, who define the boundaries of the field site where interconnections are forged 
between these actors, their ideas, interests, and practices (Delgado & Cruz, 2014). Event ethnography 
has the potential to address both spatial (where) and temporal (when) concerns of the field (Scheffer, 
2007). While geographers and ethnographers are traditionally concerned with spatially defining the 
field, events can potentially produce refined accounts of spatial-temporal nuances in the field. These 
nuances allow the researcher to reflect upon the implications of events that are past, present, or future, 
early or late, relevant or irrelevant, or weighted differently (Scheffer, 2007).  
4.4.3. The field(s) of hydropower governance in the Mekong Region  
 I had the opportunity to attend key meetings that were carried out for the Pak Beng PNPCA, 
which can be considered as nodes within mainstream hydropower governance in the LMB. I attended 
four PNPCA meetings for the Pak Beng Dam: the two MRC regional stakeholder forums in Laos and 
two community stakeholder consultations organised by the TNMC Secretariat in Thailand. I also 
attended meetings and conferences relating to the wider landscape of water governance and hydropower 
development in the LMB. The full list of the events I attended is provided in Table 4.2. This thesis 
builds mainly on the ethnographic observations made at the PNPCA meetings in Laos and Thailand, 
and the International Day of Action for Rivers organised by the STM Coalition in March 2017 
(highlighted in grey in Table 4.2), but the other events were useful in terms of providing further 
contextual understanding of participatory spaces, observing wider processes in environmental 
governance, and networking. 
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Table 4.2. List of events attended, in relation to hydropower governance in the LMB 
 
While I had previously depended on newspaper articles, summary reports, and meeting minutes 
to understand what had taken place during meetings related to mainstream hydropower development, 
these mainly focused on relating the main outcomes of the meetings. As mentioned in Chapter 1, it was 
only through attending the meetings myself that it became very apparent that the meeting’s processes 
and dynamics contributed towards particular outcomes. Lamb (2017, p. 1) also utilised this approach in 
the context of the MRC and termed ‘summit ethnography’ as an innovative method to shed ‘insights 
into the multiscale, local-national-regional tensions in transboundary environmental governance’ at the 
2nd MRC Summit and International Conference held in April 2014. Similar to Lamb’s (ibid.) approach, 
during the events I paid attention to tensions that were discursively invoked, the types of speakers, 
facilitators and participants present, and the interests and discourses that they raised. Doing so was 
especially useful in eliciting multi-scalar tensions particularly between differing groups of stakeholders, 
ideas, or discourses. The PNPCA meetings offered rare opportunities to observe state actors and their 
interactions with other state and nonstate actors in a public setting, as they otherwise worked behind the 
scenes through the series of MRC working groups described in Chapter 2 (Section 2.5.3).  
In addition to the actors present at the meetings and the languages, representations, and 
knowledges they carried and performed, attention was also paid towards how interactions were 
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influenced by elements such as the room structures, discussion formats, materials disseminated, event 
schedules as Corson et al. (2014) had done, along with how different actors were located in relation to 
one another. Event ethnography enriched the data collected from interviews, as I could observe the 
ways in which some interviewees publicly performed, represented and negotiated their positionality 
while actively participating in governance processes. In addition, it was critical to note not just what 
was present, but absences and slippages at the meetings. This included a recognition of the stakeholders 
who were not represented amongst the speakers or participants, the languages, knowledges, or 
discourses that were not used or foregrounded, and unanticipated events that unfolded during the 
meetings. This will be discussed in Chapter 6, where the absences of certain actors or knowledge types 
are considered to be reflective of a disconnect between the technical issues discussed at the PNPCA 
stakeholder consultations and the wider political-economic context of LMB hydropower development. 
Where possible I audio-recorded the sessions while making notes of who said what, and at the end of 
each meeting I made detailed field notes about my impressions based on the factors discussed above. 
Overall, all these elements relate to an observation of the spatial layouts, technologies, and performative 
dimensions of participatory events, especially in eliciting the enactments of state authority and the 
performative slippages that occur in these enactments (discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.4.1). 
Lamb (2017) notes that the meetings were not just an ethnographic site but also presented 
opportunities to network with potential interviewees based all over the Mekong Region, who would 
otherwise have been difficult to gain access to. Being in this actor-defined field was pivotal towards 
recruiting participants whom I may not have identified, or who were spread out over the country. In the 
context of Thailand and Cambodia where face to face meetings are usually more effective than digital 
communications, I was able to personally introduce myself to and secure an appointment with some 
interviewees who had not replied to my invitation emails. There was also a memorable encounter when 
a Thai official who had not replied to my invitation email made it a point to track me down at a meeting 
after spotting my name in the MRC regional stakeholder forum participant list. As a participant at the 
International Conference on Thai Studies 2017, attending a relevant session conducted by civil society 
groups also provided an opportunity to pose a question to a speaker I had been unable to gain access to.    
4.5. Literature review and discourse analysis    
In addition to the data generated from interviews and events, I also depended on secondary data 
in the form of documents such as scientific studies, meeting reports, strategic plans, terms of reference, 
concept notes, agreements, guidelines, procedures, complaints, news articles, commentaries, and 
materials disseminated during the meetings. These documents were generated and made public as part 
of the PNPCA and were amassed from a variety of sources – the MRC, government agencies, think 
tanks, civil society, and the events I attended. In addition to data relating to the PNPCA, historical 
materials were also studied to trace the origins of Mekong hydropower development since the 1950s. 
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Due to my limited language capabilities, the materials analysed were mostly in English, although my 
Thai translator assisted me with the translation of some Thai materials. There was little documentation 
collected from Cambodia as compared to Thailand. The analysis of the statements articulated in the 
interviews, events, and documents is especially important in the context of contested hydropower 
development and the Mekong River, where a politics of knowledge is very much inherent and often 
involving discourses mobilising scientific and local knowledges (Käkönen & Hirsch, 2009; Yong & 
Grundy-Warr, 2012). These texts and knowledges, in tandem with other observable forms of 
communication such as ‘body language, interactions, symbolic acts, [and] technologies’ (Dittmer, 2010, 
p. 275) are all part of these contested discourses.  
Discourse analysis has the potential to further elucidate the contexts in which truth claims are 
situated, thus assisting in making sense of the data collected through the semi-structured interview and 
event ethnography. Discourse analysis aims to explore the actions, perceptions or attitudes resulting 
from discourses, identify the regulatory frameworks that comprise the production, circulation and 
communication of statements within which different actors articulate themselves, and challenge 
hegemonic or ‘common-sense’ statements or understandings (Dittmer, 2010; Waitt, 2005). The regime 
of truth created and perpetuated by powerful actors in Mekong hydropower governance does not exist 
a-priori and is constantly challenged, negotiated, and reinstated as actors navigate and attempt to 
manipulate the power/knowledge nexus in their favour (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3). Discourse 
analysis can assist especially in identifying how practices of power and the formation of knowledge are 
interlinked in driving public participation and contestation around hydropower development in the 
Mekong region. For this thesis, attention was paid to documentation that described the rationale behind 
the PNPCA stakeholder consultations and contained criticisms of the stakeholder consultations, which 
shed light on how public participation had been problematised by state actors, the narratives that 
disrupted processes of rendering technical, and the spatial-temporal assumptions and dynamics that 
underlie these discourses.  
4.6. Note on uneven datasets between Thailand and Cambodia  
The data sets for Thailand and Cambodia are uneven in two ways. The first dimension is in 
terms of the number of community members interviewed, where the number of community members 
interviewed in Cambodia was more than three times of that in Thailand. Working with a more 
experienced interpreter in Cambodia I was able to interview many community members at the village 
level as compared to in Thailand. The second dimension is in terms of event ethnography, as I was 
unable to gain access to PNPCA stakeholder consultations in Cambodia. Having been introduced to 
TNMC Secretariat officials at the MRC regional stakeholder forums, I was invited to observe the Thai 
stakeholder consultations that took place in March and May 2017. However, I did not have CNMC 
Secretariat contacts during this time. As Chapter 5 will discuss, invitations to the Cambodian PNPCA 
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stakeholder consultations were also more tightly controlled than in Thailand. As such, while data from 
interviews, event ethnography and secondary materials are used to supplement one another as far as 
possible to reconstruct certain events, a direct comparison between Thailand and Cambodia is not 
always possible. Rather, the strengths and depth of information from these different datasets is used to 
illustrate and highlight the multifaceted issues that are raised in a study of public participation in the 
LMB.  
4.7. Reflexivity and limitations in the field 
There exists a continuum between the researcher and the 
researched. We do not conduct fieldwork on the unmediated 
world of the researched, but on the world between ourselves 
and the researched. At the same time this ‘betweenness’ is 
shaped by the researcher’s biography, which filters the ‘data’ 
and our perceptions and interpretations of the fieldwork 
experience. (England, 1994, p. 86) 
Feminist geographers have been pivotal in calling for the need to address the issue of reflexivity 
in qualitative research, as it is apparent to them that knowledge production can never be truly objective, 
value-free and detached from the field of power relations in which the research is conducted. They thus 
argue for the need to situate knowledge production by recognising the researcher’s own positionality 
through developing self-awareness of one’s position within the field and to reflect upon how this 
positionality has an impact on knowledge production (Mohammad, 2001; Rose, 1997). While the 
researcher has to take care not to indulge in ‘navel gazing’ (England, 1994), partaking in critical self-
reflexivity may lead to insights that potentially enrich the research (King & Horrocks, 2010), especially 
where cross-cultural research is concerned (Skelton, 2001). This involves an acknowledgement that 
one’s conclusions are limited and partial rather than universal, as a way to approach the issue of power 
relations and to develop an awareness of how the researcher is destabilised and constructed in the 
process (England, 1994; Rose, 1997).  
4.7.1. Negotiating being an insider/outsider  
I will begin this section with a brief biography: I am a 30-year old6, ethnically Chinese female 
from Singapore who is pursuing a PhD in Geography at the University of Sydney in Australia. This was 
very much how I chose to present myself throughout the fieldwork process. In many respects, I was 
very much an ‘outsider’ in the field engaging in cross-cultural research, as I did not speak fluently any 
of the languages of the Mekong Region, and had never been directly involved in issue of hydropower 
development in a hands-on manner. Despite being from an ASEAN ‘neighbour’, I was sometimes asked 
by my interviewees why I was conducting research in this issue – perhaps because the Singapore 
                                                          
6 Although apparently younger looking, often mistaken for an undergraduate student and very occasionally, a 
high school student.  
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government and Singapore’s academic institutions generally had not paid much attention to 
development issues involving the Mekong River. As mentioned in Section 4.3.1, in order to gain access 
to interviewees I also depended very much on the contacts and introductions of insiders who were either 
my personal contacts or affiliated with the AMRC as former students or staff.  
Nonetheless, having prior research experience in this field for an honours and a masters thesis, 
I found myself adopting some strategies to establish myself, to at least a small degree, as an ‘insider’ 
especially where the research was concerned with ‘studying up’. Power relations are configured 
differently when studying up (Mukherjee, 2017), and in situations where the researched were experts 
in their fields I did not want to be perceived as unknowledgeable, which might have affected the quality 
of information shared with me. I tried to demonstrate prior knowledge during interviews by bringing 
up my previous experience in conducting research related to hydropower development on the Mekong 
River, addressing very specific issues, and sharing my opinions. I also made the effort to establish 
reciprocal relationships. For example, Chiang Khong was a former field site and during this visit I met 
again with the leader of the community-based organisation, taking the opportunity to give him a copy 
of my master’s thesis and share my main research findings to him. With several interviewees whom I 
had interviewed for past research projects, our exchanges felt more candid than before.  
Being an ‘outsider’ was not necessarily negative, especially in studying a contested issue like 
hydropower development where I hoped to gather the views of different stakeholder groups who were 
sometimes at odds with one another. The blurred lines between my insider/outsider status affected the 
research process in varied ways. In order to elicit the multiplicity of subjectivities across the 
heterogeneous stakeholders, I chose to adopt an empathetic, ‘sympathetic, and non-judgmental’ role 
(Cook, 2005, p. 179) in my interactions with people. In general, I adopted a supplicant position which 
accepts that the people I meet have greater knowledge than the researcher (England, 1994). As an 
outsider, it was likely that certain informants remained reticent about sharing candid or controversial 
views with me. But I would also argue that being perceived as a ‘unthreatening’ female (England, 1994), 
an ‘outsider’ in terms of my nationality and being an independent researcher unaffiliated with any 
stakeholder group might have helped in playing this somewhat neutral role and to gain relatively good 
access to information.  
It is also necessary to highlight the pivotal role that interpreters played in my research. The 
‘betweenness’ of the field was also mediated through them. The interpreter is not merely a ‘neutral 
mouthpiece’ (Edwards, 1998, p. 202), and the consideration of reflexivity is a good reminder that the 
process of translation can never be neutral when mediated through situated identities (Temple & Young, 
2004). The field between the researcher and the researched becomes even more complex when taking 
into account the presence of the interpreter. Recognising that my ‘outsider’ status would be even more 
apparent in rural settings due to disparities in ethnicity, language and education levels, I depended very 
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much on my Thai and Cambodian interpreters’ ability to take the lead in establishing rapport with 
research participants (also see Borchgrevink, 2003; Edwards, 1998; Watson, 2004 who have discussed 
similar issues on language and working with interpreters). From experience, I found that this was more 
effective than trying to exert control over all aspects of the interview myself. My interpreters did not 
always provide word for word translations, but usually gave interviewees their full attention while 
taking notes and then relaying what the interviewees had said to me, sometimes in summarised form, 
after the interviewee had finished speaking on a particular point or issue. They sometimes provided 
additional contextual information for my benefit. During the interviews and transcription of the 
interviews, I tried my best to maintain a sensitivity towards distinguishing between what the 
interviewees had said and my interpreters’ personal viewpoints.  
I worked with a female interpreter in Thailand, and a male interpreter in Cambodia, both of 
whom were a few years older than me. My interpreters were able to conduct interviews in the local 
languages in Nong Khai Province (Isan dialect) and Stung Treng Province (Lao), although this was not 
possible in Chiang Rai Province as my Thai interpreter, who was from Isan, did not speak the northern 
Thai dialect. The importance of speaking local languages was highlighted along the Cambodia-Lao 
border in Stung Treng Province, where many people preferred to speak Lao despite being Cambodian 
citizens. My interpreter was able to switch to Lao when he sensed that interviewees were not as 
comfortable speaking in Khmer, and an interviewee even told him that villagers might not be so open 
to speaking to him if he did not speak Lao. Both interpreters were experienced with working in rural 
contexts and with issues relating to the Mekong River. In addition to adopting a sympathetic and non-
judgmental role during the interviews, they were also able to put research participants at ease by 
empathising and joking with them. They sometimes took the lead in asking questions once they gained 
familiarity with my lines of questioning, which helped in downplaying my presence during the 
interviews. My Thai interpreter also played a critical role when I carried out event ethnography as she 
translated the proceedings of the Thai PNPCA stakeholder consultations. There were some limitations 
to this approach as there were technical aspects of the discussion that she could not understand, but this 
also served as a reflection of how these meetings could sometimes be overly-technical in nature (see 
Chapter 6, Section 6.4.1).  
4.7.2. Implications for research findings   
The main implication of engaging in critical self-reflexivity is in having to critically rethink 
how knowledges are necessarily limited and partial, and grounding knowledge through a consideration 
of positionality (Rose, 1997). Having to negotiate multiple roles and identities has also made me more 
aware of the performative dimensions of the interview, in terms of how respondents may have to 
negotiate and perform their positions in relation to me. This meant being more sensitive to potential 
partialities in their accounts, and recognising their experiences and narrations as discursive formations 
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emerging from contingent and particular circumstances (Domosh, 2003). However, there are limitations 
to which engaging in self-reflexivity may establish a more equitable field of power relations between 
the researcher and the researched. England (1994, p. 86) argues that ‘reflexivity can make us more 
aware of asymmetrical or exploitative relationships, but it cannot remove them’, but Mohammad (2001) 
takes this argument one step further to challenge entrenched assumptions that researchers necessarily 
hold power over the researched, and to say that there are always elements in the researched and power 
relations that cannot be rendered visible to us. The researcher may sometimes feel disempowered, 
especially as an outsider to the field. 
This was made clear when interviewing experts, and even more so during uncomfortable spaces 
and moments in the field: a community representative declaring that my questioning was pointless for 
them, another participant sidestepping my questions and going off on another tangent, the interview 
being co-opted for purposes other than my own. There is no straightforward way to address and remedy 
such situations, as Coddington (2017) argues in her analysis of the ethical and methodological dilemmas 
of ‘giving voice’ to participants in qualitative research. These effects of the invisible power relations in 
the field may be considered in tandem with other limitations faced in data collection: meanings being 
lost in translation, being unable to cover concurrent sessions at meetings, and a dependence on English-
language materials. While it is impossible to completely overcome these limitations, attempts were 
made to mitigate them. Where possible, the data collected from the different sources have been 
triangulated with data from other sources to verify and interrogate various claims and narratives, not 
just that of research participants but also my own.  
4.8. Conclusion  
It is necessary to acknowledge that the knowledge produced in this thesis can only be partial. 
This is not to undermine the validity of the data collected and arguments to be made. The discussion of 
the methodological concerns has addressed the value of semi-structured interviews, event ethnography, 
literature review and discourse analysis in meeting the research objectives and in enriching one another. 
But it is also important to recognise that the findings of this thesis are situated within the ‘betweenness’ 
of the field described above, which inevitably generates partial, specific and limited knowledges. The 
researcher’s presence in the field inevitably generates a partially unknowable field of power relations 
between the researcher and the researched, producing sometimes unpredictable or uncomfortable 
interactions which further limit the extent to which we can claim that our knowledge is truly 
representative. This negotiation of positionality had both benefited and limited the data generated and 
collected. As this thesis attempts to demonstrate how multiple participatory spaces disrupt the truth 
claims made through rendering technical, a reflection on the different understandings of truth in the 
process of data collection may help to shed light on the emergence of competing truth claims in the 
contested hydropower governance of the LMB.  
71 
 
CHAPTER FIVE  
PROBLEMATISING SPACES OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION  
5.1. Introduction 
 This chapter discusses how public participation has been problematised under the framework 
of the Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation and Agreement (PNPCA). It draws upon data 
from both secondary sources and fieldwork. First, it examines how public participation came to be 
included in Prior Consultation. Second, the chapter pays attention to how the problematisation of these 
participatory spaces is mediated by the National Mekong Committees (NMCs), their institutional 
geographies, and the frictions encountered within differentiated national legal frameworks. The PNPCA 
is treated as a technology of government that enables the NMCs to enact government at a distance, 
which enrols distant localities into ‘proper’ channels of participation and creates specific types of 
subjectivities within these channels. In the next part of the chapter, attention is turned to how these 
participatory spaces are problematised and brought into being through the elements of publics, place, 
scale, and time. This involves a discussion on how the ‘public’ is determined, and how modifications 
to the stakeholder consultations can be understood through the lenses of place, scale, and the temporal. 
A politics of place, scale and time may therefore be used to understand some of the major criticisms 
associated with the PNPCA stakeholder consultations and illuminate the issues that stand in the way of 
meaningful public participation.  
5.2. Public participation and the MRC 
The MRC is aware that stakeholder involvement in decision-
making is fundamental to achieving feasible, equitable and 
lasting solutions and that the quality of decisions can be 
improved by the inclusion of a broad range of stakeholders who 
can bring important local knowledge and relevant perspectives 
to the process. Since its inception in 1995, the MRC has adopted 
a participatory approach in the work of all its core programmes 
and sector programmes and is envisaging ways to expand the 
opportunities for collaboration with both internal and external 
stakeholders. (MRC, 2005b, p. 3) 
 Within Prior Consultation, the component of public participation is a small but important one. 
The 1995 Mekong Agreement and the PNPCA do not mention the need to include public participation, 
and as discussed in Chapter 2, Prior Consultation was set out as a technical process to facilitate 
information sharing between the MRC member states to evaluate a proposed project. From the wording 
of the PNPCA, the prerogative to initiate public consultations appears to lie with the MRC Joint 
Committee (JC), as one of the responsibilities of the NMCs is to ‘facilitate any consultations, 
presentations, evaluation and site visited as requested by the MRC JC for the proposed use’ (MRC, 
2003b, p. 7).  Close to the beginning of the Xayaburi PNPCA, the PNPCA Joint Committee Working 
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Group (JCWG) came to a decision at their first meeting on 26 October 2010 to incorporate public 
participation into the process (MRC, n.d.e).  
 The concept of public participation is not new to the MRC. Following the establishment of the 
MRC, a donor-funded study on public participation was initiated in 1996 so that participatory 
approaches could be incorporated into the MRC’s Basin Development Plan (BDP) and Water 
Utilisation Programme (Kaosa-ard et al., 1998; MRC Secretariat, 1999). The resulting report published 
in 1998 (see Kaosa-ard et al., 1998) and a 1999 report by the MRC Secretariat (see MRC Secretariat, 
1999) provided a set of guidelines and mechanisms for public participation. Public participation is 
defined as ‘a process through which key stakeholders gain influence and take part in decision making 
in the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of MRC programs and projects [original 
emphasis]’ (MRC Secretariat, 1999, p. 3), and is proposed to be a ‘normal and essential process in MRC 
and NMC activities’ (ibid., p. 7). According to a 2005 MRC publication on public participation, 
stakeholders are classified into two groups: 1) internal stakeholders that include the government bodies 
in the MRC’s institutional structure, and 2) external stakeholders that broadly cover nonstate actors 
who ‘have interests or stakes to lose or gain’ (MRC, 2005b, p. 3). Sneddon & Fox (2007) observe that 
this differentiation highlights a disjuncture between the MRC Secretariat’s ‘well-intentioned aim’ of 
incorporating a participatory approach into governance activities, and the assertion by MRC member 
countries that the MRC chiefly serves to further their development goals. The 2005 publication also 
states that there is a ‘compelling case’ for any hydropower development strategy in the LMB to 
incorporate a participatory approach that would contribute towards decision making, and that the MRC 
was in a unique position to bring together ‘technical experts and high-level decision makers’ while also 
linking this to a process of public participation (MRC, 2005b, p. 19).  
 Prior to the PNPCA, the multiple programmes implemented through the MRC Secretariat had 
created differentiated spaces for participation in accordance with their respective agendas. Sneddon & 
Fox (2007) identified the BDP programme as the most prominent area in which this institutional context 
for public participation was demonstrated after the MRC’s establishment. The BDP represented MRC 
efforts to institutionalise a participatory planning process involving not only internal stakeholders but 
also external stakeholders (Dore & Lebel, 2010), and also represented the most extensive form of 
‘stakeholder engagements’ through stakeholder forums held in Vientiane in 2008 and 2010, and in 
Chiang Rai in 2009 (Hirsch, 2011b).  Nonetheless, the proceedings, agendas, and conclusions of the 
forums were still largely determined by the MRC Secretariat and overarching member state interests 
(ibid.) and privileged the quantification of hydrographs over human responses (Lebel et al., 2010). This 
participatory approach took place in tension with the decades-old hydropower agendas of MRC member 
states (Sneddon & Fox, 2007), and overall these issues would bear similarities to that of the PNPCA. A 
contrasting participatory space was created through the MRC’s Fisheries Programme that was 
established in the 1990s in response to these hydropower agendas, to assess and value the productivity 
73 
 
of capture fisheries in the Mekong River (Friend et al., 2009). This was relatively successful in 
implementing participatory research involving both government officials and community fishers 
(Sneddon & Fox, 2007). However, even in the fisheries programme, expert knowledge was privileged 
over local knowledge (Käkönen & Hirsch, 2009). 
Gao (2014, p. 159) has noted that the 1999 MRC Secretariat report mainly addresses 
participation in relation to the MRC’s plans, programmes and policies, but ‘largely ignores’ specific 
development projects and therefore provides ‘very limited guidance’ on decision making for 
mainstream hydropower dam projects. The feasibility of incorporating these participatory approaches 
into mainstream dam development may therefore be stymied when considering whether hydropower 
dam construction was considered to be part of the MRC’s hydropower programme. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, Mekong hydropower dams today are essentially public-private projects that are part of a 
sovereign state’s development plans and built on a project by project basis and lack a commitment 
towards international standards and socio-environmental safeguards recommended by international 
development actors such as the ADB, World Bank, and the WCD. With the ‘model’ Nam Theun 2 Dam 
in Laos, the inclusion of public participation was driven primarily by the World Bank (Manorom et al., 
2017; Singh, 2009), but this may not be the case for the public-private projects in a new political 
economy of hydropower development. The MRC’s limitations in enforcing a coherent hydropower 
strategy across the region became clear with the side-lining of the Strategic Environmental Assessment 
(SEA) when the Xayaburi Dam PNPCA began, as the MRC member countries never officially endorsed 
the SEA (Carew-Reid, 2016; Suhardiman et al., 2015) (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4 and 2.5.3).  
The inclusion of public participation in Prior Consultation, rather than being a ‘normal and 
essential’ process, appeared to be driven by pressure from internal stakeholders (Vietnamese officials), 
external stakeholders (civil society), and MRC Secretariat personnel (Whitehead, 2011). 
Notwithstanding the limited influence of the public participation component on decision making, its 
inclusion was nonetheless significant for civil society and Mekong local communities: 
It is important as one of the very few public platforms where 
there is greater attention to public participation and stakeholder 
engagement, one of the few platforms where affected 
communities and civil society can actually ask questions about 
the project. But we don’t see it as an effective platform to 
challenge decision making about whether or not the project goes 
ahead. (Interview, IN1) 
  These public consultation sessions opened critical physical spaces on a transboundary scale, 
where information about the proposed mainstream dams could be disseminated to potentially affected 
communities and local civil society, and where questions could be directed towards government 
authority. Spaces of participation may be both abstract or concrete, and the act of participating ‘can be 
seen as bringing spaces to life as well as carving out new spaces and creating new social forms with 
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their own momentum and impetus’ (Cornwall, 2002, p. 2). This is significant as the project information 
would otherwise be mediated behind the scenes through the MRC’s series of PNPCA working groups 
(see Chapter 2, Section 2.5.3). Project documents were also made available on the MRC’s website or 
obtained through informal channels, and civil society utilised channels such as the media and the MRC 
to get their feedback heard. However, internet penetration tends to be lower in rural areas (Tengtrakul 
& Peha, 2011) and the use of the internet in rural areas through smartphones to look up information is 
lower as compared to urban areas, especially with older age groups (Phong et al., 2016). It is the physical 
spaces of public consultations that have opened new avenues for the public to challenge decision-
making about dams, most notably in providing the grounds for 37 Thai villagers to file a lawsuit against 
the Thai government (see Section 5.3.4).  
5.3. Problematising public participation in uneven landscapes of participation  
Public participation in the LMB may be thought of in terms of regimes of practices, which are 
generally coherent sets of ways of doing things, including institutional practices (Dean, 2010). As part 
of the analytics of government discussed in Chapter 3, this chapter has the aim of investigating the 
conditions that underlie the emergence, maintenance, and transformation of the regimes of practices 
constituting public participation. This section examines how public participation has been 
problematised, the first element of rendering technical. Drawing upon Inda's (2008) work, this involves 
identifying the political rationalities that render the field of public participation calculable and 
governable. The landscape of public participation created through the PNPCA is a highly uneven one. 
The PNPCA JCWG for the Xayaburi Dam stated that participatory process and meetings were to be 
designed ‘as required by their [LMB countries] national context, frameworks and legislation’ (MRC, 
2011b, p. 9). The difficulties involved in incorporating participatory practices into very different 
national contexts had previously been recognised by the MRC (Kaosa-ard et al., 1998; Sneddon & Fox, 
2007). Examining national contexts, institutions, and legislative frameworks give insight into the 
political rationalities underlying public participation as a regime of practices, reflecting how public 
participation has been problematised.   
5.3.1. National Mekong Committees 
 One way to draw out the political rationalities of public participation is to pay attention to the 
institutions that organise the PNPCA stakeholder consultations: the NMCs who coordinate between 
their respective countries’ government line agencies and the MRC. The NMCs occupy a unique position 
within their respective governments, as they fulfil obligations and responsibilities to both their country 
governments and the MRC. The 1995 Mekong Agreement itself does not mention NMCs, but their 
functions and responsibilities become clearer in the five accompanying technical procedures for water 
utilisation that include the PNPCA (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5.3). These procedures indicate that the 
NMCs are problematised as technical and coordinative entities that would support wider decision-
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making processes in Mekong water governance. In the procedures for water utilisation, maintenance of 
flows, and water quality, the NMCs are responsible for technical areas such as data gathering, 
monitoring and reporting, informing their relevant line agencies of the MRC Procedures, and 
coordination with the MRC Secretariat and MRC JC. Under the PNPCA the responsibilities of the 
NMCs are mainly coordinative, such as to inform the relevant line agencies of the requirements for 
Prior Consultation, to receive, review and check documentation for a project submitted under Prior 
Consultation, and to transmit documentation between the relevant actors.  
As one of the key responsibilities of the NMCs is to facilitate any consultations as requested by 
the MRC JC, they are key actors in shaping the landscape of public participation under Prior 
Consultation. In the 1998 report on public participation, the NMCs are identified as the primary 
audience for its recommendations and guidelines, and they are also identified as ‘key stakeholders in 
any project executed or coordinated by the MRC Secretariat’ (Kaosa-ard et al., 1998, p. 56). NMCs 
display spatial-temporal variations as their structure, composition, and functions differ between 
countries and have been altered throughout the decades, therefore carrying with them different 
institutional histories. It is also important to distinguish between the NMCs and their secretariats, even 
though this is not usually done in practice. An NMC generally comprises representatives from the 
relevant ministries and line agencies, and has an ephemeral function and presence in the government. 
In contrast, an NMC Secretariat serves the NMC by carrying out the day-to-day work and supporting 
policy and decision making and have a permanent and physical presence within state structures. The 
role of the NMC Secretariats is characterised by coordination, in contrast to most government agencies 
who implement government policies (Interview, CG1). While they lack influence on decision making, 
their constraints still serve as useful diagnostic tools within the analytics of government. 
It is necessary to situate the NMC Secretariats within an institutional geography to assess the 
degree of their influence in facilitating the stakeholder consultations. NMC Secretariats should be 
considered as one of many state actors that carry out the rational activities of a heterogeneous 
government, for ‘definite but shifting ends’ and with diverse outcomes (Dean, 2010, p. 18). An 
institutional geography considers their relationships to wider cultural, political and economic processes, 
along with the distinct social and spatial relationships that arise when their political and spatial locations 
are considered in relation to peoples, land uses, and resources (Billo & Mountz, 2016; Philo & Parr, 
2000). Understanding how NMCs shape participatory spaces in Mekong hydropower governance can 
also be helped by the notion of critical institutionalism, which places an emphasis on how institutions 
play a dynamic role in mediating relationships between people, natural resources and society (Cleaver 
& de Koning, 2015). Of particular relevance to the discussion of the NMCs and their respective 
secretariats in this section are Cleaver & de Koning’s (ibid., p. 6) suggestions that the historical 
trajectories of institutions are important in terms of how their ‘sedimented layers of governance 
arrangements’ influence their functions today, and that change often takes place at the ‘messy middle’, 
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or meso-level, of institutions. The relationships between NMC Secretariats and other government 
agencies are also intertwined with power relationships, reflecting Tooke's (2000) suggestion that 
institutions should also be analysed through the lens of Massey's (1992) conception of a power-
geometry which destabilises notions of state power as totalising (See Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4 that 
emphasised the entanglements of domination and resistance in the context of environmental 
governance). NMC Secretariats are entangled within this web that not only constitutes the physical 
geography, but also the economic landscape of each country.   
5.3.2. Institutional geographies: the Thai National Mekong Committee (TNMC) Secretariat  
Although the TNMC Secretariat is part of the central government, its functions may be 
incompatible with government agencies tasked with water resource and economic development. Since 
the 2002 administrative reforms in Thailand, the TNMC Secretariat has been positioned as a bureau 
under the Department of Water Resources (DWR), which in turn is situated within the Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE) (Dore & Lebel, 2010). Dore & Lebel (2010, p. 68) 
argue that this structure served Thailand’s interests by ‘appointing an NMC marginalised from real 
decision-making and water resources development planning and investment within the country’. The 
TNMC Secretariat has weak connections with and little influence over historically more powerful 
agencies such as the Royal Irrigation Department and the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand 
(EGAT) (ibid.). Even though the TNMC comprises representatives from EGAT and the Energy 
Planning and Policy office, the representatives that attended meetings were not top-level officials and 
lacked decision making authority (Interview, TG1). The TNMC Secretariat’s marginalised position also 
relates to the physical geography of Thailand. Thailand is subdivided into 25 river basins, and the 
Mekong River Basin only accounts for 36% of Thailand’s land area (Carew-Reid, 2016). TG1 stressed 
the need to consider the ‘physical constraints’ of the TNMC Secretariat in managing the Mekong River 
system in Thailand: 
You have to understand that in our case, the condition of the 
basin itself, because if you look at the northeast of Thailand that 
is part of the Mekong system, it is only part of the whole country 
and we also have other river basins like the Chao Phraya. So 
when they established the DWR, it not only looked after the 
Mekong, but it looked after other river basins as well. (Interview, 
TG1) 
  The functions of the TNMC Secretariat were not always incompatible with that of the energy 
sector. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Mekong River and its tributaries were considered as a vehicle for 
Thailand’s development especially in Isan and this was reflected in the institutional structures that 
supported this development. During the time of the Mekong Committee, the TNMC Secretariat was 
situated under the government’s energy sector and was attached to the National Energy Administration 
(Kamkongsak & Law, 2001). According to TG1, the TNMC used to be bigger and was chaired by then-
77 
 
Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai, ‘but now the level of importance of the work has become lessened, 
because the country is already advanced or developed’ (Interview, TG1). Today, the TNMC is chaired 
by the Minister of MONRE. The only other ministries in the TNMC are the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives and the Ministry of Interior who are represented by their permanent secretaries. The rest 
of the Departments, including the Royal Irrigation Department, the Department of Fisheries, and 
Department of Alternative Energy Development and Efficiency, are represented at Director-General 
level (TNMC, 2016) (see Table 5.1). Tracing these developments, in Thailand, the TNMC Secretariat 
has experienced a double marginalisation at the regional and national levels as both the MRC and the 
Thai sections of the Mekong River became less of a priority for Thai economic development.  
Nonetheless, the TNMC Secretariat has a higher budget and a higher level of technical expertise 
compared to their Cambodian counterparts (see Section 5.3.3 to follow and Chapter 6, Section 6.2.2). 
Table 5.1. Composition of the TNMC (Source: TNMC, 2016) 
5.3.3. Institutional geographies: the Cambodia National Mekong Committee (CNMC) Secretariat 
In Cambodia, the CNMC Secretariat is higher placed in the government hierarchy as compared 
to the TNMC Secretariat. The CNMC Secretariat is part of the central government. Since the 1999 
Government Sub-decree came into effect, the CNMC has been established as an inter-ministerial agency 
that operates directly under the Office of the Council of Ministers, and the CNMC Secretariat sits under 
this agency (Thim, 2010). The CNMC is currently chaired by the Minister of Water Resources and 
Meteorology (MOWRM), and the 17 ministries and government agencies in the CNMC are represented 
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at the vice minister level (Interview, CG1) (see Table 5.2). According to CG1, the Secretary General of 
the CNMC Secretariat is equivalent to the rank of a vice-minister in Cambodia, indicating that the 
CNMC Secretariat is of higher status as compared to the TNMC Secretariat. The physical geography 
of Cambodia is also different from that of Thailand, as the Mekong River Basin comprises 86% of 
Cambodia’s land area (Carew-Reid, 2016). However, despite being higher up in the government 
hierarchy as compared to the TNMC Secretariat, the CNMC Secretariat is similarly marginalised from 
the decision-making centres of government. Thim (2010, p. 140) notes that even though the CNMC ‘is 
the only cross-sectoral body capable of an overall water coordination and responsibility in the country’, 
it is still often described as a weak body as its role in water resources management is a secondary one 
in comparison to regular line ministries. CG1 explained that: 
Especially with the CNMC, it is clear that our role is only 
coordination, we are not an implementing agency. If you look at 
the implementing agencies in Cambodia, they have their own 
department at the provincial level, they have their own office at 
district level. But for us, no, we only have a General Secretariat. 
When we have to go down to the province, we have to coordinate 
at the provincial level, and then to the department level. 
(Interview, CG1) 
Also speaking on the CNMC’s capacity to influence decision-making, a Cambodian civil society 
representative said that: 
It’s a really big question, it’s very hard to say. For sure they have 
some sort of capacity to coordinate, but not really much. But 
compared with their capacity to influence, this is a very big 
challenge. I used to raise some questions to some of them, and 
then they say that their mandate is just to conduct research, to 
provide the recommendations from the research, but they have 
no authority, they do not have capacity to influence the decision 
makers. (Interview, CN5)  
Historically, Cambodia was absent from the Interim Mekong Committee during the Khmer 
Rouge period, when water resources development was not a priority. By the time Cambodia had joined 
the MRC under the 1995 Mekong Agreement, member states could no longer veto the development 
projects of others and the MRC presented less of an obstacle to national water resource development. 
Like the TNMC Secretariat, the CNMC Secretariat does not have much influence over the power sector 
and appears to be similarly marginalised from decision making relating to hydropower development. 
The Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) is a member of the CNMC, but the MME does not share 
their plans for hydropower development with the CNMC Secretariat, most notably in the case of the 
planned Sambor mainstream dam (Thim, 2010; Interview, CG1). MRC1 pointed out that the CNMC 
Secretariat had limited financial resources that were channelled through the MOWRM, especially 
compared to that of the TNMC Secretariat:  
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Being part of the Department of Water Resources, the TNMC 
is very, very well positioned in terms of having millions of 
dollars of budget. One TNMC annual budget is about three 
times the annual budget of the Ministry of Water Resources in 
Cambodia.  
This lack of financial resources has implications on the capacity of the CNMC Secretariat to facilitate 
public consultations. The CNMC Secretariat has always organised fewer stakeholder consultations than 
the TNMC Secretariat (see Table 5.3 in Section 5.4). In addition, the CNMC Secretariat also lacks the 
technical capacity and expertise to assess technical project documents disseminated through the PNPCA 
(to be discussed in Chapter 6, Section 6.2.2).  
 
Table 5.2. Composition of the CNMC (Source: CNMC, n.d.) 
 
As coordinating agencies between the MRC and their respective governments, the NMC 
Secretariats are located within a power-geometry shaped by the complex interactions at the regional 
and national levels. The NMC Secretariats, as state institutions, were problematised and brought into 
being through the regional institutional framework of the MRC, rather than emerging as part of each 
nation state’s political rationalities. Yet, the positioning of NMC Secretariats within an institutional 
geography reflects the priorities of the nation-state, especially in relation to energy agencies that play 
key roles in economic development (Interview, TG1). For example, the TNMC Secretariat is located 
under the environmental ministry, which Wells-Dang et al. (2016, p. 37) have described as ‘almost 
universally’ the weakest government agencies in any nation in terms of power and influence. 
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Nonetheless, NMC Secretariats play a key role in problematising public participation for the PNPCA 
and in creating the regime of practices that come to constitute the PNPCA stakeholder consultations.  
These issues reflect the perspectives of critical institutionalism that were discussed in Section 
5.3.1, whereby institutions were considered to mediate relationships with people, natural resources and 
society in dynamic ways. In examining how meso-level institutions such as the NMC Secretariats 
influence the creation and characteristics of participatory spaces in relation to Mekong hydropower 
governance, it is again useful to draw upon the observations of Cleaver & de Koning (2015), who note 
that institutions are formed through the dynamic intersections between the exercise of agency and 
constraints imposed by wider relations of power. Importantly, this in turn influences how different 
actors find room to manoeuvre through their interactions with specific institutions and issues of social 
justice (ibid.). Returning to the case of the NMC Secretariats, there are strong spatial implications here 
when these relatively small and uninfluential institutions within the central governments coordinate 
public consultations located at the peripheries of the nation-state. They play a role in (re)producing the 
power geometries that Mekong local communities are entangled and have to manoeuvre within. As 
Section 5.4 will discuss, these spatial implications can be examined in relation to the elements of publics, 
place, scale, and the temporal. 
5.3.4. Jurisdictional differences: national legal frameworks and public participation  
 A second way to observe the problematisation of public participation under the PNPCA is to 
examine the legal frameworks for public participation as forms of political rationalities in each country. 
The PNPCA JCWG had directed the LMB countries to design public consultation meetings according 
to their respective national contexts, frameworks and legislation and agreed that these stakeholder 
consultations were ‘a national matter for each country concerned’ (MRC, 2011b, p. 2). As Prior 
Consultation had never been activated prior to the Xayaburi PNPCA in 2011, this case also represented 
the first time that the Thai, Cambodian, and Vietnamese NMC Secretariats had to organise public 
consultations to discuss a hydropower project that was not located within their national boundaries. 
PNPCA stakeholder consultations have therefore taken place within an uneven landscape of public 
participation, due to the differing standards for public participation between the four countries. 
According to the MRC-commissioned study on public participation in 1998 (discussed in Chapter 5, 
Section 5.2), of the four LMB countries, Thailand had the most developed political, environment and 
legal framework for public participation (Kaosa-ard et al., 1998) and still does today. In Thailand, the 
notion of ‘participation’, or kaan mii suan ruam (having a part in joining), first gained traction among 
NGOs in the 1980s (Käkönen & Hirsch, 2009). Despite coming to be imbued with differing 
interpretations, this notion of participation has become entrenched especially with the promulgation of 
the progressive 1997 Thai Constitution (ibid.). The TNMC Secretariat therefore faced a conundrum 
relating to transboundary complications: 
81 
 
Within our own system we have Thai laws and it is stipulated 
under the Thai Constitution that when the government wants to 
do something, they have to consult people and create a 
participatory forum to debate the issue. This is our national 
system. But the difficulty is now when the project is not within 
our own national boundary. So how could we impose our own 
system on something that belongs to our neighbours? We simply 
cannot force the PNPCA to be in line with our own national 
system. (Interview, TG1) 
 This was not just a matter of imposing Thai standards of public participation onto a Lao project, 
but also a case where the incomplete disclosure of the project information by the Lao government did 
not measure up to Thai regulations on public hearings. This reflects Gao's (2014) argument that 
transparency of information is necessary for meaningful public participation. The MRC Secretariat’s 
report on the Xayaburi PNPCA stakeholder consultations showed that the preliminary feedback 
collected from the Thai meetings included a concern that ‘the meeting cannot be recognised and 
accepted as public participation in line with Thailand public participation legislation and the 
Constitution’ (MRC, 2011b, p. 13). At the time, the 2007 Thai Constitution contained articles that 
provided for information disclosure and local community participation. The 1992 Enhancement and 
Conservation of National Environmental Quality Act also linked public participation and environmental 
protection (Gao, 2014). The 2005 Office of the Prime Minister’s regulations on public consultation 
stated that information disseminated to the public relating to the Thai government’s projects should 
include ‘substantial matter of the project’ and the ‘possible impacts on people who live or work within 
the project’s area and its vicinity and on general public’ that included mitigation measures to be taken 
(Nilprapunt, 2006, p. 2). Given the lack of a transboundary impact assessment and that the EIA and 
feasibility study for the Xayaburi Dam were only released to the public after public stakeholder 
consultations were conducted, the overall lack of information disclosure and the preliminary nature of 
the Prior Consultation process provided grounds for civil society to challenge the PNPCA process.  
  The contradictions between Thai legal frameworks and the PNPCA stakeholder consultations 
have made their way into another Thai jurisdictional arena. Thirty-seven Thai villagers filed a landmark 
lawsuit against the Thai government in the Administrative Court of Thailand on 7 August 2012, more 
than a year after the Xayaburi PNPCA had been deemed by the Lao government to be concluded. The 
lawsuit was brought against EGAT, the National Energy Policy Office, Ministry of Energy, MONRE, 
and the Thai Cabinet on three grounds, that: 1) the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) signed between 
EGAT and CH. Karnchang subsidiary Xayaburi Power Company Ltd. was invalid, 2) the PNPCA 
process did not comply with domestic laws, and 3) the cabinet’s and other defendants’ approval to sign 
the PPA was not legitimate (Thai Supreme Administrative Court, 2015). The case was initially rejected 
by the Administrative Court on the basis that Thai courts had no jurisdiction over these matters, but 
after the Thai villagers filed an appeal to the Thai Supreme Administrative Court on 21 March 2013, 
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the Supreme Court reversed the Administrative Court’s decision on 24 June 20147. While the two 
grounds relating to the PPA were not considered, the Supreme Administrative Court’s ruling noted that 
there was ‘incomplete information disclosure and public participation and non-legal compliances’ under 
the Thai Constitution and regulations (Thai Supreme Administrative Court, 2015). This was the first 
time a lawsuit had been filed in Thai courts to challenge the government’s extra-territorial obligations 
(Middleton & Pritchard, 2016).  
The Administrative Court eventually ruled in the Thai government’s favour on 25 December 
2015 and found that the DWR had ‘completely fulfilled its responsibility to conduct public consultations 
according to the PNPCA’ (Thai Supreme Administrative Court, 2015). In addition to the lawsuit, the 
TNMC Secretariat also had to answer to civil society concerns submitted to the Thai National Human 
Rights Commission (NHRC) and came under pressure to improve subsequent public consultations for 
the Don Sahong and Pak Beng PNPCAs (Interview, TG3). These developments put the TNMC 
Secretariat on the defensive, reflecting Chompunth & Chomphan's (2012) observation that the growth 
of public participation in Thai environmental decision making has largely stemmed from public 
pressure. According to TG2, the Xayaburi lawsuit has caused the TNMC Secretariat to ‘protect 
themselves and be concerned’ about issues including disseminating and making information accessible 
to local communities, ‘so that they cannot say to the courts that the Thai NMC hasn’t given any 
information to them’. It is interesting to note that for the Don Sahong and Pak Beng stakeholder 
consultations, the TNMC Secretariat chose to characterise the meetings as ‘information sharing’ 
sessions rather than ‘consultations’ (MRC, 2014a; TNMC Secretariat, 2015). According to TG3, the 
TNMC Secretariat now posts relevant data on its website (www.tnmc-is.org) and distributes 
information through community radio stations. Since 2015, the TNMC Secretariat has also acquired a 
budget for a 15-year scientific study conducted by Thai universities relating to the study and monitoring 
of the transboundary impact of mainstream hydropower development on Thailand (see TNMC 
Secretariat, 2016 for a sample report, in Thai).  
 In Cambodia, there is less attention paid to a need to conform to Cambodian legal frameworks 
on public participation. According to CG1, the higher levels of government did not issue instructions 
to improve stakeholder consultations for the Don Sahong PNPCA. Rather, the CNMC Secretariat took 
the initiative to make improvements, partly in response to criticism and blame from civil society over 
how the process was carried out for the Xayaburi PNPCA (Interview, CG1). The NGO Forum has noted 
that the existing legal framework in Cambodia does not provide for concrete procedures relating to 
public participation (The NGO Forum on Cambodia, 2017). Article 35 of Cambodia’s Constitution only 
mentions that ‘Khmer citizens … have the right to participate actively in the political, economic, social 
and cultural life of the nation’ (Constitutional Council of the Kingdom of Cambodia, 2010, p. 11). The 
                                                          
7 Coinciding with the Don Sahong Prior Consultation period (June 2014 to January 2015) 
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1996 Law on Environmental Protection and Natural Resource Management states in Article 16 that 
when the Ministry of Environment receives a request from the public, it ‘shall provide information on 
its activities, and shall encourage public participation in environmental protection and natural resource 
management’. Gao (2014, p. 212) argues that this is essentially a ‘meaningless statement’ due to the 
lack of obligation to actively disclose information and enforce public participation. Article 17 states 
that the procedures for public participation and access to information will be then determined by a Sub-
decree; although the 1999 Sub-Decree on EIA Process only states that public participation should be 
‘encouraged’ in the implementation of EIA processes (MLMUPC, 1996; Royal Government of 
Cambodia, 1999).  
 Rather, recalling Rodan's (2018) mode of participation (MOP) framework (see Chapter 3, 
Section 3.3.3), Cambodian civil society has participated in hydropower governance through state-
sponsored sites that involve societal incorporation. This can be contextualised in Cambodia’s official 
discourse of participation, kaa chaul ruam (enter-join), which indicates the joining of pre-determined 
state agendas (Käkönen & Hirsch, 2009). Representatives from the Fisheries Administration (FiA) and 
international NGOs, including Oxfam, International Rivers and WWF Cambodia were involved in a 
technical sub-working group on hydropower dams situated within the Technical Working Group (TWG) 
on fisheries (Interviews, CG5, IN1, IN3, IN6). There are 19 TWGs distinguished by sector in Cambodia, 
which were a mechanism that was initially led by Cambodia’s Development Partners (DPs). The TWGs 
comprise representatives from the Cambodian government and its DPs, and each TWG is facilitated by 
a lead donor facilitator (Ballard, 2015; Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board, 2006). 
TWGs also comprise sub-groups which deal with important technical and sometimes policy matters, 
making recommendations for discussion and/or decision at the higher level of the TWGs (Ballard, 2015). 
According to IN3, the sub-group on hydropower comprised four to five people, including NGO 
representatives and government staff who were experts on fisheries. The technical sub-working group 
provided an avenue through which these NGO representatives could channel their comments to the 
CNMC, after which they would monitor whether these comments were included in the PNPCA reply 
form (Interview, IN3) (see Section 5.3.5). In addition to the TWGs, some civil society representatives 
also said that information dissemination and discussions also took place through informal channels such 
as their personal contacts in the government (Interviews, CN5, IN3).  
 Overall, the problematisation and implementation of the PNPCA stakeholder consultations 
were complicated by the different political rationalities underlying public participation legal 
frameworks and different forms of what Rose (1999) calls governable spaces. In Thailand, the 
contradictions inherent between national and regional problematisations of public participation have 
provided grounds for the emergence of counter-politics (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4). Civil society’s 
perception of the inadequacy of the TNMC Secretariat in implementing the stakeholder consultations 
has opened opportunities to challenge the state by seeking out gaps in the diverse but ‘specific finalities’ 
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(Foucault, 1991) pursued by the TNMC Secretariat and Thai legal institutions. In Cambodia, there is a 
lack of state problematisation relating to public participation. The lack of frameworks, procedures, and 
guidelines on public participation had left the CNMC Secretariat to design the PNPCA stakeholder 
consultations with limited resources. However, alternative participatory channels are found in the 
political rationalities underlying the TWG mechanism that exists due to the influence of DPs. This 
further demonstrates the friction that the PNPCA undergoes in the multiple national contexts of the 
Mekong region, and lays the groundwork for understanding the different levels of significance attached 
to public participation by the multiple stakeholders in mainstream hydropower governance.    
5.3.5. Enabling government at a distance: the PNPCA as technology of government   
The programmatic character of government in designing interventions (Inda, 2008) in the form 
of public participation has to involve a consideration of technologies of government. These technologies 
refer to the mundane technical instruments used by government (ibid.) that enable government at a 
distance, by travelling between the spaces of public participation and broader spaces of government and 
enrolling actors into a network of interest through the process of translation (see Chapter 3, Section 
3.2.2). The 1995 Mekong Agreement may be considered a technology of government that enables 
multiple state actors to exert an influence on governing the Mekong River, by enrolling multi-scalar 
actors across the LMB. More specifically, the 1995 Mekong Agreement and the PNPCA can be 
considered immutable mobiles (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2).  As immutable mobiles that enable the 
extension and consolidation of a network through its properties of being mobile, presentable, readable 
and combinable with each other (Latour, 1986), the Mekong Agreement and the PNPCA shape the 
dynamics of translation through enabling a convergence of interests between state and non-state actors. 
The PNPCA and its specific problematisation of hydropower governance in the LMB as a technical 
process enable a two-fold enrolment of actors across space: first, carrying this problematisation 
outwards from the MRC to member state governments, and then again outwards from the centres of 
government to the localities where PNPCA stakeholder consultations are held.   
As coordinating agencies, the NMC Secretariats are key conduits through which information is 
distributed, and feedback collated. Within the MRC’s official communication channels for Prior 
Consultation, the NMC Secretariats were technically the only government agencies that are authorised 
to communicate between the national and regional levels, and according to CG1, any direct 
communication from other governmental line agencies to the MRC would be disregarded. The NMC 
Secretariats were therefore located within multiple channels of communication and information flows: 
firstly, within their respective governments as the coordinators between line agencies; secondly, within 
the MRC’s technical working groups relating to the PNPCA; and thirdly, between the channels that 
constitute public participation. Information flows via the MRC Secretariat and the NMC Secretariats 
also took place through the use of the internet, as relevant documents, data and information about not 
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just PNPCA-related matters but also data relating to the Mekong River were uploaded onto their 
respective websites, although it will be important to consider the accessibility and limitations of this 
information due to limited access to the internet and lower levels of literacy especially among rural 
riverine communities (Chenoweth et al., 2002). 
It is important to locate the problematisation of public participation within the channels of 
information flows and decision making set out by the PNPCA, as the PNPCA creates ‘proper’ channels 
and expectations through which things should be done and decisions made. The importance of the 1995 
Mekong Agreement and the PNPCA as a technology of government, more specifically a material 
artefact and an immutable mobile, which strongly influences the governance of the LMB should not be 
understated. This was somewhat inadvertently demonstrated at the start of two separate interviews held 
with TG1 and CG1; both had brought with them a physical copy of the 1995 Mekong Agreement that 
they had laid out on the table at the start of the interview. The importance of its contents was accentuated 
by the performative aspects of the interviews when the officials directly interacted with this physical 
manifestation of the Articles and Procedures by quoting from their copies of the Agreement, thumbing 
through it, or pointing at it to emphasise a point. The political rationalities that gave rise to the 1995 
Mekong Agreement also constitute the political rationalities that form the basis for NMC Secretariats 
in terms of their roles and responsibilities, which the NMC Secretariat officials took seriously.  
This was clear in the case of Thailand. The enrolling of localities into the network of interests 
set out by the PNPCA was carried out through improving public understanding about the PNPCA and 
the rationales underpinning the 1995 Mekong Agreement. The TNMC Secretariat perceived a need to 
forge better alignments with local communities, which in part stemmed from the pressure they faced 
when fierce resistance against the Xayaburi Dam took place outside of the channels of the PNPCA. The 
TNMC Secretariat set great store in public participation through the PNPCA channels, which could be 
seen from the attention paid to explaining the Prior Consultation process during the Pak Beng PNPCA 
community stakeholder consultations that I had attended. Almost one hour of the meeting was allocated 
to explaining the PNPCA, the 1995 Mekong Agreement, and the national and regional roadmaps for 
the Pak Beng PNPCA. Thai translations of the 1995 Mekong Agreement and the PNPCA were provided 
in the information booklets and pamphlets disseminated to the participants at the meetings. This 
appeared to be conscious effort to manage the expectations of participants in relation to the PNPCA, 
and how the PNPCA functions in relation to the principles laid out in the 1995 Mekong Agreement. 
TG1 explained:  
We are trying to modify the process of how to inform Thai 
people about the 1995 Mekong Agreement and its procedures. If 
you look now at our process, we not only go out to local 
communities and the region to talk about the PNPCA, but also 
to talk about the Agreement, to make them understand better the 
strengths and weaknesses provided by the Agreement in order to 
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understand why Laos takes such a position. We cannot throw 
rocks at them just because they are developing, which might 
have impacts on us. Just like our own people did during the 
Xayaburi case, you can feel the frustration but that is not the 
proper way. (Interview, TG1) 
In terms of the flow of information back towards the MRC, there are two main outputs through 
which the MRC JC will evaluate the proposed mainstream dam projects. The first is the official reply 
form from the MRC member states (discussed in this section) and the second is the MRC Secretariat’s 
Technical Review of the project (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5.3). Public participation contributes towards 
both documents. The reply form is an annex in the PNPCA, and apart from a standard cover page, there 
are no guidelines on how the substantial reply should be structured (see Appendix E). The reply forms 
are submitted by all other member countries other than the proposing country. Their concerns and 
feedback about the project, which are partly gathered from the stakeholder consultations and the 
technical review, are submitted to the MRC Secretariat via this form, which is then conveyed to the 
proposing country. The submitted reply forms are generally relatively short, and range between three 
to six pages long. NMC Secretariats play a key role in ‘curating’ the reply forms such that it reflects the 
concerns of state and non-state stakeholders. According to MRC3, the reply forms functioned as official 
records of the member country responses that will be taken into account by the MRC JC.  
In Cambodia, there appeared to be a high degree of importance attached to the reply form as a 
channel of communication and official record of concerns. The reply form also served as a technology 
of government that forged alignments between state and non-state actors to challenge the Don Sahong 
Dam. CG5 was part of a core technical team put together by the CNMC to review EIA documents and 
participate in all public consultations, and he emphasised that their responsibility was to ‘make sure that 
our [Cambodia’s] concerns are in the reply form, that is the only official document submitted to the 
MRC and other countries’. The issue of the reply form was raised by CG1, CG5, CN1, and IN3 from a 
Phnom Penh-based international NGO, who took part in the public consultations. This was possibly due 
to a relatively more interdependent relationship between the government and civil society at the time. 
IN3 saw the reply form as a way of corroborating whether the CNMC Secretariat had taken their 
feedback into account: 
We can see that the government staff have technical capacity, 
but do not have so much social knowledge [knowledge on social 
issues]. And then we give some of our social knowledge … and 
we can monitor how our work is elaborated or illustrated in the 
formal reply form … You can see two main channels to be 
involved in the formal reply form. One is through government 
staff. One is through the PNPCA consultation, but you have to 
be specific about what to say. You talk about fisheries, dam 
impacts, sediments, social, whichever area you want to highlight. 
(Interview, IN3) 
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In Thailand, the reply form was not brought up by either TNMC Secretariat officials or NGO 
representatives unless respondents were directly asked about it, perhaps indicating that other channels 
of communication, information flows, and decision making were considered more important by both 
state and nonstate actors. TN4 voiced a critical view of this role accorded to the TNMC Secretariat and 
the reply form:  
The DWR is like a postman’s job – that has been something 
people have criticised. This is the most you can do. You are just 
a courier. But you are the DWR, you are the TNMC, you should 
do much more than this… There were stronger views and points 
made in the meetings, and those points were not flagged [in the 
reply form]. (Interview, TN4) 
Overall, as Murdoch (2006) has explained, such technologies play key roles in consolidating a 
network as they function as ‘delegates’ between the centre and enrolled localities. These immutable 
mobiles travel by different pathways and acquire differing levels of significance in specific state 
contexts that are mediated by the NMC Secretariats. In Thailand, the 1995 Mekong Agreement and the 
PNPCA travelling outwards towards the Mekong local communities were emphasised by the TNMC 
Secretariat during the Pak Beng PNPCA, while in Cambodia the reply form that travelled back towards 
the MRC and Lao government took on greater significance during the Don Sahong PNPCA. The 
inclusion of stakeholder consultations in the PNPCA created an additional layer of friction as the 
immutable mobiles travelled from the centres of each nation-state to the localities where communities 
reside by the Mekong River, and through the spaces of participation themselves. For the NMC 
Secretariats, government at a distance was therefore complicated by the dynamics of translation when 
these technologies encountered friction within differentiated networks of interests, stakeholder 
alignments, and participatory spaces. The competing interests of states, the ambiguities within the 
PNPCA and selective interpretations of the Agreement and the PNPCA challenged the cohesion of this 
translation of interests across the region. The rendering technical of mainstream hydropower 
governance in the LMB, which will be further discussed in Chapter 6, must therefore be grounded 
within the technologies that make problematisation and government at a distance possible.   
5.3.6. ‘Proper’ channels of engagement: the conduct of conduct  
 While the discussion has thus far focused on government institutions and technologies, it is 
important to recall that governmentality is also defined by the conduct of conduct, or practices aimed 
towards shaping the behaviours or actions of people towards a variety of ends (see Chapter 3, Section 
3.2.1). PNPCA stakeholder consultations may have come to be problematised as a channel through 
which the ‘conduct’ of civil society and local communities were shaped not just to be in line with the 
norms of diplomatic behaviour between governments, but in some cases to subvert these conventions. 
The NMC Secretariats, through negotiating their direct engagements with both state and non-state actors 
through Prior Consultation, reflected the types of subjectivities that were valued when engaging in the 
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PNPCA. In Thailand, this could be seen when TNMC Secretariat officials contrasted confrontational 
advocacy strategies to the official, state-sponsored channels of the PNPCA. In Cambodia, the CNMC 
Secretariat saw an opportunity for civil society to voice concerns that state actors could not through 
these official channels. 
The Thai Mekong People’s Network organised protests against the Xayaburi Dam at various 
venues (see Chapter 2, Section 2.6.1), but the protest involving 250 Thai villagers who carried out a 
protest on the Mekong River in Nong Khai during the 2012 ASEM in Vientiane stood out. The incident 
was publicised through a press release from International Rivers (see Herbertson, 2012) and picked up 
by the Thai and international media (see Alpert, 2012; Bangkok Post and Bloomberg, 2012). TG1 
argued that this attempt to paint Laos in a bad light was not the ‘proper way to behave towards 
neighbouring countries’ at a time when Laos was hosting a big event on the international stage. This 
reaction can be situated within Jackson’s (2004) conceptualisation of the Thai regime of images, 
whereby actions and statements articulated in the public realm are strictly monitored, and where formal 
and informal modes of power may be exerted should such actions and statements disrupt idealised 
representations of the Thai state. Prior Consultation is considered as one of the diplomatic channels 
through which Mekong countries deal with one another, and this view about the PNPCA being the 
‘proper’ channel to raise concerns was brought up by other Thai officials as well (Interviews TG2, TG3). 
TG3 spoke about how stakeholders had ‘improved’ themselves by participating in state channels to seek 
accountability:  
Sometimes they [stakeholders] have a group against the 
government office for the Xayaburi and Don Sahong, they have 
a group to show their signs [protest banners] to stop the dam and 
everything. But here [at the Pak Beng PNPCA], maybe because 
this is the third project of Laos, they improve themselves as well. 
They not only come to the forum and show their signs, but they 
go to the NHRC… and the commissioner has to ask the 
department that is involved to answer the question. That means 
stakeholders themselves adapt themselves as well. (Interview, 
TG3) 
TG2 also described how stakeholders had changed their tactics since then:  
Now local people are more informed than before… When the 
Xayaburi started, there were many protests against us because 
they strongly did not want the dam… Now they have changed, 
because if they do like that they can’t achieve anything. So we 
say to them if you want to have [compensation] you need to 
have… good data to show that the change comes from the 
hydropower project. (Interview, TG2)  
 These comments reflect how particular types of conduct by civil society or local communities 
were valued over others, and to some degree reflect what Braun & Könninger (2017, p. 5) identified as 
an ‘enduring assumption’ by the government that the fundamental problem associated with public 
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participation is the public’s lack of trust in the process, therefore implying that it is the public, rather 
than institutions, which has to change. The problematisation of public participation within the PNPCA 
channels therefore involved creating subjects that maintained good diplomatic relations between the 
MRC member countries. These expectations of ‘acceptable’ conduct extended towards state actors, who 
were subject to even tighter restrictions in relation to diplomatic conduct. However, by incorporating 
the ‘public’ and nonstate subjectivities, the PNPCA stakeholder consultations provided avenues for the 
NMC Secretariats to circumvent the limitations imposed by state-centric and official ‘Track 1’ arenas 
(see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.4). The formality of these Track 1 processes limited room for negotiation, 
as state representatives had to perform a role reflecting state interests: 
Track 1 is a formal process where representatives from the 
government come to meetings and discuss, debate, and negotiate 
on behalf of their governments… It is difficult to come to a 
conclusion and resolution even on small issues because of this 
issue of being representatives of the government. They could not 
get things done because they talk in a formal way… We figured 
out in those days that Track 1 is not always helpful or useful. 
(Interview, TG1) 
 This is where the notion of performativity intersects with rendering technical, especially in 
relation to its second key element, antipolitics. Recalling that performativity comprises citational and 
reiterative acts that reproduce and/or subvert discourses, and which enable and discipline subjects 
(Gregson & Rose, 2000), the problematisation of hydropower governance through the technical 
channels of the MRC was infused with this performative dynamic in which state representatives could 
not overstep the limits imposed by state interests. This performative force of sovereign authority in the 
Mekong region was reinforced not just through the MRC, but through the reiterative practices that were 
reasserted and re-enacted in the context of ASEAN. Such performances were underpinned by the 
‘ASEAN Way’ and ‘Mekong Spirit’ of cooperation, characterised by a principle of non-interference in 
sovereign affairs and avoiding negative attitudes to neighbouring countries, which not only had the 
effect of suppressing conflict but also limiting cooperation over issues such as Mekong mainstream 
dams (Hirsch & Jensen, 2006; Mirumachi, 2015). This was demonstrated when both TG1 and CG1 
spoke about the need for their countries to respect the Lao government’s right to pursue economic 
development.  
The PNPCA stakeholder consultations fell under Track 2 semi-official governance forums that 
involved a wider range of stakeholders but still privileged state actors. The enrolment of non-state actors 
into the network extended through the stakeholder consultations offered opportunities for state actors 
to indirectly subvert the limitations imposed by state authority because the performances of nonstate 
actors were not subject to the same disciplinary norms. In the case of the Don Sahong PNPCA, several 
respondents agreed that there were relatively high levels of concern about the impacts of the dam to the 
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fisheries of Cambodia. At the discretion of the CNMC Secretariat, there was some dependence on 
Cambodian civil society to speak out where the Cambodian government could not:  
That was not the instructions from the top. But based on my 
analysis and understanding… when I am with the government, I 
know the limitations of speech. And sometimes I borrowed the 
voices of civil society. That is the tactic of negotiation. 
(Interview, CG1) 
 The multiple spaces of public participation that emerged in Cambodia for the Don Sahong Dam, 
both within and beyond the channels of the PNPCA, could be attributed to this temporary alignment of 
interests between the top levels of the Cambodian government and Cambodian civil society (also see 
Chapters 6 and 7). The space that was opened for civil society to advocate against the Don Sahong Dam 
was especially stark when contrasted with the controversial and politically sensitive case of the domestic 
LS2 Dam in Stung Treng Province (introduced in Chapter 2, Section 2.6.3). The Cambodian 
government was tight-lipped about the potentially negative impacts of the LS2 Dam, less open in terms 
of information disclosure, and more sensitive to public criticism (Interviews, CC1, CN3, CN5, IN5). 
CN5 said:  
We see that if we compare with the sensitive cases at the moment, 
the Sambor, Lower Sesan 2, and Stung Treng dams, all the 
project documents, the government are not allowed to disclose. 
But for the case of the Don Sahong, since it belongs to Laos, 
even though it has a transboundary impact but it’s in Laos. So 
we still have space to work with them [the Cambodian 
government], to cooperate with them. And they also still have 
space to cooperate with civil society groups. Because there are 
not too many demands from their supervisors. (Interview, CN5) 
From the perspective of state actors, PNPCA stakeholder consultations could therefore be 
problematised to serve multiple ends of government. While the initial incorporation of public 
participation into Prior Consultation may have been driven by internal and external actors to the MRC 
who had high levels of concern around the negative impacts of mainstream hydropower dam 
development, the implementation of stakeholder consultations became a key responsibility of the NMC 
Secretariats. As such, the stakeholder consultations were problematised according to the logics of 
government specific to each country’s circumstances, as discussed in Section 5.3, and were also co-
opted by state actors. In addition to these national-level contexts, the problematisation of the PNPCA 
stakeholder consultations must also be examined in relation to the political rationalities and 
technologies of government utilised by the MRC and NMC Secretariats, especially in their efforts to 
enact government at a distance by enrolling distant localities into state-dominated networks of interests 
that frame hydropower governance in the LMB.  
As argued in Chapter 3 (Section 3.3.2), public participation is closely linked to the third element 
of rendering technical relating to a containment of challenges to the status quo. As Chapter 6 will show, 
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the containment of political contestation was carried out through the element of rendering technical that 
created an antipolitics of hydropower development. The problematisation of the PNPCA stakeholder 
consultations has also been infused with performative dimensions relating to the shaping of particular 
subjectivities. The conduct of conduct, here associated with the state’s attempt to shape behaviours 
through the participatory spaces opened up through the PNPCA, was utilised to a variety of ends by the 
NMC Secretariats, who have to some degree defined ‘the permissible bounds of conflict’(Rodan, 2018, 
p. 42) in relation to the PNPCA. In Thailand, the need to ‘educate’ the public about the PNPCA and the 
1995 Mekong Agreement may be perceived as a way of shaping governable subjects such that they did 
not jeopardise state-to-state relations. The case of Cambodia also showed that public participation may 
also be utilised as a means of manoeuvring the limitations of official channels of communication, albeit 
at the discretion of the prevailing interests of policy makers and implementors at the time.  
5.4. Problematising publics, place, scale, and time: bringing participatory spaces into being  
This section moves the focus from underlying political rationalities that have problematised 
public participation in the LMB to understanding how the PNPCA stakeholder consultations have been 
established as a regime of practices from the perspectives of publics, place, scale, and time. During the 
Xayaburi PNPCA, stakeholder consultations were classified into community-based and national 
consultation meetings. Community-based meetings were primarily targeted at the local level, including 
potentially affected community groups. National consultation meetings were targeted at a ‘wider range 
of stakeholder representatives’ including government agencies, NGOs, parliamentarians, and research 
institutes (MRC, 2011b, p. 9). These meetings were first organised in January and February 2011, 
midway into the Xayaburi PNPCA, with two meetings in Cambodia, four in Thailand, and two in 
Vietnam. The Lao government noted that consultations with potentially affected communities were 
already conducted in the preparation of the Social Impact Assessment and Resettlement Action Plan for 
the Xayaburi Dam project, and did not hold any further consultations during the Prior Consultation 
period. For subsequent iterations of Prior Consultation, community-based and national consultation 
meetings were held in Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam but not Laos, which only hosted the regional 
stakeholder consultations. This thesis focuses on the country-based community-based meetings, which 
will henceforth be called ‘community stakeholder consultations’.  
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A common complaint voiced by civil society and local communities was that potentially 
affected communities were not adequately represented at the public consultations, both because not 
enough local representatives were invited and too few public consultations were held. This was a 
complaint that government officials themselves recognised, as I observed during the 2nd MRC Regional 
Stakeholder Forum for the Pak Beng Dam while sitting at the same table with CNMC Secretariat staff 
and a TNMC Secretariat official. Close to the beginning of the forum, the TNMC Secretariat official 
asked the CNMC Secretariat officials how many public consultations they had held, to which they 
replied they had held two. The TNMC Secretariat official then said that Thailand would be holding four 
public consultations, but still received complaints that this was not enough. She added that they did not 
have the budget to hold any more meetings and quipped that even if they held eight sessions, they would 
probably still get complaints that this was insufficient. This is linked to the assumption discussed in 
Chapter 3 that more public participation is always better (Braun & Könninger, 2017) and that inclusion 
is a key quality of successful participation (Chilvers & Kearnes, 2016a). Nonetheless, in the Mekong 
Region these are valid concerns especially in considering the regional impacts of mainstream 
hydropower dam development to 60 million people in the LMB. Table 5.3 shows how many stakeholder 
consultations were held for the Xayaburi, Don Sahong, and Pak Beng PNPCA, and in which locations:  
Table 5.3. List of PNPCA stakeholder consultations at regional and national levels, excluding Laos 
There were some key differences between each iteration of Prior Consultation. During the Don 
Sahong PNPCA, several changes were made to the stakeholder consultations. More stakeholder 
consultations were held across the region and especially in Thailand and Cambodia, and one regional 
stakeholder consultation held in Laos. This was partly in response to heavy criticism of the Xayaburi 
PNPCA, which was acknowledged by the then-MRCS CEO Hans Guttman in his opening speech at the 
regional public consultation for the Don Sahong Dam on 12 December 2014:  
… the process [of holding stakeholder consultations for the 
Xayaburi Dam] was justifiably criticised from two points. Firstly 
the national consultations were inadequate to account for 
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national practices and reaching a significant portion of 
concerned stakeholders. Secondly, no regional consultation was 
provided for those actors which did not have the opportunity to 
participate in the national consultations. (MRC, 2014b) 
 These changes may be seen in terms of extending the spatial reach of the stakeholder 
consultations to include a wider proportion of locales and local stakeholders in Prior Consultation. In 
terms of government at a distance, this meant that a wider number of localities had to be enrolled into 
the PNPCA network of interest. Murdoch (2006) notes that the extension and consolidation of networks 
occur in tandem with the transformation of space that establish relations between a central authority 
and micro-locales, and the following sections pay closer attention to the spatial-temporal dimensions of 
the participatory spaces that have emerged through the PNPCA. Understanding the problematisation of 
public participation in terms of its implementation involves an examination of the ways in which these 
stakeholder consultations were problematised through publics, place, scale, and time. A consideration 
of the politics associated with these elements will highlight the challenges that accompany the 
enrolment of local community stakeholders into the networks extending from the MRC Secretariat and 
the NMC Secretariats.  
5.4.1. Enrolling actors into the PNPCA network 
 In their proposal for a co-produced, emergent and relational understanding of public 
participation, Chilvers & Kearnes (2016a) criticise ‘residual realist’ conceptions of the public in two 
ways: first, that publics are imagined to exist in a ‘natural’ state external to the practices of participation, 
and second that publics are presented as aggregations of autonomous, individual human subjects. A 
relational understanding of participation sees publics as mediated and emergent and as parts of socio-
material collectives (ibid). In the context of Mekong hydropower governance, Boer et al. (2015, p. 151) 
identify how EIA regulations encourage ‘segmentation of the population into particular categories and 
subcategories, or the eliciting of certain subjectivities (such as those of ‘stakeholders’ and ‘affected 
groups’)’ [original emphasis]. As discussed in the previous section, these subjectivities were situated 
within the problematisation of the PNPCA as the ‘proper’ channel for participation. In this way, 
normative ideals of ‘ideal publics’ (Chilvers & Kearnes, 2016b) come into being. The formation of 
publics is one dimension of a participatory regime of practices, reflecting one aspect of problematisation 
that enrols civil society and local communities into Prior Consultation. This subsection examines how 
particular stakeholders come to be included or excluded from the PNPCA stakeholder consultations.  
 In Thailand, invitations to the PNPCA community stakeholder consultations were generally 
extended to members of River Basin Organisations (RBOs) that were created in 2003 ‘under the DWR’s 
rhetoric of promoting participation under Integrated Water Resource Management principles’ (Blake, 
2016, p. 35). This reflects the intersection of multiple participatory regimes of practices initiated by the 
DWR. Similar to Cambodia’s TWGs, the RBOs constitute part of Rodan's (2018) MOP framework 
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relating to state-societal incorporation. There are RBOs in the 25 river basins of Thailand, which 
comprise part of the DWR’s civil society network. The TNMC Secretariat also runs a volunteer network 
named the ‘Network of Civil Society Monitoring the Impact in Eight Mekong Provinces’ (henceforth 
known as the ‘DWR Volunteer Network’) that assists them with data collection for the 15-year study 
mentioned in Section 5.3.4 earlier. However, such representation has been criticised by members of the 
STM Coalition and local community members, who argued that local representatives from RBOs, 
despite living in the Mekong River Basin, do not necessarily work on issues relating to the Mekong 
River, or may not be directly affected by environmental impacts arising from mainstream dam 
development: 
The public consultation was held in Chiang Rai for the first time 
and it turned out that the participants were hand-picked by the 
organisers [DWR], because DWR has its own network… So 
they extended invitations to these people mostly. People who 
mostly did not have anything to do with the Mekong River. So 
when those people came to attend how could they contribute 
anything critical? (Interview, TN4) 
A community representative from Nong Khai and the Thai Mekong People’s Network was also critical 
about the invitations and representation at the community stakeholder consultations held in Isan for the 
Xayaburi Dam:  
For the PNPCA in Nakhon Phanom, they [DWR] said they 
announced it on their website but nobody told us, and we knew 
about it from NGO friends… We demanded that the PNPCA 
should be held in every province. The distance from Loei to 
Nong Khai is about 200km, and just only 30 or 40 people from 
each province is not enough … The people who came had a good 
relationship with DWR, so they have a hidden agenda together. 
(Interview, TC2) 
 This issue appears to have persisted into the Don Sahong and Pak Beng community stakeholder 
consultations. According to a blog post by International Rivers, members from the Thai Mekong 
People’s Network were not invited to the first stakeholder consultation held for the Don Sahong PNPCA 
in Ubon Ratchathani. The Thai Mekong People’s Network found out about the meeting through the 
media, and about 70 people from the network and the Pak Mun Dam area ended up protesting inside 
the meeting venue despite being refused entry by soldiers and security staff (International Rivers, 
2014c). TC2 said that for the Don Sahong PNPCA in Nong Khai, the DWR had approached her to invite 
participants, but ‘the questions from the affected people were very strong, and the DWR felt 
embarrassed and so they have not worked with me again’. For the Pak Beng PNPCA, she was unaware 
that a PNPCA stakeholder consultation would take place (Interview, TC2) and several interviewees 
mentioned how most of the participants at the meetings were from RBOs (Interviews, TG4, TC4, TC10, 
TC11). This issue was even brought up by a member of the DWR Volunteer Network in Nong Khai:   
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When there is a public consultation, we have a platform with the 
DWR, who only invite people from their network, people who 
can raise their voice but not people who will be affected by the 
future project. So before a big project is started, there should be 
a hearing. I’m very stressed about this, because the DWR invited 
people who do not have much to do with the dam. But the DWR 
invites people in their network, so they can score points. And if 
something happens [after the project goes ahead], the people 
who will face trouble will be the people who live along the 
Mekong River. (Interview, TC11)  
However, there were others who appreciated the presence of diverse stakeholders:  
The objective of this meeting is to improve understanding 
between the government and local communities … this meeting 
is not only attended by NGO people, many people attend the 
meetings and they can be farmers, workers, or in the tourism 
industry. You can have many opinions, not only NGO opinions. 
(Interview, TC15) 
 The TNMC Secretariat did not exercise full control over the participant list, as invitations were 
extended through the RBOs and DWR Volunteer Network. Information about the stakeholder 
consultations was also spread by word of mouth. While the flow of information about the stakeholder 
consultations may not have been directly communicated to the Thai Mekong People’s Network, there 
were no tight controls on who eventually turned up for the meetings. TG1 acknowledged criticism that 
the TNMC Secretariat had not been able to engage with all the relevant stakeholders and said that the 
TNMC Secretariat had ‘two or three permanent invitees from NGOs’ who would communicate the 
information about the meetings to their respective networks (Interview, TG1). For the Pak Beng PNPCA, 
a representative from the DWR Volunteer Network said that the TNMC Secretariat allowed the 
chairperson of the network to decide who to invite to the meeting (Interview, TC3). Whether or not 
STM Coalition members were invited to the PNPCA public consultations appeared to depend on their 
relationship with RBO members and the DWR Volunteer Network. For example, the Rak Chiang Khong 
was invited to attend the public consultation meetings for the Pak Beng PNPCA possibly because of 
their strong influence in the area and working relationships with district authorities (Interview, TC1).  
 In Cambodia, the formation of the ‘public’ took place in a different way. The TNMC Secretariat 
largely depended on its existing networks, which could be considered as existing participatory regimes 
of practices established by the DWR. However, the CNMC Secretariat did not have such institutionally-
embedded networks to draw upon. Although Sneddon & Fox's (2007) study showed that the CNMC 
Secretariat had organised stakeholder consultations for the MRC’s BDP in the early 2000s, CG1 said 
that the CNMC Secretariat did not have the experience to organise the Xayaburi stakeholder 
consultations, and that even with some instructions from the government it was difficult for them to 
decide on how to structure the consultations (Interview, CG1). CG1 spoke about how the CNMC 
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Secretariat rationalised the formation of a ‘public’ to be invited to these meetings based on their limited 
resources:  
We have the government component, we have the community 
component, we have the civil society component. But of course, 
we cannot invite everybody who would like to come. We have 
to make the grouping relating to their motivation, relating to 
mitigation issues. Because we have limited budget and we have 
limited time, we have to make these groupings. (Interview, CG1) 
There was also a spatial dimension involved in selecting where the stakeholder consultations were to 
be held, especially considering that the Mekong River Basin accounts for the majority of Cambodia’s 
land area, and the Tonle Sap Lake is bordered by six provinces:  
As for the area where we can hold public consultations, we can 
only do it along the Mekong River and around the Tonle Sap. 
We cannot do it for the whole country. And then along the 
Mekong River, how many provinces [to select], and around the 
Tonle Sap Lake how many provinces, then we narrow it down. 
We will consider the communities, civil society, local authorities, 
and local line departments to invite. (Interview, CG1) 
Compared to the TNMC Secretariat, the CNMC Secretariat exercised a higher degree of control 
over the invitations to the stakeholder consultations (Whitehead, 2011). The decision to hold more 
stakeholder consultations and to include local communities in the Don Sahong PNPCA was due to the 
proximity of the Don Sahong Dam to Stung Treng Province and government concerns about the impacts 
of the dam to the fisheries of Cambodia. However, the community stakeholder consultations were not 
publicly announced and only those invited from NGOs, government, and communities received 
personal notification about the meetings (Sok, 2014). Regarding the inclusion of community-level 
representation, the CNMC Secretariat depended on members of the Rivers Coalition of Cambodia (RCC) 
to recommend community representatives who should be invited to the meetings: 
The PNPCA was useful for local authorities, government and the 
community because the communities have a space to raise 
concerns and lobby with decision makers. But there were not 
enough representatives from the community – only three 
representatives from Mekong River communities joined the 
meetings … Only about four to five NGOs joined the PNPCA; 
they [CNMC] called the NGOs in Stung Treng and Siem Reap, 
and at the national level the RCC. The CNMC decided on the 
invitations. When we saw the representatives invited, we tried to 
coordinate to add more representatives, but there was limited 
space and budget to do so.  (Interview, CN4) 
They [CNMC] asked us to submit the names to identify who 
should be invited. And then we gave them [the names] for the 
community for the Mekong, but it was only around three to four 
out of all our selected participants that were invited to attend the 
meeting … We understand that the space is not big enough for 
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larger participation, but at least there should be coordination to 
collect concerns, comments and recommendations from the 
ground. (Interview, CN5) 
These NGOs also had their own preferred community contacts whom they would invite to participate 
in the meetings:  
Usually… only community representatives could join the [PNPCA] 
consultations. And those representatives are usually people who are 
active in their village. And when they are active, these people are 
usually very busy, and are always invited by NGOs. So we question 
whether they consult with their community, and whether they are 
selected by the community or the NGOs. (Interview, IN5)  
In Cambodia, a smaller range of stakeholders, especially at the community level, was able to 
attend the PNPCA stakeholder consultations as compared to Thailand. The RCC’s joint statement on 
their concerns about the Don Sahong PNPCA stated that out of 80 invited participants who took part in 
the subnational consultations, only six were local community members (RCC, 2014). However, during 
the Pak Beng PNPCA, local communities were not invited to the public consultations at all, and only 
about five NGOs received invitations, including NGO Forum (Interviews, IN3, CN1, CN5). CN5 noted 
that for the Pak Beng PNPCA, the CNMC Secretariat planned to conduct two national consultations, 
but the CNMC Secretariat said that because of budgetary limitations the second one would not involve 
NGOs. CN5 added that it was likely that the second would have been a closed-door consultation where 
only technical personnel were invited.  
Overall, in Thailand and Cambodia it was apparent, to some extent, that the more public 
consultations were carried out, a wider spectrum of stakeholders could be enrolled into the PNPCA 
process. However, the ways in which the formation of these publics were problematised were grounded 
in the political rationalities of the TNMC Secretariat and CNMC Secretariat. In Thailand, the formation 
of an ‘ideal public’ was predicated on the DWR’s existing participatory networks. But because the 
invitation of participants was delegated to the DWR’s networks, there were openings for other 
concerned segments of the public to participate in the stakeholder consultations. In Cambodia, the 
segmentation of the population into categories and perceived subjectivities was more deliberate, as there 
was a high degree of central control over the invitations. Nonetheless, the RCC was able to nominate 
community participants to attend the consultations, albeit to a very limited degree. Rather than drawing 
upon assumptions that participants are part of a homogeneous community (Cooke & Kothari, 2001), a 
relational understanding of participation is required to understand how publics come into being.  
5.4.2. Politics of place 
Place is defined by Cresswell (2009, p. 169) as a ‘meaningful site’ that brings together location, 
locale, and a sense of place. The problematisation of public participation involves a consideration of 
location which Cresswell (ibid.) describes as the where of place. The problematisation of PNPCA 
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stakeholder consultations may be considered in terms of where the public consultations should be held, 
based on the limited resources of the NMC Secretariats. The remaining elements of place relating to 
locale, or material setting for social relations, and a sense of place, relating to the meanings attached to 
a place (ibid), did not appear to be major considerations for the NMC Secretariats. Compared to the 
Xayaburi PNPCA, at least twice the number of stakeholder consultations were organised for the Don 
Sahong PNPCA, although this number fell for the Pak Beng PNPCA. The places selected for 
stakeholder consultations must be considered in relation to the physical locations of the proposed 
mainstream dams, as certain areas would be hardest hit by the impacts. This was the case for Stung 
Treng Province in Cambodia, which is about two kilometres downstream of the Don Sahong Dam, and 
for Chiang Rai province in Thailand, which is about a hundred kilometres upstream of the proposed 
Pak Beng Dam. Concerns about the impacts of mainstream dams to the fisheries of Cambodia and the 
Tonle Sap Lake were also reflected in the choosing of Battambang, one of the six provinces bordering 
the Tonle Sap Lake, as a meeting location. These issues were noted by civil society representatives in 
Thailand and Cambodia:  
They [TNMC Secretariat] made more consultation meetings and 
bring a few people from every province, and the village heads 
go to the meetings. For the Pak Beng we heard that they are 
starting to do so. We know that MRC Thailand [TNMC 
Secretariat] is trying to make it more open for people’s 
participation which is good … even if they do not do [the 
consultations] properly, at least they have more. I heard that at 
least they try to make it very complete, try to give more 
information, and have more time for the questions and answers. 
It seems that we have some development. At least they are aware. 
(Interview, TN3) 
You can see in terms of the procedure, the quality is there, and 
for the Don Sahong [PNPCA] I would say it was better than the 
Xayaburi in terms of participation. That means that more people 
were involved in terms of participation at the grassroots. Even if 
they disagree, they are involved in the discussion. (Interview, 
IN3) 
The locations of the public consultations mattered because this has an impact on who was able 
to attend the meetings. A participant may have to travel to another district or province to attend the 
meeting closest to them, which may involve hours of travel as these distances typically span hundreds 
of kilometres. An anecdote from the Pak Beng PNPCA meeting in Nong Khai might illustrate the effort 
required to attend such meetings. The meeting started later than the scheduled 9.30AM, as the group 
from Nakhon Phanom, about four hours away by road, was delayed. The meeting was attended by 
representatives from four of the seven provinces that border the Mekong River in Isan: Nong Khai, Loei, 
Nakhon Phanom, and Bueng Kan (see Figure 5.1). Representatives from Udon Thani Province were 
also present, even though the province does not border the Mekong River. This meant that resources 
were required for participants to take part in the meetings, especially in terms of transport and foregoing 
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their income for the day. In the case of Cambodia, CN5 said that even for national NGOs, ‘It’s also a 
big challenge for them even if they are invited, but they don’t have the money to support [their 
participation], because the CNMC does not have the budget [to support them]’ (Interview, CN5). This 
was also noted by Sok (2014) in his study of the Don Sahong PNPCA consultation that was held in the 
provincial capital of Stung Treng, which was located at least three hours away from affected 
communities by boat and taxi (see Figure 5.2).  
 
 
Figure 5.1. Map of the eight Mekong provinces in Thailand, and the meeting venues for the Pak Beng PNPCA. 
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Figure 5.2. Map of meeting venues for the Don Sahong PNPCA in Cambodia 
 
This politics of place could also be seen in terms of the venues chosen for the public 
consultations, which demonstrate how the notion of place in terms of locale and sense of place are 
closely intertwined and challenge state problematisations of public participation that drew upon a 
seemingly simplistic understanding of place as location. Places are constituted by power relations, and 
choices made in relation to the choosing of locations venues may possibly be an enactment of state 
authority. This was especially apparent when the Thai Mekong People’s Network chose to boycott the 
final stakeholder consultation for the Don Sahong PNPCA, which was held at the Royal Army Club in 
Bangkok on 7 January 2015. The political climate of Thailand at the time was largely dictated by a 
military government, following the coup of 22 May 2014. In explaining their reasons for the boycott to 
the Bangkok Post, the leader of the Rak Chiang Khong group said: 
I am very upset that the forum will be conducted at a military 
venue. It shows the department lacks sincerity in collecting 
opinions from participants and stakeholders. The military cannot 
offer an atmosphere of freedom of expression. (Wipatayotin, 
2015) 
 The choice of location and consistent use of government venues for stakeholder consultations 
constitutes a performative demonstration of state authority, whether intentional or merely an outcome 
of pragmatic considerations or protocol. The venue for the public consultations were usually 
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government buildings or hotels. Through the ‘staged’ nature of these public consultations, state 
authority and formality were reinforced through the meeting proceedings. From my observations at the 
Thai stakeholder consultations for the Pak Beng PNPCA, participants must register their identification 
details before receiving information handouts, and the substantial sessions within the meetings were 
usually preceded by opening addresses from a representative from the provincial or district governor’s 
office and/or the DWR. This confers an air of formality on the proceedings and may reinforce a 
disconnect between the NMCs, who are part of the central government, and the peripheral localities 
that were to be enrolled into the ‘proper’ channels of the PNPCA.  
In the case of Cambodia’s public consultations during the Don Sahong PNPCA, Sok (2014, p. 
20), noted that ‘there was no forum or local consultation at the community level where more villagers 
could attend and where they would feel more “at home” asking questions and voicing concerns’. Such 
choices in locations and venues might have exacerbated imbalances in power relations especially given 
that community representatives only constituted a small minority of the participants at the stakeholder 
consultations in Cambodia. This performance of state authority will be further discussed in Chapter 6 
in relation to the performative acts of rendering technical. Chapter 7 will discuss how this politics of 
place was also very apparent in civil society-organised events. For now, it is sufficient to note that the 
problematisation of public participation has thus far been centred around an understanding of place as 
location, but it is necessary to consider the multi-faceted dimensions of place if one is to adopt a co-
produced, emergent, and relation understanding of public participation.  
5.4.3. Politics of scale  
The second key difference between successive iterations of Prior Consultation was also spatial 
in nature, relating to scale. The spatial-temporal ‘scalar disconnect’ (Suhardiman et al., 2012) that has 
characterised transboundary water governance of the Mekong River privileges the imperatives of the 
state at the expense of the local, who are often excluded from participating in decision making as many 
observers have noted (Dore & Lebel, 2010; Fox & Sneddon, 2005; Lebel et al., 2005; Sneddon & Fox, 
2007). It is necessary to reiterate that scale should not be conceptualised as an a priori construct 
(MacKinnon, 2011), but rather, considered as categories that emerge through practice (Moore, 2008). 
Given that mainstream hydropower dams would have transboundary impacts, the problematisation of 
stakeholder consultations at the national level was deemed to be insufficient to address the 
transboundary implication of the dams. This could also be seen in calls from the STM Coalition and 
downstream governments Cambodia and Vietnam for transboundary impact assessments. The Xayaburi 
PNPCA lacked a regional public consultation, which the STM Coalition had demanded for in an open 
letter to the MRC and its DPs (Save the Mekong, 2012). Regional consultations were incorporated into 
the Don Sahong and Pak Beng PNPCAs, which were hosted in Laos. One regional stakeholder forum 
was organised for the Don Sahong PNPCA and two were organised for the Pak Beng PNPCA.   
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According to a speech made by the then-MRCS CEO Hans Guttman at the Don Sahong regional 
stakeholder consultation, the regional consultations aimed to ‘provide an additional venue for regional 
and international organisations, civil society, the media, research institutes and the MRC’s 
Development Partners who may not have had the opportunity to participate in the national events’ 
(MRC, 2014b). This problematised the ‘regional’ as a category that was characterised by very particular 
practices and actors, which involved the technical review as the key object of concern and the 
emergence of a ‘public’ comprising the stakeholders mentioned by the Mr. Guttman. This also suggests 
strongly that consultations with local communities still fell under the purview of each national 
government. It is therefore important to pay attention to the absences at these regional meetings, as 
argued in the discussion on event ethnography (Chapter 4, Section 4.4.3). At the regional level, there 
was little representation from local communities and local civil society organisations (see Figure 5.3). 
These were also my observations at the two regional stakeholder forums for the Pak Beng Dam, which 
were conducted in English and therefore posed a language barrier even if local community 
representatives were to attend. 
Figure 5.3: Summary of participants at MRC Regional Stakeholder Forum for the Pak Beng Dam, 22 
February 2017 (Based on participant list distributed at the forum) 
 
At the first regional stakeholder forum, the only Mekong community representatives present 
were part of the Thai government delegation. The TNMC Secretariat had included two local civil 
society representatives from their network in their entourage. According to one of the representatives, 
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this was the first time that the TNMC Secretariat had done so at the regional level (Interview, TC3). I 
observed the Thai officials translating the proceedings for the local community representatives who had 
limited understanding of English; one representative later had the opportunity to share his experience 
at the community stakeholder consultation in Nong Khai. At the second forum the TNMC Secretariat 
included one of their ‘permanent invitees’ civil society representatives on the final reflection panel 
during the forum, who spoke about his concerns regarding the upstream impact of the Pak Beng Dam 
to Chiang Rai Province. This representative, Mr. Hannarong Yaowalers, leads the Thai Water 
Partnership (a water-related NGO in Thailand), and had also been involved with the STM campaign. 
This inclusion of civil society representation could be attributed to the TNMC Secretariat’s concern 
with improving stakeholder engagement. This inclusion could also possibly be attributed their concerns 
about the direct impacts of the Pak Beng Dam to Thailand, which may have been similar to the CNMC 
Secretariat’s strategy during the Don Sahong PNPCA to encourage civil society voices to speak out on 
their behalf.  
In the case of Cambodia, CN4 recalled that their Stung Treng-based organisation was involved 
in the provincial and national-level public consultations for the Don Sahong PNPCA but did not receive 
an invitation to participate in the regional public consultation. CG1 recounted that given the limitations 
of what the CNMC could say as representatives of the Cambodian government, this was a key 
opportunity for Cambodian civil society to voice their concerns at a regional level. However, he felt 
‘frustrated’ when WWF Cambodia boycotted the meeting. In addition, civil society and community 
representatives from the NGO Forum and Stung Treng did not make it to the meeting after running into 
administrative complications at the Cambodia-Lao border crossing8 (Interview, CG1). As for the Pak 
Beng PNPCA regional stakeholder consultations, the RCC was represented by Phnom Penh-based 
Oxfam Australia at the first forum, and then by the NGO Forum at the second forum. Overall, there 
appeared to be a disconnect between the regional and local levels of hydropower governance due to the 
way different scalar categories of public participation are problematised and created through the 
PNPCA. Local communities had little opportunity to provide direct input into Prior Consultation. 
Rather, their voices were usually mediated, either through civil society representatives at national and 
regional stakeholder consultations, or through the NMC Secretariats via the reply form.  
A consideration of the Mekong as an arena of contested development must also account for 
shifting relations between centres and peripheries (Hirsch, 2016), further illustrating how community 
stakeholder consultations remain separate from the literal centres of decision making. Meetings held in 
the country’s capital usually included key government line agencies, national and international NGOs, 
while meetings held in the provinces usually involved provincial agencies, local authorities, NGOs and 
                                                          
8 The Cambodian delegation was travelling by van to Pakse, Laos, via the border crossing in Stung Treng 
Province. However, the driver of the van carrying these representatives had forgotten to bring his passport, and 
as a result the entire delegation returned to Cambodia (Interview, CG1).  
104 
 
communities. This may not always be a result of deliberate exclusions or rationalisation, reflecting 
Ferguson’s (1994, p. 275) argument that planned interventions do not always carry with them strong 
intentionality, but rather must be seen as but a cog in a larger machine which comprises ‘anonymous 
sets of interrelations’ which may then be attributed with ‘retrospective coherence’. For example, in 
Cambodia, Phnom Penh-based NGOs in the RCC were given priority to attend national level 
consultations because it is more convenient for them to do so (Interview, CN3). It is also important to 
look at the level of government representation at community stakeholder consultations. TN1 had 
observed at the Thai consultations that the government was often represented by lower level officials 
who lacked the knowledge to answer participant questions (Interview, TN1). Although TC3 noted that 
higher ranking officials such as the Deputy Director-General of the DWR were present at the 
community stakeholder consultations for the Pak Beng PNPCA, which was not the case for the 
Xayaburi and Don Sahong meetings, TG6 argued that higher level representatives with decision making 
authority should have been present at the meetings (Interviews, TC3, TG6).  
Overall, the previous two subsections have questioned the simplistic assumptions underlying 
the notions of publics and place in the problematisation of public participation, and this section argues 
the same for scale. It is necessary to recognise how the construction of the ‘regional’ involves particular 
and exclusionary practices, and also how a disconnect is reinforced between central governments and 
Mekong local communities in the peripheries.  
5.4.4. Politics of the temporal  
In addition to place and scale, a consideration of the formation of publics and the landscapes of 
public participation has to take into account a politics of the temporal. Massey (2005) argues for space 
and time to be considered in tandem instead of in opposition to one another, and that space, as opposed 
to being associated with stasis and closure, is instead lively and relational. In thinking about the 
emergence, transformation, and maintenance of the regime of practices that constitute the PNPCA 
stakeholder consultations, it is necessary to incorporate this notion of temporality. The regional and 
community consultations for the Don Sahong and Pak Beng PNPCAs generally took place earlier in the 
Prior Consultation process as compared to the Xayaburi PNPCA. Prior to the Pak Beng PNPCA, 
Vietnam was the only country to hold multiple national consultations in the same province, Can Tho. 
The Pak Beng dam PNPCA was different in that follow-up public consultations were held at the regional 
level, the first taking place relatively early in the PNPCA period and the second towards the end. TG1 
noted that there were advantages and disadvantages to both ways of doing so:  
What we heard from the stakeholders or what people told us 
during the Don Sahong regional forum, we could not put 
together in time and address them towards Laos. So now the 
MRC tries, and members agree that the first regional meeting 
should be organised early in the process. But there is also some 
danger in this way as we don’t have a total understanding of the 
105 
 
whole system [of the Pak Beng Dam] yet, because we are still 
trying to learn and digest the report itself. (Interview, TG1) 
Such an approach was also taken at the community stakeholder consultations in Thailand, with 
two public consultations being held in Chiang Rai province, albeit in different districts (see Figure 5.1). 
The second Chiang Rai public consultation was possibly timed, as a procedural improvement, to take 
place after all the other Thai stakeholder consultations and the 2nd MRC Regional Stakeholder Forum. 
During that public consultation, the concerns collected from the previous three community stakeholder 
consultations were summarised, along with the issues and concerns that were raised during the regional 
forum relating to the impact of the Pak Beng Dam on Thailand. Therefore, there were some procedural 
improvements in terms of seeing public participation as a process at different stages of the project where 
feedback and updates were circulated among participants, rather than as one-off consultations with no 
follow-ups.  
The politics of temporality also had to do with the timing of invitations to the stakeholder 
consultations and the dissemination of relevant information to participants. It was a common complaint 
from civil society and community representatives for all three iterations of the PNPCA that invitations 
were often issued on short notice and that the information to be shared during the stakeholder 
consultations were either circulated at short notice (ranging from two days to week), or not at all 
circulated to participants prior to the meetings (Interviews, TN4, IN3, CN4, CN5). This has hindered 
meaningful participation during the public consultations themselves, as participants were unable to 
peruse the heavily-technical documents before the meetings (also to be discussed in Chapter 6, Section 
6.2.1). TC4, who attended the Thai national consultations in Chiang Rai for the Pak Beng Dam, said: 
The information provided by the government is useful, but they 
only gave me the information on the day of the meeting. It was 
a lot of information. How can you finish studying and know 
everything about the information within one hour? They should 
provide the information three months earlier so that the villagers 
can study it and raise their concerns, and know what is in the 
information. (Interview, TC4) 
A politics of temporality can also be observed within the participatory spaces themselves, in 
terms of the format of the consultation and the amount of time allocated to different stakeholders to 
voice their concerns (to be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7). In addition, Prior Consultation itself takes 
place at a preliminary stage of dam development, whereby the design of the proposed mainstream dam 
has yet to be finalised. This falls short of the principles and guidelines in the 1999 MRC Secretariat 
report noting that public participation should be evident throughout a project cycle (MRC Secretariat, 
1999), which were also reflected in the WCD’s recommendations (WCD, 2000). An implication of this 
is that stakeholders must deal with uncertainties over the possible impacts of mainstream dams. The 
PNPCA’s participatory spaces and the tensions that arise within them are closely intertwined with 
uncertainty about the future. There is no official mechanism for accountability beyond the Prior 
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Consultation period. It was only during the Pak Beng PNPCA that the MRC has announced a post-Prior 
Consultation Joint Action Plan would be developed to reflect how the concerns of member countries 
had been addressed (Save the Mekong, 2018), but at the time of writing this has not been publicly 
released. The politics of the temporal therefore extends beyond the Prior Consultation period itself, 
especially as the PNPCA consider the proposed mainstream dams on a project-by-project basis, rather 
than an expanded spatial-temporal scale to account for the cumulative impacts of hydropower 
development planned for the entire Mekong River Basin.  
Overall, this section has turned a geographical lens onto the emergence of public participation 
as a regime of practice by examining how problematisation has taken place through considerations and 
assumptions made about publics, place, scale, and time. While Murdoch (2006) and Rose (1999) have 
identified space as a key issue in terms of understanding how government at a distance takes place 
through the process of translation, this section shows how in the case of public participation in the 
Mekong hydropower governance, the dynamics of translation and enrolment of stakeholders into the 
PNPCA also involved some of the key tenets of geographical enquiry. The problematisation and 
implementation of successive iterations of the Prior Consultation process, however, was predicated on 
a seemingly self-evident understanding of place, scale, and temporality. As a result, the procedural 
tweaks made to the stakeholder consultation processes have to some extent reflected what Cleaver (1999) 
had called a ‘tyranny of techniques’ associated with the refining of techniques and practical solutions 
to improve inclusion in participation. This demonstrates how the invited spaces of participation 
(Cornwall, 2008; Gaventa, 2006) created through the PNPCA, and comprising the components of 
publics, place, scale, and temporality, were largely defined by state actors. A consideration of the 
multifaceted and relational dimensions of place, scale, and temporality and their roles in bringing 
participatory spaces into being sheds light on how contestations surrounding the perceived inadequacy 
of these participatory spaces arise, and demonstrates that these contestations may not be easily resolved.  
5.5. Conclusion  
 Studies by Chenoweth et al. (2002), Gao (2014) and Sneddon & Fox (2007) have shown how 
approaches to public participation came to be incorporated in the MRC’s programmes, although the 
effective incorporation of these ideals have been hindered by a vagueness in guidelines, the challenges 
of uneven legislative and regulatory frameworks across the region, and the differentiated, vested 
interests of states. Depending on the perspective and motivations of the different stakeholder groups, 
the Prior Consultation stakeholder consultations lie on a spectrum between success and failure. 
Therefore, to understand these contestations it is useful to adopt Sneddon & Fox's (2007) perspective 
that participation is always a work in progress and that the multiple pathways in which participatory 
development is conceived, implemented and contested may be understood through analysing their 
underlying political, socioecological, and institutional conditions. It is especially necessary to 
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understand the different national contexts in which the stakeholder consultations have emerged and 
unfolded. In order to lay the groundwork for the discussions to come, especially in relation to the limited 
influence of the PNPCA stakeholder consultations on decision-making and Mekong hydropower 
governance, this chapter has examined how the PNPCA stakeholder consultations have come to be 
problematised and brought into being as regimes of practices by utilising an analytics of government, 
and then showing how contestations emerge through considering a politics of place, scale, and the 
temporal.  
 This chapter has examined in detail the first element of rendering technical: problematisation. 
It has discussed how the problematisation of public participation was situated in an uneven landscape 
of participation formed within the regional mechanisms set out by the 1995 Mekong Agreement and 
national political contexts. The NMC Secretariats were considered as key actors within the PNPCA, 
which constituted an important link between the line agencies in their respective governments, and also 
between the government and the public. The NMC Secretariats were located within webs of power 
relations where their responsibilities were subordinated to more powerful economic interests. 
Nonetheless, their influence was most apparent in bringing the PNPCA stakeholder consultations into 
being, which involved the eliciting of particular subjectivities and the forging of alignments of interests 
between different stakeholders. This happened even as the 1995 Mekong Agreement as a technology 
of government (Inda, 2008) encountered friction within national spaces and created differentiated 
dynamics of translation due to different legislative frameworks, state-to-state relations and drivers. The 
participatory spaces were therefore problematised in multiple ways to serve different alignments of 
interests, but also created unique openings for the state to be challenged. A good example of this was 
the Xayaburi lawsuit, despite its limited influence on halting destructive hydropower development on 
the Mekong River.   
The discussion then turned to examining public participation as a regime of practices, paying 
attention to how the stakeholder consultations were problematised through publics, place, scale, and 
time. To understand the persistent criticisms aimed at the PNPCA stakeholder consultations, it is 
necessary to question the simplistic assumptions that underlie these concepts. It is necessary to consider 
the politics of space, scale, and the temporal that are interweaved with performative dimension of state 
authority in constituting these landscapes of public participation. All these issues demonstrated that 
while procedural adjustments and improvements to the PNPCA stakeholder consultations have been 
made in these respective areas, these adjustments fall into the same assumptions through which public 
participation has been problematised and thus rendered technical. This may cause the stakeholder 
consultations to continue falling short of civil society and community expectations. The 
problematisation of these participatory spaces is but one element of the process of rendering technical, 
and while this chapter has excavated the conditions underlying this process, Chapter 6 will turn towards 
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an in-depth, ethnographic examination of how mainstream hydropower governance is further rendered 
technical through the participatory spaces themselves.  
  
109 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
CONTESTING A TECHNICAL REGIME OF TRUTH: PERFORMATIVITY AND 
PARTICIPATORY SPACES OF PRIOR CONSULTATION 
6.1. Introduction 
 This chapter examines how rendering technical has taken place through the spaces of public 
participation formed as part of the PNPCA. The sharing of information is one of the key components 
within the PNPCA that is valued by stakeholders. However, a politics of knowledge ensues because of 
the overly technical nature of the information, and its transformations within spaces of public 
participation when mediated through a range of performative actions. This chapter first investigates 
how a technical regime of truth is established through the dissemination of technical information, and 
the challenges faced by the MRC and NMC secretariats in making this information accessible to the 
public. Second, the participatory spaces and their performative aspects are analysed to shed light on 
how hydropower governance and public participation are rendered antipolitical. Using the data 
collected from event ethnography, this chapter will demonstrate how the PNPCA’s participatory spaces 
come into being through the structuring and segmentation of knowledge, the micro-geographies and 
technologies of government that emphasise the role of the expert, and the performance of consultation. 
Third, this chapter examines how the PNPCA stakeholder consultations function as a technical process 
that may be considered as a deliberate measure to contain challenges to the status quo, but also observes 
the performative slippages that occur by demonstrating how state actors have been challenged in these 
spaces. Finally, this is linked to how a politics of the technical has occurred within the PNPCA.    
6.2. Creating a regime of truth: mobilising flows of technical information  
 The 1995 Mekong Agreement reimagines the Mekong region as a governable space relating to 
the creation of powerful discourses that envision the Mekong River primarily as a watercourse rather 
than a complex socioecological system (Bakker, 1999; Sneddon & Fox, 2006). This is reminiscent of 
James Scott's (1999) concept of state simplification, in the sense that the river has been rendered legible 
according to state-centric reasoning (Käkönen & Hirsch, 2009). Problematised as an intelligible field 
for intervention (Li, 2007; Rose, 1999), the 1995 Mekong Agreement defines boundaries of this 
governable space, and in line with Rose’s (1999, p. 33) conceptualisation, renders visible the entities 
within them, assembles information about its included component parts, and finally devises techniques 
to mobilise the revealed entities and forces. In the case of the PNPCA, mainstream projects are 
rationalised as being ‘more likely to have a significant impact on the mainstream of the Mekong River’, 
and therefore more extensive technical data and information are required for Prior Consultation as 
compared to Notification for tributary projects (MRC, 2005a, p. 5). With the MRC viewing 
transparency as a guiding principle for the PNPCA processes (Gao, 2014), Prior Consultation 
functioned as a mechanism for the assembling and mobilising of information about mainstream 
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hydropower governance. While the discussions in chapters 2 and 5 have established that Prior 
Consultation has reimagined hydropower governance as an intelligible field for technocratic 
interventions, this section pays closer attention to how a regime of truth in LMB mainstream 
hydropower governance is constituted by technical flows of information. Technical information may 
be considered as technologies of government that enable the MRC and NMCs to extend their 
governance reach over the LMB at a distance (Rose, 1999) alongside the processes of rendering 
technical.  
6.2.1. Contesting and translating flows of technical information   
One of the key outcomes associated with Prior Consultation, to date, has been in relation to 
information sharing about the dam projects. IN2 said: ‘I think the information sharing aspect of the 
PNPCA is crucial. The fact that it outlines some kind of procedural basis for assessing and mitigating 
impacts for mainstream dams is a positive, because otherwise there is a void of process’ (Interview, 
IN2). TG1 stressed the importance of the PNPCA as an information sharing platform that was 
underscored by goodwill between MRC member countries:  
Imagine if you don’t have the PNPCA – the [MRC] members 
will do according with what they wish to do. You wouldn’t even 
have a chance to see any report. So how could you get the 
information? But when we have the PNPCA, we start getting 
something from the other members… Goodwill will lead to 
sharing of good information, and with good information, we will 
be able to assess as close as possible to the real situation or the 
projected situation. (Interview, TG1) 
This was also a point brought up by MRCS 1: 
We are trying to say to them [stakeholders] that without the 
PNPCA, they would not get this information. Where in the world, 
when you have an independent country’s project, would you get 
this information publicly? So, they should recognise that. 
(Interview, MRC3) 
It should be noted that provisions for information sharing across a transboundary context exists in 
international law, such as in the 1997 Watercourses Convention and 1991 Convention on 
Transboundary Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context. Nonetheless, A2, a water governance 
expert, noted that in the context of LMB hydropower governance ‘(T)he PNPCA is an opportunity to 
bring some things into the public domain, that otherwise would not be’. The release of project 
information into the public realm has been useful for civil society, especially for the Save the Mekong 
(STM) Coalition which has issued its own studies contesting the validity of the EIAs provided by the 
Lao government (see Chapter 2, Section 2.6.1). The PNPCA stakeholder consultations may be 
considered a key arena through which information is not only disseminated, but also generated (Rieu-
Clarke, 2015). However, while technical documents circulated through the MRC website are provided 
111 
 
in their entirety, the dissemination of information through the discrete time-spaces of public 
participation presented a different challenge. As immutable mobiles in the network of interest 
established by the PNPCA, the project documents are only able to enrol actors with the requisite amount 
of technical expertise to evaluate these studies. However, in travelling through the PNPCA’s 
participatory spaces, the information contained in the project documents is condensed according to the 
spatial and temporal constraints of these spaces. While state actors or international NGOs may possess 
the knowledge and capacity to process and evaluate the English-language technical information, public 
consultations are one of the key arenas through which this information is filtered down to potentially 
affected communities and local civil society actors.  
 The main areas of contention about information dissemination centre around the quantity, 
quality, and accessibility of the information. The ambiguity of the PNPCA as to exactly what and how 
much data the proposing country should provide, and the varied expectations of data provision from the 
other member countries have been discussed by authors including Gao (2014) and Rieu-Clarke (2015), 
but this chapter focuses on the expectations from the perspectives of civil society and local communities. 
To date, two reviews of the PNPCA involving MRC member countries have been carried out. The first 
review took place in 2012 in relation to the Xayaburi PNPCA, and the second was initiated by Thailand 
and took place in February 2016 in the form of a one-day workshop, in relation to both the Xayaburi 
and Don Sahong PNPCAs. A summary of the 2012 review commissioned by Australia’s aid programme 
(AusAID) noted that Thai and Cambodian civil society representatives were ‘dissatisfied with the 
quality of the official Prior Consultation process and the information provided’, as the only information 
made available at national consultations were summarised documents in the form of PowerPoint 
presentations (DFAT, 2014, p. 4). This was compounded by the fact that the final Xayaburi EIA was 
not yet made public, there was no transboundary impact assessment, and the dam designs were 
incomplete when the stakeholder consultations were carried out (Save the Mekong, 2014). This was 
problematic as the availability of key, relevant information by stakeholders was considered to be 
‘crucial for meaningful engagement and participation’ (MRC, 2016c, p. 7).  
In addition, there were concerns that the information made available was too technical for a 
layperson to understand. The February 2016 workshop report noted that although comprehensive 
technical information was useful to certain groups of stakeholders, the language used in public 
consultations could be ‘overly complex’ for other groups such that the relevant information ‘may not 
be comprehensible to some important stakeholders’ (MRC, 2016c, p. 7). This was an issue faced by 
those who attended the Xayaburi PNPCA stakeholder consultations in Thailand, as observed by a 
representative from the Thai Mekong People’s Network: 
I attended the meetings at Loei, Nakhon Phanom, Ubon 
Ratchathani and Bangkok; at first when I attended the speaker 
was speaking in English, and I didn’t understand what the 
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PNPCA meant, and they talk about [the Xayaburi dam] in 
technical terms. (Interview, TC2)  
This issue was also raised by several interviewees from Cambodia (Interviews, IN3, IN6, CN1, CN3) 
and was clearly reflected in a joint statement issued by the RCC about the Don Sahong PNPCA:  
Provincial-level consultations in Cambodia have largely failed 
their core purpose of helping participants to understand the 
project, its implications and discussions fully, which were too 
technical and complex at many points. Specifically, printed 
documents are mostly in English. Both presentations and printed 
documents contained many technical words that were not 
properly explained to the participants. (RCC, 2014, p. 2) 
 Chapter 5 has discussed the notion of translation in the context of ANT that describes the 
enrolment of actors into an expanding network of interest, but here translation is considered in its literal 
sense. The uneven landscapes of public participation in the LMB were also formed through the issue of 
language, as consultations with communities were conducted in their respective national languages. 
However, the technical project documents submitted by the Lao government under Prior Consultation 
were written in English, which presented a double barrier for local communities and local civil society 
groups. The 2012 PNPCA review noted that civil society interviewees ‘stressed the importance of 
making the information available in the national language of all the riparian countries’, and quoted an 
interviewee who was of the opinion that the EIA report should have been translated in its entirety and 
that the costs of doing so should have been borne by the project developers (DFAT, 2014, p. 5). Rather, 
in Thailand and Cambodia the responsibility of translating the documents fell to the NMC Secretariats. 
To understand the processes through which information is literally and metaphorically translated across 
these spaces of public participation, it becomes necessary to understand how these agencies have 
problematised this issue in relation to their limited resources.  
6.2.2. Experts of truth and the mediation of information flows   
 One of the effects of the PNPCA as a technical process has been the enrolment of experts into 
hydropower governance in the Mekong Region. In their discussion of how sustainable territories are 
assembled, Vandergeest et al. (2015, p. 1909) argue that these territories are defined by expertise that 
is understood in terms of ‘a bundle of codified and concentrated knowledges’, and ‘experts’ may be 
defined as those who have ‘the exclusive capacity and qualifications to create or apply these knowledges’ 
and to ‘produce the rules that define the central objects of concern’. Experts of truth are entangled in a 
regime of truth, which constitutes the criteria of truth, the actors who have the power to define truth, 
the roles of different authorities of truth, and the conditions that underlie the ‘the production and 
circulation of truths’ (Rose, 1999, p. 30) (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3). Experts are actors who can 
define truth, and where they intersect with state authority, they become authorities of truth. Experts 
produce knowledge that plays a critical role in processes of legitimisation, and in the LMB the politics 
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of knowledge has previously been studied through drawing lines of tension between expert, scientific 
knowledge that supports governance agendas and local knowledge (Käkönen & Hirsch, 2009).  
Technical experts within the MRC and NMC secretariats play key roles in defining, mediating, 
and presenting the knowledge that is deemed to be relevant for participants in the stakeholder 
consultations. However, the production of a coherent regime of truth within Prior Consultation is 
severely challenged by the uneven landscape of participation and a multitude of authorities of truth 
across the region. Technical project documents, which include EIAs and details about the proposed dam 
design, are constituted by specific types of expertise. These are commissioned and/or produced by the 
private dam developers, but the evaluation of these documents enrols experts and expertise from the 
secretariats of the MRC and NMCs. The first time that stakeholder consultations were conducted for 
the Xayaburi PNPCA, MRC Secretariat staff assisted with presenting the technical information. To get 
some sense of the problems associated with the absence of the project developers, who were not 
obligated to be present at the stakeholder consultations, it is worth citing the findings of the 2012 
PNPCA review: 
MRC Secretariat staff were on-hand to assist in presenting about 
the Xayaburi project at all of the official Prior Consultation 
nation meetings. However, they could not always respond to 
participants’ questions effectively, and the project developer 
was nowhere in sight. As a result, the consultation process was 
widely viewed as constituting only a forum for giving out 
information about the project, without adequate explanation of 
its potential impacts on the ecology and livelihood of people 
along the Mekong. (DFAT, 2014, p. 4) 
The legitimacy of the stakeholder consultations was therefore threatened by the absence of the 
experts who produced the information in the first place (further discussed in Section 6.4.2 ). The absence 
of a publicly available EIA and a transboundary EIA at the time exacerbated the issue, possibly 
contributing to the situation alluded to in the excerpt of the 2012 PNPCA review above, where technical 
information about the Xayaburi Dam itself was emphasised over information about its potential impacts. 
To evaluate the proposed mainstream dam projects during the six-month Prior Consultation period was 
a challenge, and for the TNMC Secretariat, this challenge was first and foremost a technical one:  
The first weakness of the Xayaburi PNPCA is a technical one… 
[T]he consultation time period of six months was too short, 
because it takes time for us to digest the information, prepare 
and translate the documents. We cannot translate the entire 
feasibility study, only abstracts from it, and the whole process 
becomes difficult within itself. (Interview, TG1)  
 It is useful to understand the volume and nature of the technical project documents submitted 
under Prior Consultation. For the purposes of this analysis, the social impact assessments (SIA) are 
excluded as they pertain to Lao communities in the vicinity of the proposed dam rather than 
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communities at a regional scale. These documents are available through the MRC’s website (MRC, 
n.d.e, n.d.g, n.d.h), and all are in English. For the Xayaburi PNPCA, the feasibility study (231 pages) 
and EIA (399 pages) came to a total of 530 pages. As noted above, during the time of the public 
consultations the EIA was not publicly available. More documents were submitted for the Don Sahong 
PNPCA: two engineering status reports (332 pages), an EIA (254 pages including separate annexes), 
environmental management and monitoring plan (53 pages), and a cumulative impact assessment (76 
pages), coming to a total of 715 pages. For the Pak Beng PNPCA, a total of 20 documents were 
submitted, which included engineering status reports (386 pages), an EIA (401 pages), an 
environmental management and monitoring plan (148 pages), a transboundary environmental and social 
impact assessment and cumulative impact assessment (313 pages), and other studies relating to various 
aspects of hydrology, sediment, and fish. Excluding the SIAs, these documents totalled 1,924 pages. 
Given that the NMC Secretariats and MRC Secretariat bore the responsibility of summarising these 
documents for the PNPCA stakeholder consultations, they therefore played key roles in defining the 
objects of concerns by deciding on what abstracts would be presented at the consultations.  
It was not just the translation of the technical reports that posed a challenge, but also 
understanding what the technical information meant. TG1 noted that there were different levels of 
difficulty to overcome relating to the technical nature of the information. First, the member countries 
themselves faced some difficulties in understanding the technical reports. Second, the engineering 
community believed that the experts should be trusted because they knew what was best for the 
layperson. Third, it was difficult to explain such information and draw out its implications in a way that 
local communities could understand (Interview, TG1). Understanding the technical details relating to 
dam design required engineering knowledge, and understanding EIAs required expertise relating to 
hydrology, sediment, or fisheries. The TNMC Secretariat was relatively more well positioned in this 
aspect, as it had personnel trained in engineering which, based on my personal observations, included 
a few individuals with PhDs in engineering. This may be partially related to its institutional history. 
Blake (2016, p. 28) identifies the DWR as one of the many state agencies from Thailand’s water 
resources sector which tended to subscribe to a discourse with a ‘technocratic bias that stressed the 
superior expert knowledge and problem-solving capacity of state agencies’. TN4 also noted that the 
TNMC Secretariat had traditionally been staffed by technocrats and engineers, dating back to the time 
it was situated under the Thai National Energy Administration (Interview, TN4).  
These technical challenges were heightened for the CNMC Secretariat, which lacked technical 
expertise as compared to its Thai counterpart. This could be observed from the stakeholder consultations 
held under the Pak Beng PNPCA. Although the TNMC Secretariat continued to rely on the MRC 
Secretariat staff to present technical information during the Don Sahong PNPCA (TNMC Secretariat, 
2015), during the Pak Beng PNPCA they was able to carry out the stakeholder consultations without 
assistance from the MRC. In contrast, the CNMC Secretariat still relied on the MRC Secretariat for 
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assistance during the Pak Beng PNPCA stakeholder consultations (Interviews, MRC1, MRC2). MRC2 
noted that the CNMC lacked the technical capacity to assess the technical project documents and 
therefore had to depend on the MRC Secretariat for technical support, whereas the TNMC Secretariat 
had the technical capacity to do so (Interview, MRC2). IN3 emphasised the CNMC Secretariat’s 
coordinating role over its technical one during the Don Sahong PNPCA meetings: ‘The CNMC just 
does the hosting, organising – they are the organisers for the logistical arrangements and for planning 
and data collection. But the technical discussion is done by MRC Secretariat staff’ (Interview, IN3). 
IN3 added: 
The documents were in Khmer or English; sometimes in only 
one language, English or Khmer, sometimes in both languages. 
The translation quality is sometimes good, sometimes it’s not so 
good, because of the terminology. If you have a background in 
water or fisheries, you can understand it very well. But if you do 
not have a background in hydrology, I would say it is very hard 
to understand what is sediment, what is water flow, the capacity 
of the dam, the dam height, the dam site, the reservoir, and so on. 
These are terms difficult for the non-technical person. (Interview, 
IN3) 
CG1 also acknowledged the CNMC Secretariat’s limited technical capacity especially in 
relation to hydropower dam engineering: ‘In general, they [CNMC Secretariat] understand the 
environmental impact, but if they look at the engineering design of the dam, they have no knowledge 
about that’, and said that there were few individuals in the Cambodian government who had such 
expertise (Interview, CG1). MRC1 also noted that the technical capacity of the NMC Secretariats were 
also related to their respective financial resources: 
For Thailand, they always have their own budget … and they 
can also afford more national consultations. They have more 
different people to look at it [the project documents] and present 
it in their own language, rather than expect the consultant to 
come and explain to them in English... So they [CNMC 
Secretariat] don’t have the technical capacity, they don’t have 
the resources, and all the time if they want to get something done 
they always write a request for money from the MRCS or from 
someone else. 
 Therefore, while the volume of technical project documents submitted for each successive 
PNPCA had increased, this likely posed additional challenges for the NMC Secretariats in terms of 
evaluating and translating the documents. CN1 viewed these challenges as an obstacle to meaningful 
participation, noting that the translation of information into the languages of ethnic minorities might 
pose an additional difficulty for the CNMC Secretariat (Interview, CN1). The limited technical capacity 
of the CNMC Secretariat, along with the heightened levels of concern within the government about the 
Don Sahong Dam had led Cambodian government agencies to depend on not just the MRC but also 
civil society for technical and scientific expertise. CG5 who was involved in the Don Sahong PNPCA 
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said that he found the MRC-commissioned Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) very useful, 
although they could not openly refer to it as it had not been officially endorsed by all MRC member 
countries (Interview, CG5; see Chapter 2, Section 2.4 and 2.5.3 on the SEA and its relevance to the 
PNPCA). This will be further discussed in Section 6.5.  
It is worth noting that some of these issues are not completely new. Suhardiman et al. (2015) 
observed that officials from the environmental ministries and scientists who participated in the SEA 
national consultation meetings in Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia were disappointed with the focus 
on the technical design of dams than their potential impacts, and the limited dissemination of technical 
information due to issues of confidentiality. What this section has shown thus far is that the PNPCA 
(re)produces the LMB as a governable space by mobilising the flows of technical information, which 
function as technologies of government that enrol experts into the PNPCA’s network of interest. 
However, in passing through the PNPCA’s participatory spaces, these flows of technical information 
have come to be perceived by nonstate participants as inadequate. The NMC Secretariats, with varying 
resources and capacities, must evaluate, summarise, and translate the technical project documents, 
causing inadequacies in the information that is finally disseminated in the stakeholder consultations. 
This section has also examined the role of experts in defining the objects of concern and producing 
what Rose (1999) has termed as a regime of truth. This heterogeneous group of experts has influenced 
the emergence of participatory spaces within the PNPCA through their presences and absences, and has 
contributed towards this contested, technical regime of truth. In the process of rendering mainstream 
hydropower governance technical, these are some of the underlying institutional and technical 
conditions that bring a contested regime of truth into being.  
6.3. The co-production of PNPCA stakeholder consultations as realms of technical expertise  
 To understand how mainstream hydropower governance is rendered technical through PNPCA 
stakeholder consultations, this section draws upon the understanding that public participation is co-
produced, relational, and emergent, and comprising three key elements that make up collective 
participatory practices: 1) subjects (publics and their concerns), 2) objects (issues and material devices), 
and 3) models (including formats and participatory procedures) (Chilvers et al., 2018) (See Chapter 3, 
Section 3.3.3). Using the approach of event ethnography, this section focuses on observing how the 
intertwining of objects (technical categories of knowledge and technologies of government) and models 
(proceedings and micro-geographies) produce specific and technical participatory practices within Prior 
Consultation. This draws upon the understanding that spaces are brought into being by performances 
and function as a performative articulation of power (Rose-Redwood & Glass, 2014). These 
participatory spaces may be considered a microcosm of governance processes relating to Mekong 
mainstream hydropower development, where the performative dimensions of state authority and state-
nonstate actor dynamics may be directly observed.  
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6.3.1. Problematising and segmenting a river basin: producing technical modes of perception  
 This discussion returns to an examination of how the 1995 Mekong Agreement discursively 
problematises the Mekong River primarily as a watercourse. As an innately problematising sphere of 
activity (Inda, 2008), government sees a need to translate the complex material conditions of the 
Mekong River into a governable form. This is challenging especially taking into account Bakker's (2003) 
well-known description of water as an ‘uncooperative commodity’ due to its fluid and dense biophysical 
characteristics that prevent it from being easily captured. Rose (1999, p. 32) notes that the use of 
technical means to form governable spaces creates the conditions that produce new modes of perception. 
The PNPCA stakeholder consultations are not only produced as governable spaces through their publics, 
spatial dimensions, and technical flows of information, but also reflect how hydropower governance in 
the LMB has been construed as a governable space. Paying attention to the objects and models of public 
participation provides insight into this realm of problematisation. 
There are several ways in which public consultations reflect this problematisation of 
hydropower governance. First, the information disseminated at the stakeholder consultations, or issues 
of concern, reflect the types of knowledge that the MRC deems to be important for assessing 
mainstream dam projects. Second, the model, or proceedings of the stakeholder consultations, which 
structures these issues provide a clearer reflection of such a problematisation. There are congruences in 
the way this information is presented and shared during regional and national stakeholder consultation 
meetings, because technical information about the proposed projects is disseminated from the MRC 
Secretariat to the NMC Secretariats, and MRC Secretariat staff assisted with presenting information at 
the stakeholder consultations in Thailand and Cambodia. These combinations of objects and models 
may be considered as technologies of participation specific to the PNPCA stakeholder consultations, 
in terms of what Chilvers & Kearnes (2016b) have noted as the standardisation and mobility of public 
participation tools across time and space. This section will show how rendering technical takes place 
through the segmentation of knowledge into the following issues: 1) the PNPCA, 2) proposed dam 
design, 3) hydrology and sediment, 4) dam safety and navigation, 5) environment and fisheries, and 6) 
socio-economic issues.  
 As discussed in Chapter 5, the PNPCA, which functions as a key technology of government, 
problematises hydropower governance in terms of establishing specific channels for information and 
feedback to flow between multiple stakeholders. At the regional and national stakeholder consultations 
that I attended for the Pak Beng PNPCA, these procedures occupied a prominent part of the meeting 
agendas (also discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.3.5 in relation to Thailand). Presentations on the 
rationale and objectives behind the 1995 Mekong Agreement and the PNPCA were accompanied by a 
detailed roadmap for the Pak Beng PNPCA. These presentations took place before the presentations 
that would delve into the technical aspects of the Pak Beng Dam. This was possibly carried out in order 
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to alleviate concerns and criticisms arising from the lack of clarity in the Xayaburi and Don Sahong 
PNPCAs relating to the objectives, timeline, and responsibilities of key actors (see MRC, 2016c). In 
this context, the clarification and setting of objectives is perhaps designed to manage the expectations 
of stakeholders, especially in terms of explaining the objectives of the meetings and the ‘proper’ 
channels for engagement. As discussed in Chapter 5, this relates to the ‘conduct of conduct’ in 
governmentality (Dean, 2010), where the stakeholder consultations function as a channel through which 
the subjectivities and behaviours of participants may be shaped in accordance with state interests and 
expectations.   
 At the MRC regional stakeholder forums for the Pak Beng Dam, it was made clear that the 
feedback from participants would contribute towards the MRCS’s technical review. This participatory 
space was therefore brought into being with the technical review as a central issue of concern. With this 
aim, there was a need to collect reasonably in-depth feedback from stakeholders and to structure the 
consultation such that the MRC Secretariat could draw upon the relevant expertise from participants, 
including scientific experts from the region and abroad. The segment relating to the PNPCA and the 
proposed dam design involved everyone present, but participants were later split into two parallel 
sessions (see Appendix F for the schedule). The first parallel session covered the topics of 1) hydrology 
and sediment and 2) dam safety and navigation, and the second session covered 3) environment and 
fisheries and 4) socio-economic issues. Within these two sessions, several MRC Secretariat technical 
experts made their presentations (five to 10 minutes each), which were followed by 10 minutes of 
clarifying questions. Next, participants within each session were further divided into four subgroups 
that would discuss each topic. The intertwining of the objects (issues) and models (proceedings) of 
public participation was seen clearly here, reflecting the ways in which participatory spaces reproduced 
the discursive rendering of Mekong hydropower governance into neat technical categories. Emerging 
as sites for participatory intervention (Chilvers & Kearnes, 2016b), the PNPCA stakeholder 
consultations reflected how public participation was problematised in relation to hydropower 
governance.  
 The following observations are from the first MRC regional stakeholder forum held on 22 
February 2017, in the parallel session that comprised presentations on the topics of environment (5 
minutes), fisheries (5 minutes), and socio-economic issues (10 minutes). During this session, the 
challenge of whittling down almost 2,000 pages of technical documents into a series of short 
presentations became clear. The presentations only provided an overview of the issues raised in the 
documents and, generally, a broad indication of what the possible impacts may be. Because the 
proposed dam design had not been finalised and there was still an existing lack of comprehensive data 
relating to the complexities of the Mekong River’s massive ecosystems, the studies could not state with 
absolute certainty what the impacts of the dam might be. In addition, the environment and fisheries 
presentations allocated time towards explaining the MRC Secretariat’s approach and methodology for 
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the technical review. The brevity of the presentations inevitably led to many questions and comments 
from participants, including critiques relating to the parameters of the studies and how the MRC 
Secretariat would reconcile the studies with its own datasets and methodologies. Sensing some 
frustration in the room, a high-level MRC Secretariat official said at the end of the presentations: 
You may think that we [MRC] are holding back in our views. 
This is the first time we are opening up to share how we are 
conducting the technical review, and to incorporate a 
participatory approach in terms of our assessment methods. We 
are focusing more on information sharing rather than views.  
This had implications for the discussions that took place during the small group sessions. I 
joined the group discussing socioeconomic issues and we were asked to provide feedback on the 
methodology and approach taken by the project developers. This served to reinforce the technical 
review as the primary object of concern around which interventions were sought. MRC Secretariat staff 
and the facilitator from the Bangkok-based Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) were keen to seek 
feedback, and the facilitator described the session as a ‘co-designing [of] the review process’. There 
were many participants who actively suggested factors (e.g. gender, ethnicity, youth, best practices) 
that the MRC Secretariat should account for, but at times the facilitators would not receive responses 
to their elicitations for feedback. I noted that one possible reason for this could be because participants 
did not have enough information on hand to identify gaps in the study due to the brevity of the prior 
presentations, unless they had read the project documents in full beforehand. The segmentation of the 
participants into the four reflection groups, while facilitating a more intimate discussion (see Section 
6.3.2 to follow), did not provide the opportunity for linkages to be drawn between the four topics. The 
socio-economic issues discussed were closely linked to the river’s hydrology, sediment flow, and 
fisheries, yet it was unclear from the presentations and discussions how one would impact the other. In 
the final session, each group had five minutes to report on the key messages and follow-up actions to 
be taken for the technical review, followed by reflections from the audience on the key messages and 
actions and the MRC’s next steps for the Pak Beng PNPCA. However, neither the facilitators nor the 
MRC Secretariat staff discussed the linkages between these topics.  
This segmentation and compartmentalisation of knowledges was also replicated in the Thai 
stakeholder consultations, although MRC Secretariat technical review was not foregrounded as much. 
For the Pak Beng PNPCA held in Nong Khai in March 2017, the public consultations were divided into 
two segments: information sharing relating to the PNPCA and the Pak Beng Dam before lunch, and 
questions and answers after lunch. Half an hour was allocated to presentations on the design of the 
proposed dam, and another half an hour was allocated to the presentations on hydrology, sediment, 
fisheries, and socio-economic issues. In Cambodia, the format of the stakeholder consultations for the 
Don Sahong PNPCA began with information sharing about the PNPCA, followed by the formation of 
sub-groups based on either their affiliations (government, NGOs, communities) or topics such as 
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fisheries and social issues (Interview, IN3). At both the Thai national consultations I attended, 
discussions from the MRC regional stakeholder forums and earlier Thai community stakeholder 
consultations were also summarised for the participants, reflecting how information flowed between 
multi-scalar sites of public consultations. While this sub-section has largely focused on the MRC’s 
regional stakeholder forum, the Thai and Cambodian stakeholder consultations will be treated with 
greater detail in the rest of this chapter.   
Looking into the objects and models of the PNPCA’s participatory spaces provides critical 
insight into the performative effects of the specific participatory practices that render Mekong 
mainstream hydropower governance technical. This draws upon Cohen & Harris's (2014) argument that 
performative approaches focus on the effects produced by citational practices. The ‘intelligible field’ 
designated for intervention is bounded by the PNPCA, creating new modes of perception in the public 
realm in terms of technical categorisations. In the case of the MRC regional stakeholder forums for the 
Pak Beng Dam, this was also defined by designating the technical review as the primary field for 
intervention. This segmentation of knowledges is not unique to the mainstream dams. As Baird & 
Barney (2017) have also demonstrated in the cases of large resource projects in Mekong tributary river 
basins in Laos and Cambodia, including hydropower dams, there exists a segmentation of knowledges 
due to the bureaucratic separation of land and water resource management, as well as professional and 
disciplinary expertise. This discursive reimagining of the Mekong River and its ecosystems may be 
viewed from the perspectives of a production of socio-nature (Castree, 1995), or the creation of 
waterscapes where altered or new socionatural forms are produced as ‘both medium and expression of 
shifting power positions’ (Swyngedouw, 1999, p. 460). As Tavares (2013) points out in his study of 
environmental governmentality, nature is deeply integrated into the mechanisms through which 
government operates. Through such a reimagination of the LMB, stakeholders within these 
participatory spaces are made to perceive the Mekong River and hydropower development through 
these technical lenses.  
6.3.2. Micro-geographies and technologies of government: creating realms of technical expertise  
 This subsection examines the material models (micro-geographies) and objects (technologies 
of government) of public participation that reinforce PNPCA stakeholder consultations as realms of 
technical expertise, constituting the regime of truth in Mekong hydropower governance and shedding 
light on the entanglements between power and space. Foucault (1984, p. 252) noted that ‘space is 
fundamental in any exercise of power’, and his study of Bentham’s panopticon provided a diagrammatic 
representation of power that made a spatiality of power visible in an institutional micro-space (Allen, 
2003). These spatial representations of power demonstrate how power is both dispersed in materials, 
techniques and practices, and concentrated in particular processes (Murdoch, 2006), and will be referred 
to as micro-geographies in this thesis. Critically, they demonstrate how power relationships are 
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produced within particular settings (Allen, 2003). The focus is placed on the productive dimensions of 
power, where space intersects with techniques and strategies ‘to channel the conduct of individuals in 
a certain direction’ (ibid., p. 71). This subsection will demonstrate how these micro-geographies 
generate power dynamics that elevate the authority of technical experts within a technical regime of 
truth.  
Attention is then given to the objects of public participation that include technologies of 
government. As discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2.2), these technologies are mundane tools that render 
things visible and into calculable, knowable and programmable forms, such as graphs, tables, statistics, 
or rules (Inda, 2008). These material devices and technologies are closely intertwined with the 
constitution of the human and social (Barry, 2001), and are a key component of the collective 
participatory practices constituting the PNPCA. While experts play a critical role in bringing spaces of 
public participation into being, it is also important to consider how they are aided by technologies that 
represent and transfer technical knowledge to stakeholders, which creates a performative articulation 
of authority and power. While Section 6.2.2 demonstrated how experts and expertise varied between 
different institutional contexts and contributed towards an uneven flow of information across the LMB, 
this section focuses on their roles within the spaces of public participation themselves. Together, these 
micro-geographies and technologies of government create participatory practices through which the 
PNPCA stakeholder consultations emerge as realms of technical expertise.   
 The micro-geographies of participatory spaces here encompass the spatial layout of the public 
consultations, how different actors are physically positioned in relation to one another, and the power 
dynamics that are generated as a result. These micro-geographies were relatively similar at the regional 
and national level, as seen from the pictures of the MRC regional stakeholder forum (Figure 6.1) and 
the Thai community stakeholder consultations (Figure 6.2) for the Pak Beng PNPCA. The front of the 
room functioned as a ‘stage’ for government representatives and experts who would address the 
audience. This area usually included a projector screen and a row of seats and/or a table provided for a 
panel of presenters. An elevated stage was sometimes used especially where higher-ranking government 
officials were involved, but the technical staff made their presentations from the same ‘level’ as the 
audience. Nevertheless, the act of addressing the audience from the front of a large room had the 
performative effect of designating the speaker with the authority; this is similar to the attention 
commanded by a performer in a theatre. This privileged spatial position was reinforced by the temporal 
structuring of the public consultations, where the speakers are allocated most of the time to speak 
uninterrupted. Therefore, if one were to map a spatial representation of power based on not just the 
PNPCA spaces of participation, but also similar settings such as a theatre, seminar, or conference, the 
production of power relationships occurs when certain actors occupy not just a spatially, but also 
temporally privileged position (Figure 6.3).  
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Figure 6.1. Opening session of the 2nd MRC Regional Stakeholder Forum in Vientiane, Laos, May 2017 
 
Figure 6.2. Pak Beng PNPCA stakeholder consultation in Nong Khai Province, Thailand, March 2017 
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Figure 6.3. Diagrammatic representation of stakeholder consultations. This reflects the possible positions taken 
up by presenters at the front ‘stage’ area, and two different consultative formats. 
 
To understand how the specificities of the PNPCA’s participatory spaces are brought into being, 
there is an additional need to examine the technologies of government that were used during these 
events. The role of the expert, in particular, was designated through the use of the prosaic tools (Inda, 
2008) that rendered the LMB knowable in relation to the proposed mainstream dam projects. At the 
stakeholder consultations, there were multiple experts on hand to present the various topics relating to 
dam design, hydrology, sediment, fisheries, and socio-economic issues. The presentation of technical 
information was always accompanied by PowerPoint slides. Technical expertise was reinforced through 
the tables, models, graphs, numbers, flow charts, and animations of the proposed dam that were flashed 
onto the projector screens (Figure 6.4). These tools (re)produced power relations between the experts 
and the participants and reinforced the centrality of quantitative methods that render the LMB and dam 
projects intelligible and technical. Such technologies therefore constitute a key component in 
constructing a regime of truth.   
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Figure 6.4. Use of PowerPoint slides and diagrams to explain the proposed design of the Pak Beng Dam at the 
PNPCA stakeholder consultation in Nong Khai Province, Thailand, March 2017  
 
These models (micro-geographies) and objects (technologies of government) were entangled 
in the production of the PNPCA’s participatory spaces. The micro-geographies of these spaces were 
akin to spatial representations of power that made visible the dispersion of power in actors, materials, 
techniques, and strategies. The technologies of government brought these participatory spaces into 
being by playing an integral role in the performative acts of government and expert authorities, which 
in turn contributed to the generation of power relations that reinforced the technical dimensions of 
hydropower governance. Therefore, in thinking about how hydropower governance in the LMB was 
rendered technical through participatory spaces, it is useful to view the emergence of unique 
participatory spaces through the lens of collective participatory practices (discussed in Chapter 3, 
Section 3.3.3).  
6.3.3. Technologies of participation: distinguishing information sharing and consultation 
At this point, there is a distinction to be made between information sharing and consultation, 
which correspond to Arnstein's (1969) distinction between differing degrees of tokenism (informing, 
consulting, and placation). This subsection pays attention to how micro-geographies and technologies 
bring the element of ‘consultation’ into being. While the preceding subsection spoke of technologies of 
government relating to information sharing, the focus here is turned towards technologies of 
participation relating to the act of consultation. Technologies of participation comprise particular 
formats, configurations and skills that become standardised and ‘black boxed’ as established and 
persistent designs, which then travel between different contexts (Chilvers & Kearnes, 2016b). 
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Technologies of participation reflect some degree of effort to make the act of collecting public concerns 
transparent, and to re-centre participants within the proceedings. In the PNPCA stakeholder 
consultations, this collection of concerns raised by participants was performed. For example, a ‘living 
document’, in the digital form of a Microsoft Word document was projected onto screens, at both the 
MRC stakeholder consultations and Thai community stakeholder consultations, where participants 
could see their concerns and issues being recorded in real time.  
In the PNPCA stakeholder consultations, there were two dominant models of participatory 
technologies: 1) the question and answer (Q&A) format and 2) the small group discussion format 
(Figure 6.3). The Q&A format allowed participants to pose questions to a speaker after a presentation 
and was used in the MRC regional stakeholder forums and the Thai community stakeholder 
consultations. Drawing upon my observations at the Thai community stakeholder consultations, 
participants who asked questions had to walk to a microphone that was usually set up close to the front 
of the room where the TNMC Secretariat officials and experts were seated. In terms of such a micro-
geography, participants may find it intimidating to raise their concerns in front of a large audience. The 
temporal dimensions of this micro-geography also mattered. The TNMC Secretariat facilitator would 
allow two to four participants to ask questions before turning to the panel of experts for their responses. 
There was no time allocated for a reflection on participant concerns, and during the stakeholder 
consultation in Nong Khai the Q&A session was cut off abruptly by TNMC Secretariat staff when the 
scheduled meeting time came to an end. Even though the time scheduled for Q&A was equivalent to 
the time allocated for presentations, this time had to be shared between all participants. In such a format, 
it was the experts who had the last say, rather than the participants. There were instances during the first 
MRC regional stakeholder forum where questions were not directly addressed unless probed by an 
independent facilitator from SEI. In addition, technologies of government remained the tools of experts. 
The participants did not have such opportunity to use ‘expert’ tools to raise their concerns, and instead 
only made their points verbally. Even in the act of consultation, the Q&A format ultimately privileged 
the position of the speakers over the participants.  
  The other dominant technology of participation used was small group discussions. In contrast 
to the more rigidly structured Q&A format, small group discussions were geared towards facilitating 
dialogue between participants, facilitators, and experts. Smaller reflection groups that were part of the 
MRC regional stakeholder forums attempted to create less formal settings, using ‘workshopping’ tools 
such as paper and marker pens to create a temporarily ‘living document’ that reflected the exchange 
between stakeholders. The Don Sahong PNPCA stakeholder consultations in Cambodia used a similar 
format, where stakeholders were divided into groups either by issues of concern or interest groups (see 
Section 6.3.1). This format may reinforce the segmentation of knowledge discussed in Section 6.3.1 but 
facilitates intimate discussions that may be less intimidating than asking a question in front of a large 
number of state officials, experts and participants. A sense of being ‘consulted’ also has to do with how 
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the facilitation of the discussion was carried out. IN3, who attended the Don Sahong PNPCA 
stakeholder consultation held in Battambang Province, said: 
For me, I felt that the discussion was free-flowing. You can 
speak what you want, with no problem. Whether they record 
your voice or take notes, these are just steps. But I observed that 
at the end of the day they try to summarise what the group heard 
from the participants, and cross check whether it is right or 
wrong, where were the mistakes, and what were the gaps. I 
would say what I joined was quite a good discussion and showed 
transparency in terms of data collection. (Interview, IN3) 
  While much of the criticism around the PNPCA stakeholder consultations discussed thus far 
has centred around the issues of information disclosure, and the elements of publics, place, scale, and 
the temporal, this chapter argues that it is equally important to scrutinise the technologies of 
participation that became ‘black boxed’ through the PNPCA. Rose (1999, p. 208) notes that this 
technique of ‘black boxing’ renders an entity ‘invisible and hence incontestable’, which may be true of 
the regime of practices that constitute the participatory spaces of the PNPCA. Through an examination 
of multiple PNPCA stakeholder consultations, similarities can be seen in the ways the LMB and 
hydropower governance are problematised as an intelligible field for interventions, the micro-
geographies and technologies of government mobilised, and the technologies of participation used. 
Ultimately, these participatory spaces remained a realm very much dominated by technical experts, who 
became established as what Rose (1999) terms ‘authorities of truth’ through the power relations 
generated in these spaces. This in turn further contributes towards the rendering technical of mainstream 
hydropower governance in the Mekong region, by establishing and reinforcing a regime of truth that is 
dominated by technical knowledge.  
6.4. Contesting the antipolitics of PNPCA stakeholder consultations  
On the notion of antipolitics, Li (2007, p. 7) argues that questions that are rendered technical 
are at the same time rendered non-political, especially when experts frame interventions and solutions 
in technical terms rather than situating issues in their political-economic contexts. This argument 
corresponds to Braun & Könninger's (2017) critique of public participation and scientific governance, 
in which they observe that the framing of issues as risks that are ‘endlessly debated’ in effect distances 
these issues from those of power and justice. In the context of knowledge production in the MRC, 
Käkönen & Hirsch (2009) draw upon Dean's (2010) argument that risk is a set of ways of ordering 
reality and rendering it into a calculable form. They add that the way risk is used in knowledge 
production is part of the political technologies of the MRC and a key aspect of rendering technical. This 
technical debate about the risks, especially for proposed dam projects that did not yet exist, was 
prominent in the participatory spaces of the PNPCA, leading to situations where uncertainties about the 
possible impacts became a source of frustration for participants. Working through these issues will also 
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lead us to consider the third dimension of rendering technical: whether the PNPCA as a technical 
process may be considered as a deliberate measure to contain challenges to the status quo.  
6.4.1. Rendering public participation antipolitical  
The information is not clear. Laos said the [Pak Beng] dam is 
not going to impact us, but Thailand says that it will. On behalf 
of the Thai government, do you think that the dam will impact 
Thai villagers or not? You have to make it clear whether we will 
be affected or not. You cannot let the villagers just think and 
predict [on their own], I need clear information from you. What 
are your concerns? Are you concerned about money, or people’s 
livelihoods, or about the relationship between Thailand and Laos? 
What is your stand? And are you going to be responsible for us? 
(Excerpt from Q&A session in Nong Khai)  
This quote from a community representative at the stakeholder consultation held in Nong Khai 
in March 2017 encapsulates several key issues. First, it is important to pay attention to the linkages 
between subjectivity and performativity, relating to the ‘conduct of conduct’. In Thailand, possibly 
because of the presenters’ positionalities as a technical expert and/or TNMC Secretariat official, the 
presenters could only directly address questions, or parts of the questions that came under their purview. 
One of the TNMC Secretariat experts would preface his responses to questions with statements such as 
‘I will answer the questions I am responsible for’, or ‘I would like to address the technical parts for 
these questions’. This reinforced the difficulties that participants faced in understanding the technical 
information, which was also demonstrated from my personal experience. I attended the Thai stakeholder 
consultations with my interpreter, and when a TNMC Secretariat expert was answering the technical 
aspects of a question she fell silent. When I probed her for details about what was being said, she replied, 
‘I’m sorry, I don’t understand what he is saying because it’s too technical!’.  
As discussed in the previous section, rendering technical took place through the use of 
technologies of government such as numbers, statistics, and models. However, these tools made it 
difficult for local community representatives to understand the extent to which they would be impacted 
by the dam in lay terms. There were also limitations to which scientific modelling can predict 
transboundary impacts to localised areas, and in some cases, there was also a lack of data, which led to 
problems with pinpointing the exact impact to local community livelihoods. This led to some frustration 
about the information disseminated at the meeting. It is important to recall that the notion of a regime 
of truth is intertwined with knowledge and the aspirations of government (Huxley, 2007). The TNMC 
Secretariat has an inherently technical role as prescribed by the five procedures attached to the 1995 
Mekong Agreement, and in evaluating the project documents submitted under the PNPCA. The TNMC 
Secretariat therefore functioned as an authority of truth in LMB hydropower governance, whereby the 
criteria of truth were constituted by technical or scientific knowledge. The participatory spaces of the 
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PNPCA stakeholder consultations were a performative articulation of the TNMC Secretariat’s power 
as experts and authorities on the technical knowledge.  
There were non-technical issues raised during the public consultations, and the 2016 workshop 
report on the lessons learnt from the PNPCA emphasised that ‘not all public concerns can be answered 
in technical terms’ (MRC, 2016c, p.7). For local communities there are many social, cultural, and even 
spiritual elements in their lives that are also closely tied to the ecological systems of the Mekong. During 
the Thai community stakeholder consultations for Pak Beng Dam, participants brought up a variety of 
issues that would be affected by overall changes to the ecosystems of the Mekong River beyond the 
elements of hydrology, sediments and fisheries. These included: the annual Naga Fireball Festival that 
marks the end of Buddhist Lent, where balls of light emerge from the waters of the Mekong and rise 
into the air, the Mekong Giant Catfish, which is a symbol of river conservation in Chiang Khong district 
in Chiang Rai province, and the impacts on their livelihoods, which may be derived from events based 
on these cultural elements. In Cambodia, a key cultural issue that was raised had to do with prahok, a 
fermented fish paste that constitutes a central component within Cambodian culinary culture and is 
considered a key part of Cambodian identity (Interviews, IN3, CG1).  
 This is not to say that community members were unable to engage with the technical 
discussions. TC8 said he thought that the DWR made some effort to use lay terms to explain the project 
(Interview, TC8). Some Thai participants were able to challenge the TNMC Secretariat officials by 
questioning discrepancies in the data that was given to them. Others demanded for more information 
and data to be shared. One of the key points of contention for representatives from Chiang Rai Province 
was in relation to the backwater from the Pak Beng Dam that would extend upstream into Wiang Kaen 
district. The project documents noted that the Kaeng Pha Dai reef (Figure 6.5)  is ‘collectively 
recognised as a natural monument for demarcating national border between Thailand and Lao[s]’ (MRC 
Secretariat, 2017b, p. 3), and as such the generating capacity of the dam had been adjusted downwards 
to ensure the reef’s visibility by maintaining the water level at 335 metres above sea level (masl) in the 
dry season, and 340 masl in the wet season. However, a representative from a village located close to 
the Kaeng Pha Dai reef argued that his village was situated at 315 masl and would therefore be at risk 
from flooding. However, the TNMC Secretariat could not address this concern in definite terms. 
According to the engineer from Chulalongkorn University who carried out the presentation on dam 
safety, the TNMC Secretariat was trying to push Laos to conduct more studies that were needed to 
address this concern. He also acknowledged that there might be problems for Thailand from the 
combined effects of water released from the upstream Chinese dams and the water blocked by the Pak 
Beng Dam. 
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Figure 6.5. Map showing the Pak Beng Dam in relation to Chiang Rai Province in Thailand 
 
In Thailand and Cambodia, several interviewees who had participated in the PNPCA 
stakeholder consultations expressed some degree of appreciation for the information that was shared. 
This included information about the proposed dam, the project developer, and to some extent, the 
possible impacts of the proposed project. This was especially so for members of the DWR Volunteer 
Network (Interviews, TC3, TC10, TC11, TC12, TC8), possibly because these public consultations 
constituted their main source of information. In the case of civil society representatives from Cambodia 
and the STM Coalition in general, information was disseminated through alternative channels (see 
Chapter 5, Section 5.3.4 and Chapter 7). Nonetheless, CN5 said that the one benefit from the PNPCA 
was in terms of the knowledge and information gained from the CNMC Secretariat (Interview, CN5). 
A representative from the Tonle Sap Lake who had attended the PNPCA stakeholder consultation in 
Siem Reap for the Xayaburi Dam said that the information shared about the plans for the dam, the 
process, and the impacts and benefits of the dam was useful, and he could in turn share this information 
with his community (Interview, CC22). TC9, who attended one of the stakeholder consultations in 
Chiang Rai Province said: 
The benefit of the PNPCA meeting is that we know how the 
structure of the dam looks like. They provided information that 
Laos is going to build the dam, and the Mekong River will be 
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changed, and that people will have to adjust to these changes. 
But they didn’t provide the information about when the dam will 
be completed, and how far the impacts of the dam will extend to. 
(Interview, TC9) 
Despite the technical nature of the information, transparency of information was still very much 
valued among stakeholders. Boer et al.'s (2015) study of the development of the Mekong River Basin 
from a socio-legal perspective provides a useful perspective in linking transparency to public 
participation. The authors note that because of the influence of international standards and advocacy, 
and a general lack of channels to engage with decision-makers, the provisions within EIAs for project-
oriented ‘public participation’ have come to be ‘a prominent way in which transparency has come to be 
understood and enacted in the Mekong River Basin in connection with hydropower development’ (ibid., 
p. 154). This is akin to the ways in which public participation have been incorporated in Prior 
Consultation, which correlates with what the authors describe as an ‘episodic understanding of the 
demands of transparency [original emphasis]’, that ‘encourages a focus on formal channels for public 
notice, participation and consultation involving mediation by experts [original emphasis]’, and where 
efforts are directed towards the prediction of impacts (ibid., p. 151).  
Boer et al. (2015, p. 155) suggest an additional notion of ‘remedial’ transparency, which they 
argue is not encapsulated by the expectations tied to ‘public participation’. Remedial transparency is 
defined by the authors ‘as a means to remedy grievances, address injustice or exclusion and, at least 
potentially, bring wrongdoers to account’ despite some recognition that such access was frequently not 
empowering (ibid.). As seen from Section 6.2.2, the amount of information disseminated through the 
PNPCA had increased greatly since the Xayaburi PNPCA, and Chapter 5 has discussed how the MRC 
Secretariat and TNMC Secretariat had come under pressure from civil society to make improvements 
to information accessibility. However, there were limits to which remedial transparency could be 
achieved through the PNPCA stakeholder consultations. This can be attributed to the myriad ways in 
which hydropower governance and Prior Consultation had been rendered technical, in terms of 
problematising the LMB into technical categories, the limitations that NMC Secretariats faced in 
translating the project documents, and technical ‘language’ that was not accessible to those without the 
necessary expertise. These limitations will also become apparent in the discussions that follow.  
6.4.2. Containing challenges to the status quo: accountability and absences in the PNPCA 
 The dimension of rendering technical relating to the containment of challenges to the status quo 
become clearer when examining the lines of tension arising in the PNPCA stakeholder consultations, 
centred around another key non-technical concern relating to accountability. Most of the participants 
who raised concerns at the Thai community stakeholder consultations in Nong Khai and Chiang Rai 
asked variations on the question of ‘who will be responsible?’ for the impacts they might suffer from 
the Pak Beng Dam. This included questions about what the Thai government would do to help in case 
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of flooding, or if compensation would be provided for the losses to livelihoods and incomes. Several 
participants also demanded to know if the Lao government and dam developer would benefit most from 
the Pak Beng Dam, and leave Thailand to unfairly bear the negative costs of the dam. The responses 
relating to these issues of accountability were mostly handled by the director of the TNMC Secretariat. 
She acknowledged that there were no clear answers as the Pak Beng Dam was under review, the 
mitigation measures were under negotiation, and that they were carrying out a 15-year study to 
investigate the transboundary impacts of mainstream hydropower dams to Thailand. She also said that 
a compensation fund may be set up in the future. This was also separately mentioned by TG2, who said 
that the Thai government may request the dam developers or Lao government to set up such a fund 
(Interview, TG2).  
Overall, the TNMC Secretariat did not provide participants with much concrete reassurances 
relating to accountability and ultimately deferred the concerns raised by participants, particularly those 
relating to the technical issues and mitigation, to the channels of communication designated by the 
PNPCA. This could be seen from the TNMC Secretariat director’s comments at the closing of the 
stakeholder meeting in Chiang Rai:   
On the issues of backwater, flooding, mitigation, and 
compensation, we have recorded your concerns. We will send a 
letter to the MRC, and the MRC will send it to the Lao 
government for their further consideration. We will have joint 
measures to avoid and reduce the impacts of the dam. You can 
raise your concerns here, and we cannot stop you from giving 
your opinions. The Lao government will convey your concerns 
to the project developer. (Excerpt from stakeholder consultation 
in Chiang Rai Province, May 2017)  
This performative act relates to the NMC Secretariat’s lack of authority in decision making processes 
and positionalities as government representatives. An antipolitics and the containment of challenges to 
the status quo took place in the LMB when technical and uninfluential government agencies were made 
responsible for running public consultations. In Cambodia, IN3 recognised that CNMC Secretariat 
officials could not overtly speak out against the proposed dam projects, and the PNPCA protocols 
constituted a key element in their performative actions:  
Some people say that as the CNMC you have to speak out more 
strongly than that, otherwise there will be more dams. But they 
[CNMC] say that they cannot speak strongly because they are 
government staff and they have one way of talking. In the public 
consultations, the chair sometimes keeps quiet. And they try to 
use CNMC protocol, guidelines to talk instead. (Interview, IN3) 
While some procedural improvements had been made to the stakeholder consultations (see 
Chapter 5, Section 5.4), the parameters of Prior Consultation as a technical process posed limitations 
on the extent to which the concerns of local communities were addressed. This could be observed in 
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the reply forms submitted by the TNMC and CNMC close to the end of Prior Consultation. In general, 
community concerns that were reflected in the forms were listed under the technical categories 
discussed in Section 6.3.1. These concerns were generally cross-referenced with inadequacies in the 
project documents, indicating that only concerns considered to have a sound basis in evidence might be 
included in the official reply forms (see CNMC, 2011, 2015, 2017; TNMC, 2011, 2015, 2017). In 
Cambodia, several civil society representatives acknowledged that advocacy needed to be grounded in 
evidence-based approaches to gain credibility among policy makers and technical experts (Interviews, 
CN1, CN5, IN6). Recommendations in the reply forms generally called for further studies and 
assessments to be conducted. Recommendations relating to compensation were included in the Thai 
reply form for the Xayaburi PNPCA and the Thai and Cambodian reply forms for the Don Sahong 
PNPCA, but were not mentioned in the reply forms for the Pak Beng PNPCA. In addition, during the 
Pak Beng PNPCA the component of public participation was subsumed under the MRC Secretariat’s 
technical review. While separate and detailed reports on public consultation were submitted by the 
NMCs and MRC Secretariat to the MRC JC during the Xayaburi and Don Sahong PNPCAs (see MRC, 
2011b, 2014a), in the case of the Pak Beng PNPCA stakeholder comments from regional and national 
stakeholder consultations were only briefly mentioned in the main technical review report, and detailed 
comments were attached as an Annex (see MRC Secretariat, 2017b).  
As discussed in Chapter 4, in carrying out event ethnography it was not only the lines of 
tensions that were observed but also the absences of particular actors or types of knowledge from the 
event. These absences further reflected a distancing of the technical issues from the wider political-
economic contexts of LMB hydropower development. The lack of accountability was also demonstrated 
by the general absence of the project developers and the government energy sector from these spaces 
of public participation (mentioned earlier in Section 6.2.2). At the MRC’s regional stakeholder forums 
for the Pak Beng PNPCA, even though representatives from dam developer Datang were present, it was 
a representative from the Lao Ministry of Mines and Energy who presented information on the dam and 
fielded questions. Although the NMC Secretariats were key nodes within the MRC channels of 
communication, dam developers were not part of these channels designated under the PNPCA and were 
only obligated to deal with the Lao government. In the case of the Xayaburi Dam, TG1 and TG2 had 
personal contacts working in CH. Karnchang but they could not communicate directly with these 
contacts as communications with the company had to take place through the MRC or Lao government 
(Interview, TG2). For the Pak Beng Dam, it was only at the initiative of Datang that meetings with the 
Rak Chiang Khong group took place following Prior Consultation (Thai Mekong People’s Network in 
Eight Provinces, 2018; The Nation, 2018a). 
Overall, the PNPCA came to function as a justification for absolving the Lao and Thai 
governments from further blame in relation to public participation. This was reflected in the cases of 
the Lao government’s unilateral declarations that Prior Consultation for the Xayaburi and Don Sahong 
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dams had concluded, and the Thai Xayaburi lawsuit whereby the Thai Administrative Court ruled that 
the DWR had fulfilled its responsibilities to conduct public consultations in accordance with the 
PNPCA. For the Don Sahong Dam, the PNPCA provided a similar justification for the project developer 
following an attempt by civil society to hold developer Mega First Corporation Berhad accountable 
through the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM): 
Before the PNPCA, Mega First showed that they were willing to 
meet with NGOs after receiving the complaint letter. But after 
the PNPCA process was finished they responded to the 
commissioner [of SUHAKAM] that they don’t have to meet 
with civil society because they have already done the PNPCA 
consultation, that was supposed to include affected people and 
NGOs and civil society in Cambodia and Thailand. So they said 
that they don’t have to meet with us, and if our NGO and partners 
wanted to understand we could ask the NGOs who participated 
in the PNPCA… My impression of the PNPCA is that it is not 
just weak but a proxy for companies to say they have complied 
with the right to consultation. (Interview, IN5) 
The absence of discussions on energy was also conspicuous in the PNPCA. Even though 
electricity demand from Thailand has been one of the key drivers of mainstream hydropower 
development in Laos including the Xayaburi and Pak Beng dams, Prior Consultation does not provide 
scope for energy demand to be discussed. For example, EGAT dealt directly with the Xayaburi Power 
Company Ltd. in signing Power Purchase Agreements (PPA) (Chitnis, 2013), and did not play any 
significant role within these three iterations of Prior Consultation. However, there has been growing 
awareness especially among the Thai-based members of the STM Coalition about the need to tackle 
this driver of hydropower development. This could be seen from the naming of EGAT and invocation 
of the PPA in the Xayaburi lawsuit, a 2012 conference and report ‘Know Your Power’ by the Bangkok-
based Mekong Energy and Ecology Network (MEE Net) that shed light on the power sector (MEE Net, 
2012), and the recent establishment of the Thai Extraterritorial Obligation Watch (Thai ETO-Watch) 
group (Middleton, 2018a). It was possibly due to the heightened awareness of EGAT’s role in 
mainstream dam development that an EGAT representative was present at the stakeholder consultation 
held in Nong Khai (see Section 6.4.3 to follow).  
Overall, this subsection has demonstrated how the PNPCA has contributed towards the 
containment of challenges to the status quo by simultaneously rendering the PNPCA stakeholder 
consultations antipolitical. Public participation was dislocated from the wider political economic 
contexts of hydropower development, and situated within a technical process that absolved complicit 
actors from being held accountable. Li (2007) cautioned that it was important not to assume or assign 
hidden agendas to state actors, noting that governments in their heterogeneous forms pursue diverse 
ends that may be incompatible with one another. The ways in which the PNPCA stakeholder 
consultations contained challenges to the status quo were deliberate in some ways, for example in the 
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distancing of actors such as dam developers and EGAT from Prior Consultation. However, it was less 
deliberate in other ways, as demonstrated by the performative acts of NMC Secretariat officials during 
the PNPCA stakeholder consultations. On one hand, there were elements of deliberateness in containing 
challenges the status quo, as seen from the examples raised in Chapter 5 which explained how 
improvements made to the PNPCA stakeholder consultations in Thailand were driven by pressure from 
civil society, and how the PNPCA had been problematised as a way for NMC Secretariats to shape the 
conduct of conduct. On the other hand, the NMC Secretariats lacked decision making authority and 
may arguably be carrying out their technical responsibilities laid out by the PNPCA, being enmeshed 
within what Rose, (1999, p. 232) described as a ‘morality of numbers within its own politico-ethical 
matrix’. The answer to this question of deliberateness likely lies somewhere in between, as the rest of 
this chapter will show.  
6.4.3. Performative slippages and the limits of government   
 In considering the contestations that have arisen within the PNPCA participatory spaces, 
Gregson & Rose's (2000, p. 434) argument that spaces are ‘brought into being through performances 
and as a performative articulation of power’ is reiterated in this subsection. The power relations 
generated through these participatory spaces are influenced by the performative acts of sovereignty (see 
Chapter 3, Section 3.4.1) that maintain a technical regime of truth. The performance of sovereignty is 
therefore intertwined with rendering technical. By nature of being reiterative, these performative 
articulations of power open up possibilities for disruption, or ‘performative slippages’ (Rose-Redwood 
& Glass, 2014). This section focuses on the Thai and Cambodian stakeholder consultations, and draws 
upon Singh's (2009) observation that participation is a ‘negotiated performance’. This involves paying 
attention to the performances that constitute the interactions between state and non-state actors, the lines 
of tensions that reveal the performative slippages of state authority, and the ways in which participatory 
spaces are performative of a wider network of power relations. Ultimately, these elements reveal the 
limits of government in rendering technical hydropower governance in the LMB especially in terms of 
shaping desirable conducts, and not being able to fully convince nonstate stakeholders that their views 
and opinions, voiced through the PNPCA stakeholder consultations, would be meaningfully taken into 
account through the PNPCA’s participatory channels.   
At the community stakeholder consultation held in Nong Khai in March 2017, a participant 
raised a question about whether Thailand was buying the electricity from the Pak Beng Dam. In 
response, the EGAT representative couched the issue in cautious terms, leading to the exchange that 
followed: 
EGAT Representative: Laos has already contacted us but we 
haven’t signed any contract… Right now I can tell you that it is 
not certain that we are going to buy electricity from the Pak Beng 
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Dam, I am not lying to you about this… There is no contract to 
buy electricity from Laos yet.  
Community Representative, Udon Thani Province: I think the 
motivation to build the dam is from the Thai government. I need 
a clear example [evidence] that this is not going to impact us. If 
you have an example I will believe you, but right now I will not. 
If we conduct further studies and find that there is going to be an 
impact, can they stop building the dam?  
Community Representative, Bueng Kan Province: I joined the 
meetings for the Xayaburi and Don Sahong dams. Our concerns 
were raised in the past meetings, but I have not seen you do 
anything about the issues we were concerned about. Because we 
already have experience from the Xayaburi and Don Sahong 
[PNPCA], so right now I haven’t seen any action from you. Can 
you provide us with a document that we can see [how concerns 
were taken into account]?  
TNMC Secretariat Representative: We accept your concerns and 
the next time we will have follow up documents for you. Some 
of this information we have already provided on our website.  
(Excerpts from Nong Khai stakeholder consultation, March 
2017) 
These performative speech acts by both state and nonstate representatives demonstrated the negotiated 
performances between participants and Thai government representatives, and the openings through 
which the performative forces of authority were challenged. The performative forces of authority are 
dependent on their continuous reassertion and re-enactment (Rose-Redwood & Glass, 2014). In the 
context of Jackson’s (2004) Thai regime of images, where appearances, surfaces, and presentation 
emphasising formality, conformity and ceremony all play integral roles in Thai society and the 
maintenance of power, the importance of understanding performativity is reflected in Jackson’s (ibid., 
p. 209) suggestion that ‘we may perhaps postulate a performative identity as the pattern of modern Thai 
subjectivities’.  
However, as articulated by the community representative from Bueng Kan province, the 
performative force of EGAT’s and the TNMC Secretariat’s authority was no longer compelling after 
being repeated over three iterations of Prior Consultation with no meaningful change. The EGAT 
representative’s comment that she was not lying reflected the public distrust directed towards the Thai 
state, even though it was true at the time that EGAT had not yet signed a contract with the Lao 
government (also see Chapter 2, Section 2.5.6). This distrust stemmed partly from public knowledge of 
EGAT’s vested interests in buying electricity from Lao hydropower projects, and memories of the 
opaque manner in which the Xayaburi PPA was signed (Interviews, TN4, TG5) between EGAT and 
Xayaburi Power Company Ltd. before the Prior Consultation process for the Xayaburi Dam was 
completed. Participants may therefore have perceived the technical information delivered by 
government officials in state-sponsored participatory spaces as being biased. Some interviewees 
136 
 
thought that the information provided at the stakeholder consultations emphasised the benefits of the 
proposed project over its negative impacts, in order to push the project through and to tick the checkbox 
of having conducted stakeholder consultations (Interviews, TC10, TC11, TG6, CC1):  
I don’t have information about the impact [of the dam] to us. 
Most of the information is positive information for the investors. 
They will talk about the benefits we can get from the 
electricity… When the MRC wants anything, they will only 
provide the positive information. They will not provide the 
negative information. They want to make us go along with 
them… to achieve their goals. (Interview, TC10) 
A community representative from Stung Treng Province, in speaking about the consultations held for 
the LS2 Dam, saw similarities with the consultations undertaken for the Don Sahong Dam:  
I feel like they try to downplay the impacts… the government 
talks the most about the advantages from the dam, to increase 
economic growth, increase income, help electricity usage. It 
sounds like all levels of the government try not to mention the 
impacts and try to talk about the advantages. It happened in a 
similar way for the Don Sahong Dam. (Interview, CC1) 
In addition, there was tension between the perceived and actual roles of these state agencies, 
especially when considered in relation to how the functions of different agencies may not be compatible 
with one another (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4). While the Thai state is a heterogeneous entity and some 
interviewees recognised the limited influence of the DWR (Interviews, TC9, TC14, TG6), the 
discussion thus far has demonstrated that there were still expectations from civil society and local 
communities that the agencies fronting the public consultations to be representatives of the Thai 
government as a whole. In Cambodia, the converse was also observed where the CNMC was 
occasionally perceived to have stepped beyond its technical responsibilities:  
Even though we sometimes approach the CNMC [about the Pak 
Beng Dam], they say it’s not really a big concern for Cambodia 
because the Pak Beng Dam is a little far away. Sometimes the 
technical government officials, they play a role not really as a 
technical person, but play the role like a decision maker 
representing the Cambodian government. (Interview, CN5) 
 After the Xayaburi and Don Sahong PNPCAs, it had become clear to many state and non-state 
stakeholders that the PNPCA was a platform to voice their concerns but was not a decision-making 
mechanism (Interviews, TC3, TC9, CN1). From the precedents set by the Xayaburi and Don Sahong 
dams, it was clear during the Pak Beng PNPCA that Laos would proceed with the construction of the 
dam (Interview, TG6). Some representatives from the STM Coalition acknowledged that their efforts 
had delayed mainstream dam development and increased public scrutiny of the projects and state actors, 
but could not influence decision making in any major way (Interviews, TN1, TN4, IN3, CN5). Several 
interviewees expressed the view that even if their concerns were relayed to the Lao government they 
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could not influence decision making on Lao dam projects (Interviews, TC1, TC12, TG6, TG8, CC2). 
They also expressed frustration at the lack of mechanisms that would obligate the Lao government to 
compensate and mitigate the transboundary impacts of its dam projects (Interview, TC15).  
The reiteration of unsatisfactory responses from the state authorities amidst calls for 
accountability reveal the performative slippages of state authority. These slippages occurred when 
responses were perceived as attempts to obfuscate the state’s vested interests. This was reinforced by 
the tendency by NMC Secretariat officials to stress technical dimensions over accountability, emphasise 
abidance by the PNPCA, and speak in terms of uncertainties and risks. The incompatibility of diverse 
government functions along with such performative slippages highlighted the limits of government in 
shaping desirable conducts and enrolling localities and local communities into the ‘proper’ channels of 
the PNPCA. These limitations were even more apparent given that energy and private sector actors 
could not be held accountable through the PNPCA. This relates to Hensengerth's (2015) argument that 
the trans-nationalisation of Mekong hydropower development has also led to complexities in 
identifying the locus of authority over such development policies, which was now dependent on 
complex constellations of interests and actors involved in each project. Nonetheless, the contradictions 
that arose through the PNPCA stakeholder consultations have served as opportunities for state authority 
to be challenged, especially as these slippages have recurred over the multiple iterations of the PNPCA 
and within shifting configurations of authority, interests, and actors.  
This section has delved into the lines of tension that have arisen between state and nonstate 
actors, stemming from the process of rendering technical especially with the production of an 
antipolitics around mainstream dam development. Interventions and solutions to the issues around 
mainstream hydropower governance were framed in technical terms, which posed several problems. 
First, it was difficult for participants to understand and evaluate overly-technical information. Second, 
even where participants were able to engage with the technical discourse, the discussions led to 
unresolved debates framed around the notion of risk, rather than concrete information or follow-up 
actions for participants. Third, there was little room for non-technical issues to be addressed within a 
technical regime of truth, and the stakeholder consultations became divorced from their wider social, 
cultural, political, and economic contexts. Fourth, the channelling of concerns and feedback through 
the PNPCA also represented a containment of challenges to the myriad authorities supporting 
mainstream dam development. Nonetheless, understanding how challenges to the legitimacy of the 
Prior Consultation process arise can be carried out through a consideration of the PNPCA stakeholder 
consultations as performative events, which Dewsbury (2000) had conceptualised as sites that 
encompass potential contestations, alongside shifting power dynamics and alliances between multiple 
actors (see Chapter 3, Section 3.4.2). When performative slippages occurred, civil society and 
community members were provided with opportunities to not only disrupt these performative 
articulations of authority, but also call the legitimacy of Prior Consultation into question.  
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6.5. Politics of the technical  
 The chapter has thus far discussed how the rendering technical of hydropower governance and 
public participation in the LMB have also provided opportunities for contestation. It is therefore 
important to recognise, as Boer et al. (2015) have done, that a politics of the technical constitutes a key 
component of the politics surrounding the development of the LMB. This is especially so when EIA 
reports in the Mekong Region are often of low quality, situated in processes tied to differentiated 
political-economic contexts across the region (Wells-Dang et al., 2016) and in practice serve the 
interests of project investors (Fisher, 2008; Wells-Dang et al., 2016). In this sense, EIA reports 
submitted by hydropower dam developers have played a key role in legitimising the proposed 
hydropower projects (Boer et al., 2015), which in turn have implications for the PNPCA. At the national 
and regional level, the differentiated functions of government associated with very specific expertise 
contribute towards this politics of knowledge within mainstream hydropower governance in the LMB, 
reflecting conflicting concerns within and between governments. Technical knowledge may be used to 
navigate and negotiate their positions. However, the politics of a technical may not always take place 
through the channels of public participation in the PNPCA.  
 While Li (2007) argues that to render an issue technical is also to render it antipolitical, there 
were cases where it was precisely this antipolitical dimension that was leveraged upon to facilitate 
negotiations between stakeholders. This was due to performative implications when one represented 
themselves as a government representative as opposed to a technical specialist. As discussed in Chapter 
5 (Section 5.3.6), Track 1 negotiations could be hampered by the need for government officials to 
represent the interests of their respective countries. However, within and between the government 
agencies themselves, the perceived objectivity of technical discussions also provided opportunities for 
more meaningful discussions to take place beyond the constraints of Track 1. In a way, spaces of 
constructive dialogue could be brought into being through technical discussions. For TG1, a way to 
overcome the formalities in Track 1 negotiations was to develop a ‘Track 1.5’ process that emphasised 
technical expertise:  
We have been developing Track 1.5. It’s… somewhere in 
between [formal and informal]. We commit to the discussion or 
issue as technical people or as working group members who are 
willing to discuss. This does not mean that we represent the 
government on all issues, but we can learn from each other. So, 
when we later engage in Track 1 we can hopefully find a way to 
resolve some of these issues. (Interview, TG1) 
Technical discussions have also paved the way for constructive dialogue between state and 
nonstate actors. While this chapter has placed a strong focus on how state actors have rendered 
hydropower governance and public participation technical, is important not to essentialise and 
dichotomise different knowledge types, which would fail to account for the logics and epistemologies 
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through which a knowledge type may be mobilised by different interests (Agrawal, 1995). While the 
MRC’s participatory turn had done little to challenge the technocratic core of the MRC (Käkönen & 
Hirsch, 2009), civil society actors have utilised scientific discourses to challenge mainstream 
hydropower development (Yong & Grundy-Warr, 2012). The case of Cambodia and the Don Sahong 
PNPCA provides insights into how collaborations between civil society and government agencies took 
place around the generation of scientific knowledge. Given the limited technical capacity and resources 
of the CNMC and government agencies such as the Fisheries Administration (FiA), there were several 
international NGOs, scientists, academics, and donors who filled the gap by conducting their own 
scientific studies. Some of the key scientific studies that were used at the time to justify the Cambodian 
government’s position were the SEA, the MRC’s technical review and a study on the vulnerability of 
food and nutrition security to mainstream hydropower development in Cambodia carried out by the FiA, 
Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), Phnom Penh-based Oxfam Australia, and 
WWF (Interview, CG5) (see IFReDI, 2013 for the study).  
In considering how a politics of the technical has unfolded within the participatory spaces of 
the PNPCA, it is important to pay attention to the power/knowledge nexus and how particular types of 
knowledge come to be embedded within a regime of truth (Rose, 1999). As Prior Consultation was 
increasingly established as a technical process, some stakeholders recognised a need to make arguments 
based on technical and scientific evidence (discussed in Section 6.4.2). As mentioned in Chapter 2 
(Section 2.6.1), International Rivers had commissioned independent technical reviews that critiqued 
and challenged the legitimacy of the Xayaburi, Don Sahong and Pak Beng dams’ EIAs. Boer et al.’s 
(2015) critical analysis of EIAs and the politics of the technical in Mekong hydropower development 
also demonstrated how such a politics provided openings for the public and civil society to both 
participate in and challenge decision making processes. However, it was possible that domestic NGOs 
of the RCC did not have the resources or capabilities to engage with the scientific discourses favoured 
in state-centred reasoning. Yasuda (2015) noted that RCC did not utilise science as a strategy or conduct 
its own research to target decision makers, and instead used existing information from the SEA. 
Nonetheless, the attention paid to scientific evidence by some quarters of the Cambodian government 
was noted and appreciated by members of civil society:  
Inside the CNMC you have technical people who did raise some 
good questions, I think those people do care about this dam 
because they are the ones who know everything about the future 
of dams… There was some kind of effort made by the technical 
people. (Interview, IN5) 
I remember that during the discussion that people raised the 
point that the objective of the technical working group on 
fisheries is not to support the hydropower. And there was an 
interesting debate. Some people in the government, in particular 
the technical people, they know what is going to be the 
consequences and impacts. Some others don’t… From a 
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technical perspective they are aware of the impacts, but the 
political perspective is different. (Interview, IN6)  
This is a possible indication that technical government agencies in Thailand and Cambodia displayed 
some degree of agreement with the concerns raised by the STM Coalition, and reflects Boer et al.'s 
(2015) argument that technical work remains non-political until it falls into the hands of politicians. 
Gao (2014) has also noted that the DWR had raised concerns in public forums about the sustainability 
of the Xayaburi Dam and supported the extension of the Xayaburi Prior Consultation, reflecting 
political wrestling between MONRE and EGAT. In addition, the use of the SEA by both the Cambodian 
government and the RCC reflected Suhardiman et al.’s (2015) observations that the SEA had created 
political space for some actors, and partially compensated for the lack of public opinions in discussions 
about mainstream dam development through initiating an open discussion involving state and nonstate 
actors.   
  This politics of the technical made a tangible impact on mainstream dam development 
especially in the area of fisheries, as demonstrated in the case of the Xayaburi Dam. One of the key 
outcomes of the MRC technical review and both state and nonstate criticism was to pressure project 
developer CH. Karnchang into delaying the construction of the Xayaburi Dam and, according to the 
project’s main consultant Finnish engineering company Pöyry, to spend $200 million on further fish 
research and redesign of the fish passage, which was more than what had been spent on any other major 
project in the region (Cronin & Weatherby, 2015). The Lao government had announced that altogether, 
an additional $400 million was invested in the redesign of the Xayaburi Dam (Harris, 2017). Members 
of the STM Coalition recognised that their campaign efforts had an effect on delaying mainstream 
hydropower projects for further studies to be conducted (Interviews, IN1, IN3, CN5). A report from the 
Stimson Centre challenged the narrative of inevitability around mainstream hydropower development, 
by pointing to the Lao government’s increasing attention to mitigation measures as an indicator that a 
more nuanced view of Prior Consultation was needed (see Cronin & Weatherby, 2015). This view was 
acknowledged by IN1, but who also took on a more cautioned stance:  
It’s really still following a pattern of build now and then worry 
about the study later, and then worry about the impacts later. So 
we don’t actually have clear evidence, despite knowing how 
much money was invested in these [mitigation] measures, we 
know that the measures have been described by experts as state 
of the art technology and they probably are. But at the same time, 
they are still untested in the context of the Mekong, and they 
haven’t been used in a context like this where millions of people 
are reliant on the services provided by the Mekong River. So, 
it’s still proceeding along the model of risk and uncertainty. So 
that pattern hasn’t changed, and that’s why we’d be reluctant to 
paint that as a success, even though it’s clearly an outcome of 
the campaign. (Interview, IN1) 
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The elements of risk and uncertainty opened the space for debate in the technical realm both 
within and beyond the PNPCA. This is especially so as the efficacy of these mitigation measures are 
still in doubt. For example, despite the investments put into redesigning the Xayaburi Dam’s fish pass, 
the SEA had earlier emphasised that ‘fish passes, whatever their type, are not a realistic measure to 
mitigate the impact of mainstream dams on mainstream fish migrations’ (Baran, 2010, p. 115). However, 
as this chapter has demonstrated, there were also limitations around a debate framed in these terms. 
TN2 argued that the PNPCA constrained stakeholders, including civil society, in the framework of an 
EIA which ultimately constituted part of a rubber-stamping process that had limited influence on 
decision making (Interview, TN2). This chapter has also demonstrated that the ability of different 
stakeholders to engage in a technical debate was uneven and differentiated by their capabilities and 
resources to do so. Importantly, the PNPCA stakeholder consultations were not necessarily effective 
platforms for understanding, negotiating, or engaging in technical debates about the proposed 
mainstream dam projects. Many of technical discussions took place through the MRC’s PNPCA 
working groups or the NMC platforms at the national level, all of which existed beyond the PNPCA’s 
public spaces of stakeholder consultation.  
6.6. Conclusion  
The case of the prior consultation over mainstream dams 
exemplifies the limits to governance that has been rendered 
technical through a rules-based regime informed by science and 
thereby made agnostic to the political context in which it is 
embedded. Yet it also demonstrates how a procedural, technical 
arena provides some political openings for more inclusive 
governance… Despite their deficiencies, public consultations 
nevertheless represent an example of flexible governance, 
potentially open to strategic intervention by a range of actors. 
(Boer et al., 2015, p. 112) 
 The analysis by Boer et al. (2015) neatly captures the complexities of rendering Mekong 
hydropower governance technical. By the time of the Pak Beng PNPCA, there had been to some extent 
improvements made in terms of the volume of information provided to the MRC by the project 
developer, and efforts by the MRC Secretariat to incorporate a participatory approach into its technical 
review of the project. There had also been some recognition and effort by the TNMC Secretariat to 
make the technical information more accessible for participants in the Thai stakeholder consultations, 
although these meetings were still characterised as ‘information sharing’ sessions rather than 
consultations. This chapter has examined the complexities that have contributed towards the 
establishment and contestation of a technical regime of truth (Rose, 1999) through the PNPCA. This 
was done by investigating how technical flows of information were mobilised through the PNPCA and 
the challenges faced by the MRC and the NMC secretariats in terms of processing, translating, and 
delivering technical information to stakeholders. In addition to their resources and capacities to do so, 
this chapter has also paid attention to both the micro-geographies and technologies of participation that 
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have co-produced and elevated the legitimacy of technical knowledge and experts in this regime of 
truth. While transparency and information disclosure were valued by both state and nonstate 
stakeholders, the PNPCA stakeholder consultations not only highlighted the limits to information flows 
through these spaces, but also opened up avenues for contesting technical hydropower governance. 
However, the micro-geographies and technologies of the stakeholder consultations indicated that 
information sharing was generally given precedence over consultation at these events. More broadly, a 
co-produced, emergent and relational understanding of public participation in a development context 
could also more specifically be analysed through the performative components of micro-geographies, 
technologies of participation, and experts in a regime of truth, and elucidated through the use of event 
ethnography. 
The establishment of a technical regime of truth also lays the foundation for the emergence of 
an antipolitics. The rendering technical of hydropower governance in the LMB has been revealed and 
reinforced through the PNPCA stakeholder consultations, as knowledge and debates associated with 
Mekong hydropower development were segmented into discrete technical categories. An antipolitics of 
information dissemination was mediated through the performative actions of experts and government 
officials that were supported by a technical regime of truth. To a certain degree, the PNPCA stakeholder 
consultations functioned as a containment of challenges to the status quo. However, the limits of 
government in shaping desirable conducts and enrolling localities and communities into the 
participatory channels established by the PNPCA become clear through an examination of performative 
slippages that occurred. This was especially apparent when, in the absence of project developers and 
more influential policy makers, NMC Secretariat officials were unable to adequately assuage concerns 
relating to accountability. While the technical regime of truth has opened up spaces of dialogue 
elsewhere to influence mainstream dam development, the procedural limitations imposed on the 
PNPCA stakeholder consultations not only subsumed public participation under technical procedures 
but also distanced public participation from the centres of decision making, therefore limiting the extent 
to which civil society and local communities may participate in such a debate. The implications of this 
will be drawn out in Chapter 8, especially in terms of rendering technical hydropower governance 
legitimate and increasing a disconnect between local communities and the PNPCA. In the meantime, 
there is a need to look beyond the PNPCA and turn towards understanding what meaningful 
participation means to these stakeholders, along with how the spaces associated with meaningful 
participation come into being (Chapter 7).  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE MEANINGFUL AND RELATIONAL SPACES OF PARTICIPATION: 
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES  
7.1 Introduction  
 This chapter argues for a co-produced, emergent and relational understanding of public 
participation, examining the elements that make the participatory spaces of the Save the Mekong (STM) 
Coalition meaningful to communities, especially in contrast to the Procedures for Notification, Prior 
Consultation and Agreement stakeholder consultations. First, perceptions of the PNPCA as a rubber 
stamp procedure are examined and contrasted to perceptions of meaningful participation characterised 
by elements of Free, Prior and Informed Consent. Second, the participatory spaces that give a voice to 
local communities are examined. While bearing similar formats to the PNPCA stakeholder consultations, 
these spaces produce power dynamics that re-centre community voices as authorities of truth. This 
provides insight into how hydropower governance is problematised by the STM Coalition. Third, this 
chapter examines how the Mekong River provides a material basis for bringing certain types of 
participatory spaces into being. Fourth, an argument is made for situating these participatory spaces in 
their wider political contexts, as varied encounters with the heterogeneous state reinforce negative 
perceptions of state-sponsored participatory sites and constrains political space for further participatory 
opportunities. Finally, the importance of engaging with the ‘local’ is emphasised, by highlighting the 
obstacles to wider public engagement and the anti-participatory forces generated by local level power-
geometries. The need to move beyond an event-based understanding of public participation is also 
examined, and the challenges and necessity of sustained community engagement further explored.  
7.2. Contesting a rubber stamp: understanding the elements of meaningful participation    
The concern we have in general about these changes [to the 
PNPCA], is that it’s unclear at the moment whether they are just 
box ticking or whether they are actually real attempts to make 
the process meaningful and engage with the concerns raised by 
communities and civil society. (Interview, IN1) 
Some of us think that it is a rubber stamp. If we participate, it 
means that we support the rubber stamp. But some people still 
feel that we have to participate, at least there are some people to 
question, to say something, to make their voice heard and to 
make a stand. (Interview, TN1)  
The government feels like civil society and community 
sometimes are their obstacles to get something signed on and 
something approved, and of course they have their own 
government interests. And they still have the public participation 
box to tick to look good. (Interview, IN5)  
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 With the Lao government ignoring the recommendations of the SEA and proceeding with the 
construction of mainstream dams despite facing strong opposition from downstream countries and the 
STM Coalition, Prior Consultation had come to be regarded by some members of the STM as a rubber 
stamp for the proposed dam projects. The selection of quotes provided above give some sense of the 
concerns relating to the lack of meaningful public participation within Prior Consultation. These 
concerns were about public consultations being carried out as part of a box ticking exercise that project 
developers and state actors have used to legitimise the proposed dam projects, and to absolve them of 
further responsibilities to the public (see Chapter 6, Section 6.4.2). Overall, such concerns ultimately 
led to the STM Coalition’s decision to boycott the Pak Lay PNPCA in 2018. But up to the Pak Beng 
PNPCA, this created a dilemma among some civil society and community members. Chapters 5 and 6 
made reference to several boycotts of the Don Sahong PNPCA stakeholder consultations by TERRA 
and the Thai Mekong People’s Network for final Thai stakeholder consultation in Bangkok, and by 
International Rivers and WWF Cambodia for the regional stakeholder consultation held in Pakse, Laos 
(Barron, 2014; TERRA, 2015; Wipatayotin, 2015). The justifications given by International Rivers and 
WWF for boycotting the process were directly related to the lack of meaningful consultation and 
concerns that the consultations would serve as a legitimation of the Lao government’s decision to 
proceed with the Don Sahong Dam.  
 In contrast, the RCC chose to participate in the stakeholder consultations after RCC members 
discussed how to negotiate this dilemma (Interview, IN5). Some interviewees saw the PNPCA 
stakeholder consultations as an avenue to have their concerns about the Don Sahong Dam officially 
recorded (Interviews, CN1, CN4, IN3), and were concerned that the RCC would be put in a difficult 
position if the dam went ahead despite a boycott (Interview, IN3). The RCC therefore clarified that they 
did not support the Don Sahong Dam prior to participating in the PNPCA consultations (Interviews, 
CN1, CN4):  
Participation doesn’t mean that you agree with the dam. But this was 
kind of an official opportunity to challenge the dam developer and 
the country that initiated the dam. If we don’t take the opportunity, 
then our stakeholders, including the private sector, they don’t hear 
any concerns of the people. But if you take this as an opportunity – 
we go there, we challenge, we raise the issue, we go against them – 
so in the minutes of the meeting there is an official record that the 
RCC made these points. (Interview, CN1) 
 Even during Pak Beng PNPCA, the decision on whether to boycott the stakeholder consultations 
was uneven across the region. In Thailand, the leader of Rak Chiang Khong decided not to attend the 
stakeholder consultations, but other representatives from the group were present at the consultations 
held in Chiang Rai Province (Interviews, TC1, TC4, TC9). This was possibly due to the high levels of 
concern relating to proximity of the Pak Beng Dam to Chiang Rai Province. The PNPCA consultations 
would also serve as the grounds for another lawsuit filed by the Rak Chiang Khong against the DWR 
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and the TNMC in June 2018 for failing to conduct proper consultations with potentially affected 
villagers 9 . At the regional level, there were indications of some effort to improve stakeholder 
engagement for the Pak Beng PNPCA. This included the February 2016 review workshop (discussed in 
Chapter 6, Section 6.2.1) that brought together representatives from MRC member countries and 
international experts to review the lessons learnt from the Xayaburi and Don Sahong PNPCAs. IN1 
noted that there had been better information transparency for the Pak Beng PNPCA, both in terms of the 
earlier timing in which the project documents were released and the inclusion of a transboundary and 
cumulative impact assessment (Interview, IN1). Speaking before the first MRC regional stakeholder 
forum for the Pak Beng Dam, IN1 also said:  
There are efforts to ensure greater stakeholder engagement and 
public participation, and we can see some signs of that. The MRC 
has been reaching out to key people, including International Rivers, 
to get…[a] take on… [its] concerns. But at this point it is not really 
clear to what extent this is actually going to change the process this 
time around. (Interview, IN1) 
 The discussions in Chapters 5 and 6 have demonstrated that the procedural improvements made 
to the PNPCA stakeholder consultations had not successfully overcome criticisms stemming from multi-
faceted dimensions of spatial politics and rendering technical. When asked about what the key areas of 
improvement of the PNPCA should be, TN3 said: 
People’s participation is the key, from every country, not just a few 
people or groups. And the people’s participation should include 
access to information, what is true [information], when the project 
will come, what they can do, what are the technical details, and what 
are the impacts … The villagers want access to information, and the 
correct information not biased information, then communities or 
people can consider the project. And the public hearing should be 
balanced, not only hearing from the project proponents … When I 
talk about people’s participation, it means first they have to get the 
right information, then they have to be consulted, and then, have 
their views considered. There must be these three steps. (Interview, 
TN3) 
The constitution of meaningful participation through community representation, transparency of 
information, and the incorporation of feedback into decision making were also recognised by other 
interviewees (Interviews, CN1, TC9, IN3). CN5 said that the stakeholder consultations functioned more 
like a ‘symbolic consultation process’, and suggested the need for a more comprehensive collection of 
community concerns:  
                                                          
9 The plaintiffs asked the court to rule that the acts of the Director-General of the DWR, the DWR and the 
TNMC were unlawful and that the public consultations that were conducted under the PNPCA for the Pak Beng 
Dam in Thailand should be annulled (International Rivers, 2017b). The Administrative Court dismissed the 
complaint in September 2017 (The Nation, 2017). 
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There should be coordination among the grassroots people, not just 
before the consultation workshop, but it should be three months or 
four months before. And there should be a coordination body or 
mechanism to make sure that all the concerns and requests from the 
grassroots, from the people on the ground, are collected. And then 
all the inputs, comments, and recommendations should be brought 
to the national or to the regional consultation. But they failed to do 
that. (Interview, CN5) 
 These perspectives on what meaningful public consultation should entail are aligned with 
human rights based approaches that have been used to challenge transboundary decision making around 
Mekong hydropower development, especially in terms of the procedural obligations of Free Prior and 
Informed Consent (FPIC) (Middleton & Pritchard, 2016). This was particularly evident in the 
approaches used by US-headquartered international NGOs including International Rivers and 
EarthRights International (ERI). Under FPIC, participation at all stages of development is seen as a key 
human right (FAO, 2016). Elements of FPIC corresponded to key criticisms of the PNPCA stakeholder 
consultations, indicating that the language and principles of FPIC had also been picked up by Thai and 
Cambodian civil society. These elements included having meetings in locations, times, languages and 
formats determined by rights-holders (free), providing the requisite time for rights-holders to understand, 
access and analyse information (prior), having complete information delivered in local languages and in 
an objective manner (informed), and coming to a freely given and collective decision determined by 
affected people (consent) (FAO, 2016). There is a significant distinction to be drawn between 
consultation and consent (Hurtwitz, 2014), and in the case of Prior Consultation it was consultation that 
was sought (regardless of effectiveness) rather than consent from local communities.  
These standards should be contextualised in a wider assumption that has arisen among multiple 
stakeholder groups, including activists, donors, experts, policy-makers and scholars, that international 
law in the areas of watercourses, human rights and environment may be ‘potentially curative’ of the 
deficiencies plaguing the governance of the Mekong River (Boer et al., 2015, p. 192). However, Boer 
et al. (2015) argue that it is more productive to view how international laws, norms and practices have 
been mobilised in distinctive, hybridised ways in the Mekong region. This perspective can be observed 
in Floch & Blake's (2011) reflections on the gap between Thai participatory rhetoric and practice in 
relation to the Lao-Thai water transfer project, Ha's (2011) examination of the historically situated 
participatory processes of resettlement in the case of the Son La Dam in Vietnam, Middleton & 
Pritchard's (2016) study of arenas of water justice and the Xayaburi Dam, and Harris's (2016) analysis 
of the contested LS2 Dam at the intersection of international and Cambodian domestic laws. This 
perspective has implications for understanding the distinct ways in which public participation has 
unfolded beyond the spaces of the PNPCA.  
Overall, there is a need to understand the multiple positions that differentiated stakeholder 
groups take on public participation and the qualitative differences between them. Chapters 5 and 6 have 
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described how state motivations for conducting the PNPCA stakeholder consultations tend to be aligned 
towards the legitimation of the PNPCA process, whereby public input relating to mitigation measures 
may be incorporated even while the proposed projects remain fundamentally unchanged. This section 
has thus far discussed how the PNPCA has failed to meet expectations of meaningful public participation 
as envisioned by members and allies of the STM Coalition, and how such expectations corresponded to 
the principles of FPIC. However, it is important to note that these expectations are not merely procedural 
in nature. A range of motivations drive civil society involvement in public participation: to be heard; to 
raise concerns; to mitigate the impacts of the dams through modifying the projects; and to cancel the 
projects. These motivations may differ within and between the STM Coalition and its allies, but they 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive, may be expressed with differing degree of explicitness, or may 
shift in response to the outcomes of campaign efforts. In the following discussions, it will be useful to 
keep this multiplicity of motivations in mind, especially in terms of how public participation is driven 
and influenced by the convergences, contradictions, and shifts between these motivations,  
7.3. Giving communities a voice: reconfiguring power dynamics  
The PNPCA stakeholder consultations demonstrated Cornwall's (2008) point that involvement 
in a process is not the same thing as having a voice. Cornwall argues that the translation of voice into 
influence, such that people may express themselves without fear of punishment or the expectation of not 
being taken seriously, requires effort from above and below to exert pressure for change. This would 
include effort from state (institutions) and nonstate actors (civil society, communities). In contrast to the 
PNPCA stakeholder consultations, the approach taken by the STM Coalition viewed participation as a 
political methodology of empowerment (Hickey & Mohan, 2005) rather than as technologised 
procedures (Chilvers & Kearnes, 2016a). This reflects Oakley's (1995, p.24) observations that NGOs 
more naturally espoused the concept of participation ‘in its fullest sense’. This approach engages with 
development ‘as an underlying process of social change’, aligning participatory and rights-based 
approaches that stress multi-scalar political engagement (Hickey & Mohan, 2005, p. 237). This section 
examines the invited spaces (Cornwall, 2004, 2008) of participation that are structured by the STM 
Coalition, which present both parallels and contrasts with that of the PNPCA stakeholder consultations.  
7.3.1. Reconfiguring participatory spaces, technologies and information 
Chapter 6 (Section 6.3.3) discussed how technologies of participation, in terms of standardised 
formats and configurations, travel between different contexts (Chilvers & Kearnes, 2016b). 
Technologies of participation may also be loosely based on the concept of boundary objects which were 
characterised by both their plasticity and robustness across multiple sites (Bowker & Star, 1999) 
(discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2). The robustness of these technologies was reflected in the ways 
that similar models (formats and procedures) of participation (Chilvers et al., 2018) were used in both 
PNPCA stakeholder consultations and STM forums for information dissemination. This is also a 
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common format used for seminars and conferences. The plasticity of these technologies of participation 
were also demonstrated when they were adapted in civil society-organised forums to enact a reversal of 
power dynamics in favour of local communities. The micro-geographies of STM forums may bear 
similarities to the PNPCA stakeholder consultations in terms of the spatial layouts of the room but were 
markedly different in terms of the relations of power that were generated. The technical information 
disseminated through the PNPCA may also be conceptualised in these terms: robust enough to retain its 
technical characteristics within civil society forums, but plastic enough to be perceived and utilised very 
differently when handled by nonstate actors. 
 This section uses an event organised by the STM Coalition as a case study to demonstrate how 
nonstate participatory spaces contrast with the state-organised PNPCA stakeholder consultations. The 
three-day event took place on 13-15 March 2017 in Chiang Khong and Wiang Kaen districts which 
border the Mekong River in Chiang Rai Province (see Figure 6.5 in Chapter 6). It was held in 
conjunction with the annual International Day of Action for Rivers and brought together members of 
the coalition from Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. This coincided with the Pak Beng PNPCA and 
took place about a month after the first Thai stakeholder consultation held in Chiang Saen District. The 
first day of the event was a closed-door annual general meeting (AGM) of the STM Coalition followed 
by an evening of food, music, and remarks from country representatives. The second day comprised a 
public forum in the morning, followed by youth performances and a joint reading of the Chiang Khong 
Declaration by the STM Coalition. The third day of the event took place in the village of Ban Huai Leuk 
in Wiang Kaen District, which included a discussion about the proposed Pak Beng Dam and visits to 
the village’s fish conservation zone and the Kaeng Pha Dai reef. I participated in most of the three-day 
event with my Thai interpreter, except for the closed-door AGM.  
 The public forum involved local community representatives, civil society representatives, and 
academics taking on the role of presenters and speakers. Technologies of participation are not just 
exclusive tools in the enactment of government authority, and the formality of the room’s spatial layout 
now conferred authority upon these nonstate actors. A table was set up at the front of the room where 
the speakers would sit as part of a panel facing the audience, with a projector screen set up on the side, 
although not all speakers required its use (Figure 7.1). The power dynamics generated tilted in favour 
of the community representatives, civil society and academic representatives who occupied the spatially-
temporally privileged position within the room and took on the role of the expert. The structure of the 
sessions was also similar to the PNPCA stakeholder consultations, beginning with an opening address 
and each session having the majority of time allocated to the presenters with some time afterwards for 
questions and answers. However, the issues of concern now reflected the ways in which the STM 
Coalition problematised key issues relating to mainstream hydropower governance in the Mekong 
Region. Hydropower governance was framed in terms of local community experiences, avenues and 
mechanisms to seek accountability, and scientific knowledge.    
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Figure 7.1. Save the Mekong Public Forum, 2017. This picture shows local community representatives from 
Thailand and Cambodia forming a panel during the session on community experiences. 
 
The opening speech was given by the leader of Rak Chiang Khong. The forum was divided into 
three main sections. The first panel comprised representatives from local communities and was centred 
around their experiences and concerns relating to the Mekong River and hydropower development. 
There were two representatives from Thailand (representing Ban Huai Leuk village and Ubon 
Ratchathani province) and two representatives from Cambodia (representing Kratie Province and the 
Tonle Sap Lake). The panel was facilitated and translated into English by representatives from TERRA 
and the RCC. The community representatives did not use any form of technology apart from the 
microphone to talk about their experiences. They spoke about how the livelihoods and ways of life of 
their communities depended on the Mekong River, and their experiences with negative changes in the 
Mekong River’s water quality, biodiversity, seasonal water levels, sediment, fish catches, and forests. 
The Thai representatives emphasised how unseasonal water fluctuations caused by the upstream Chinese 
dam cascade had already affected their lives. The community representatives made requests to the STM 
Coalition to assist them with these challenges they were facing, which would be exacerbated by further 
hydropower development:  
On behalf of villagers from the Tonle Sap I would like to make a 
request to the STM Coalition and NGOs in Cambodia to raise 
awareness to the public and in the Tonle Sap Lake, and conduct a 
big campaign together with communities against the development 
projects. At the same time, I would also like to make a request to 
NGO partners from Thailand, Vietnam, and the grassroots to have a 
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big regional campaign together against the dam projects. Finally, I 
would also like to make a request to STM Coalition to create a 
platform where grassroot communities from the three countries 
[Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam] can come together to discuss the 
issue and how to address it. (Excerpt from STM public forum, 14 
March 2017) 
 The second session in the seminar was fronted by a panel of civil society representatives from 
International Rivers, the RCC, Vietnam Rivers Network, Thai NGO Community Resource Centre 
(CRC), and the Finance and Trade Watch from Austria. The session was centred around their strategies 
for addressing large hydropower dam projects and their varying levels of success in seeking out 
accountability. It was conducted in English. The discussants spoke about the different mechanisms 
through which they have tried to hold the MRC, state actors, and private sector actors to account for 
their interests and investments in the Xayaburi and Don Sahong dams. This ranged from using national 
avenues such as the Thai courts and the Thai NHRC, regional avenues such as ASEAN, or international 
avenues such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. The third session emphasised 
academic and research perspectives, which comprised two presentations by academics from Vietnam, 
who spoke on the Pak Beng Dam, and from Mae Fah Luang University in Chiang Rai. The two 
presenters utilised technologies of the expert such as PowerPoint presentations, statistics, diagrams, and 
graphs during their talks, providing critical perspectives that challenged the information that had been 
disseminated through the MRC and the PNPCA (see Intralawan et al., 2018 for the study from Mae Fah 
Luang University). The presentations were conducted in English, although they were not overly 
technical.  
 Even though the format of participation was recognisable and common across different contexts, 
the collective participatory practices (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.3) that emerged in this localised site 
stood in contrast to those produced through the PNPCA. In this public forum, some aspects of the 
subjects (participating publics), objects (issues), and models (political ontologies) were extremely 
different even though other aspects of objects (material devices) and models (formats) retained similar 
forms. In this case, the forum provided a useful contrast to the PNPCA stakeholder consultations by 
reversing the voices of authority and allowing local communities, civil society representatives and 
academics to occupy centre-stage to deliver a coherent narrative around their experiences and 
perspectives. This format was also utilised in Cambodia, where public forums formed one of the main 
prongs of the RCC’s strategy targeting the national government. In a climate change forum organised 
in December 2011 (coinciding with the Xayaburi PNPCA), both the CNMC and nonstate actors made 
presentations about hydropower (Yasuda, 2015).     
While the PNPCA stakeholder consultations served as a useful point to observe an analytics of 
government that renders Mekong hydropower governance visible, these civil society-organised 
participatory spaces conversely serve as a starting point to carry out an analytics of resistance where a 
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similar process of problematisation takes place (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4). An analytics of resistance 
renders Mekong hydropower governance visible in a way that counters state simplification (Scott, 1999), 
rendering technical (Li, 2007), and the technical regime of truth (Rose, 1999) established through the 
PNPCA. The standardisation of technologies of participation in the PNPCA stakeholder consultations 
bore similarities to the standardisation of boundary objects, which lead to the creation of ‘residual 
categories’ where things that do not fit into specified categories become marginalised (Star, 2010). The 
rendering technical of the PNPCA stakeholder consultations created residual categories relating to local 
community voices, accountability, and critical knowledge. However, these residual categories were 
resurrected through the STM Coalition forum.  
7.3.2. Spaces of meaningful consultation: critical flows of information 
 Another technology of participation used at the STM event was the small group discussion. In 
contrast to the PNPCA stakeholder consultations, this small group discussion took place in a setting that 
reflected the elements of FPIC, specifically in what the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) 
(2016) has described in terms of allowing right-holders to determine the location, format, time, 
language-medium, and access to objective information. In examining the participatory practices that 
have emerged through the STM Coalition, it becomes possible to understand how local communities 
perceive authorities of truth and the criteria of truth (Rose, 1999) on their own terms. This does not 
necessarily involve drawing a false dichotomy between scientific and local knowledge (Agrawal, 1995; 
Yong & Grundy-Warr, 2012). In this case, it is useful to emphasise the plasticity of technical information, 
which adapts itself to local needs by constructing alternative understandings of truth.  
 While the public forum might have been aimed at a more regional and international audience, 
the visit to Ban Huai Leuk village on the third day of the STM event was catered towards representatives 
from the local communities living along the Mekong River. The small group discussion was held at the 
village temple, where further discussions about the Pak Beng Dam and community concerns about 
mainstream hydropower development were carried out. Traditionally, Thai temples have functioned as 
a community centre where villagers may hold meetings (Pornsiripongse et al., 2014). As Figure 7.2 
shows, the setting was more intimate and informal than that of the forum, with participants sitting on 
reed mats placed along the perimeter of a small hall. The participants comprised civil society 
representatives from the STM Coalition and local community representatives from Thailand and 
Cambodia. There was no panel of speakers and although the discussion was initially led by a Thai 
representative from International Rivers and representatives from Ban Huai Leuk, the discussion was 
later facilitated by a STM representative and flowed relatively freely. Most of the discussion was in Thai, 
and the Thai facilitator translated the proceedings into English, which was in turn translated by RCC 
representatives for the Cambodian local community members. This participatory space was marked by 
informality, in part due to the lack of expert and state authorities during the event.  
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Figure 7.2. The small group discussion held in the village temple of Ban Huai Leuk 
 
Information about both the Pak Beng Dam and PNPCA, from the Thai PNPCA stakeholder 
consultations and the MRC regional stakeholder consultation, was discussed. This revealed how the 
same technical information circulated and changed in form between different participatory spaces. 
Community representatives from Ban Huai Leuk raised their concerns about discrepancies between their 
own measurements and the technical details provided in the project documents. These discrepancies 
related to the water levels and the distance between the Kaeng Pha Dai reef and the proposed dam site. 
These inconsistencies were illustrated with a hand-drawn map (Figure 7.3), and various participants 
would approach the map to provide their input. This was reminiscent of the living document used in the 
PNPCA stakeholder consultations, albeit more dynamic. As opposed to having facilitators typing in or 
writing down feedback, here participants physically approached and engaged with the map, filling in 
gaps to create an overall picture of the discrepancies and concerns raised. In this space, technical 
information transformed into an object to be critiqued rather than passively received from technical 
experts, demonstrating the intersections and overlaps between technical and local knowledge. The 
performative act of critiquing the information reflected a criteria of truth valued by community and civil 
society, serving to challenge the regime of truth conceptualised by Rose (1999). Comparing the Thai 
PNPCA stakeholder consultations and the STM event, a village head said:  
The meetings were very different, especially the information 
provided. The NGOs provided the actual information, and they also 
had examples. But as for the government meeting, some of the 
information they provided, they said it [the project and its impacts] 
has not happened yet and you don’t have to worry about this. 
(Interview, TG5) 
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Within this participatory space, power relations were reconfigured in the absence of state 
authority, and local community members were instead considered authorities of truth. Even though there 
was direct engagement with the technical information provided in the Pak Beng Dam project documents, 
I found that the discussion was easy to follow without having prior knowledge. Community 
representatives from Ban Huai Leuk were key subjects within this space of dialogue, feeling comfortable 
enough to criticise the DWR for failing to properly consult their village, providing updates on how they 
had contacted the NHRC and the DWR to obtain more information about the dam, and asking the 
Cambodian and Vietnamese representatives if they had faced similar challenges to their livelihoods. The 
other participants also shared their experiences, concerns, and posed questions to Ban Huai Leuk 
representatives, who had multiple opportunities throughout the session to share their views. This stood 
in contrast to the PNPCA stakeholder consultation held in Wiang Kaen District three months later, where 
the role of Ban Huai Leuk community representatives was restricted to questioning TNMC Secretariat 
officials during the Q&A segment. However, it was likely that the STM small group discussion played 
some role in preparing community representatives to engage with the technical discourse at the PNPCA 
meeting (discussed earlier in Chapter 6, Section 6.4.1). 
Figure 7.3. The use of a hand-drawn map during the small group discussion. The map illustrated discrepancies 
between the data from the Pak Beng Dam project documents and knowledge from villagers and civil society. 
 
 It should be noted that a politics of scale was also demonstrated here. The event allowed the 
Thai community representatives to understand hydropower development on a regional level, in contrast 
to state problematisations of the PNPCA stakeholder consultations that placed community stakeholder 
consultations under the purview of national governments (see Chapter 5, Section 5.4.3). While local 
communities are often excluded from participating in decision making in national or regional arenas 
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(Dore & Lebel, 2010; Sneddon & Fox, 2006; Suhardiman et al., 2012), the participatory practices of this 
event, especially in bringing together subjects from across the region, established the ‘regional’ as an 
inclusive category that local communities could participate in. Gaining knowledge of negative 
experiences of hydropower development from local communities across the region further served to 
challenge the regime of truth established through the PNPCA. TG5 reflected on the usefulness of 
exchanging information with villagers and civil society representatives from Cambodia and Vietnam:  
They also provided information about dam construction in their 
countries, and they shared their experiences on the impacts they 
received from the dams. Dam construction has already happened in 
their countries, but it has not happened here yet. They also talked 
about mitigation and they, the other countries, said that the 
mitigation has not been effective. So this information was very 
useful for me. (Interview, TG5)  
NGOs from the STM Coalition were also perceived as authorities of truth. In both Thailand and 
Cambodia, several interviewees from local communities said that their primary source of information 
about mainstream hydropower dams was either from their networks or NGOs, rather than from 
government sources. TG5 said that he first received information about the Pak Beng Dam from a 
network that worked on the Mekong and Mun rivers in Ubon Ratchathani Province (Interview, TG5). 
In Cambodia, information about the Don Sahong Dam primarily originated from NGOs (Interviews, 
CC1, CC2, CC3, CC4, CC15. CC17), namely the WWF, the Culture and Environment Preservation 
Association (CEPA) and the Kratie-based Cambodian Rural Development Team (CRDT) for 
respondents from Stung Treng Province (Interview, CC1, CC15) and FACT for communities on the 
Tonle Sap Lake (Interviews, CC35, CG6, CG7). This may have contributed towards a perception among 
certain community members that information disseminated and evaluated through civil society-
organised participatory spaces was more authoritative than information disseminated by the NMC 
Secretariats. These flows of information from NGOs to Mekong local communitimes reflect 
Vandergeest’s (2006) observation that ‘communities’ who undertake community-based natural resource 
management emerge from the interactions between trans-local networks and local networks and/or 
communities.  
 The plasticity of the technologies of participation and technical information described above 
allowed these elements to take on the characteristics of boundary objects conceptualised by Bowker & 
Star (1999), relating to how they inhabit multiple communities of practice and to satisfy each of these 
communities’ informational requirements. The performative dimensions of the STM Coalition’s 
participatory spaces created markedly different power dynamics due to the informality of the setting 
(e.g. sitting on the floor instead of chairs) and the conspicuous absence of experts associated with state 
authority. In contrast to the PNPCA stakeholder consultations, there was a lack of tension in the 
proceedings. Even though the content of the sessions and comments from the participants contained 
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critical views on mainstream hydropower development, these were directed towards state actors and 
dam proponents who were not part of the event. In this sense, these participatory spaces may be 
considered in the context of what Barnes et al. (2004) have conceptualised as ‘parallel discursive arenas’ 
where groups with shared aspects of identity meet to express and develop perspectives on an issue.  
Technical information contributed heavily towards rendering PNPCA stakeholder consultations 
technical, but in this participatory space it was mobilised as an object of critique. Chapter 6 had 
demonstrated how the antipolitics of public participation had framed interventions in terms of technical 
solutions, but when performed by state actors, these antipolitical technical interventions had ironically 
been perceived as biased by community stakeholders. In contrast, the performative act of critically 
evaluating and engaging with technical project information that was directly relevant to the potentially 
affected community was deemed to be objective by providing communities with ‘actual information’. 
An analytics of resistance therefore provides insight into how meaningful spaces of participation come 
into being, especially in diagnosing and reaffirming criticisms of the antipolitical PNPCA stakeholder 
consultations despite sharing common themes around information sharing.   
7.3.3. Reshaping the boundaries of action  
  The mutually respectful relationship between local community representatives and NGOs was 
built up over time and strengthened by the assistance provided by NGOs to pursue accountability. This 
has been done by identifying and utilising multi-scalar ‘arenas of justice’ (Middleton & Pritchard, 2016) 
through which they were able to exert influence, which included the PNPCA at the regional level, and 
the Thai Administrative Court and the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM) at the 
national level. The transnational flows of state and private investments into the mainstream hydropower 
dam projects and shifting loci of authority (Hensengerth, 2015) had led the STM Coalition to pursue 
multiple channels of recourse. This subsection focuses on the Xayaburi lawsuit in Thailand and the 
complaint filed to SUHAKAM over the Don Sahong Dam, which demonstrate how national arenas were 
utilised as part of a regional, transnational campaign. These strategies took the novel approach at the 
time of testing the extraterritorial obligations of the Thai and Malaysian governments in relation to 
overseas investments carried out by companies from their respective countries. Key in the run up to the 
filing of the lawsuit and complaint were consultations held with community members.  
 The Xayaburi lawsuit10 was not only unprecedented in terms of challenging Thailand’s overseas 
investments, but also because it was the first time that local Mekong communities affiliated with the 
STM Coalition had utilised legal strategies to challenge the Thai state (Chapter 5, Section 5.3.4). As 
such, there was an initial need to overcome perceptions among community members that the courts were 
only associated with criminal activities, and that they were at risk of being counter-charged or fined 
                                                          
10 Niwat v Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand, 2014, Thailand 
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should they lose the case (Interview, TN3). NGOs worked with Mekong communities to obtain their 
agreement to participate in the lawsuit (ibid.), resulting in 37 community representatives from the Thai 
Mekong People’s Network acting as plaintiffs and the collection of more than 1,000 signatures from 
community members supporting the lawsuit. ERI, who provided legal support, documented the process 
of how the CRC consulted with the Mekong community representatives (see Suriyashotichyangkul, 
2012). Consultations were held in the provinces of Mukdahan, Bueng Kan, and Loei, during which a 
CRC lawyer explained the administrative procedures, the laws that could be used to challenge EGAT, 
and shared her past experiences to convince communities of the need to take action rather than suffer 
the negative impacts of such developments (ibid). The blog post contrasted these consultations with the 
PNPCA:   
Consulting about a lawsuit is not just about getting the villagers’ 
consents and signatures. It is also about ensuring that all the villagers 
in all communities completely understand what we are trying to do; 
otherwise, they will not support the litigation over the long term. 
Ironically, in discussing the communities’ options, Sor [the CRC 
lawyer] followed the process that should have been done under the 
MRC’s PNPCA. Sor informed them of the goal of the consultation; 
provided information and updates on the current situation; consulted 
and shared the experiences including the concerns raised by 
participants, and then worked out a consensus. [Emphasis added] 
(Suriyashotichyangkul, 2012) 
Thai civil society and communities could use Thai national institutions such as the NHRC and 
Administrative Court to hold the Thai government accountable for their involvement in mainstream 
hydropower development, but in Cambodia such options were not legally available. In addition, the 
locus of authority for the Don Sahong Dam did not lie with the Cambodian government, which was not 
an investor in the Lao mainstream hydropower dams. This reflected Middleton & Pritchard's (2016) 
observation that there was no one arena of water justice whose authority and jurisdiction could function 
as a ‘silver bullet’ for redressing claims of injustices, and civil society and affected communities 
therefore had to take innovative actions to pursue multi-scalar arenas of justice. For the Don Sahong 
Dam, the attempt to extract extraterritorial accountability was pursued in the Malaysian national arena 
by filing a complaint against the Malaysian project developer Mega First Corporation Berhad (MFCB) 
through SUHAKAM. The complaint, which was submitted in October 2014, argued that MFCB had 
‘done little to understand the likely impacts of Don Sahong, done less to minimise its harms, and done 
next to nothing to inform and consult with the communities that will be affected’ (Community Resource 
Centre et al., 2014, p. 1). The complainants further argued that these actions went against principles of 
international law, which included ‘the duty to consult with and inform affected communities’ in addition 
to conducting an adequate investigation into the dam’s negative impacts and to mitigate them (ibid.).  
The complaint to SUHAKAM was also supported by ERI and included community consultation. 
According to IN5, there were two rounds of community consultation held in Stung Treng and Kratie 
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provinces, involving about 200 people from NGOs and potentially affected communities. The 
invitations were issued by NGOs which worked in the potentially affected areas, namely the 
Northeastern Rural Development (NRD) and CEPA. Provincial, district, and commune government 
authorities were also invited and were present. At the first meeting, the participants were informed about 
the possible mechanisms through which they could seek recourse, including explanations about the 1995 
Mekong Agreement, the PNPCA, background information on the Don Sahong Dam, and the possible 
role of SUHAKAM in holding MFCB accountable. At the second meeting, agreement was sought from 
community members to submit a complaint, and the participants were asked to select representatives 
who would travel to Malaysia to submit the complaint. Again, elements of the FPIC approach were 
present here, especially in the area of rights-holders making a collective decision and choosing their 
representatives (FAO, 2016) in relation to submitting the complaint to SUHAKAM. 
These consultations associated with the SUHAKAM complaint also functioned as one of the 
main sources of information for these communities, given that very few were invited to the PNPCA 
stakeholder consultations (see Chapter 5, Section 5.4.1). CG2, a village official from Stung Treng 
Province, said that about 10 to 30 representatives from each potentially affected village attended the 
consultations, and added:  
Attending the dissemination meeting can lead local communities 
towards a good understanding of the impacts of the Don Sahong 
Dam. The people really didn’t know about the impacts, and we had 
very little knowledge about the hydropower dam. So since we had 
the dissemination meeting, we understood the dam’s impacts, that it 
could affect water quality, damage biodiversity in the river and 
surrounding areas, affect fish migration, and could cause a loss of 
the [Irrawaddy] dolphins. (Interview, CG2) 
Interviewees from Preah Rumkel Commune in Stung Treng Province found the discussion of their 
options helpful:  
I felt at that time that the NGOs were helpful. Even though they 
could not say directly that they really strongly supported us, they 
raised clear scenarios and analysis about what the impacts of the dam 
might be, what has happened so far, and what we should do. 
(Interview, CC1) 
We now know that we cannot stop hydropower by doing campaigns. 
But another objective of the campaign is to get them to clarify and 
tell us who will be responsible for the impacts of the dam; if we are 
affected by the Don Sahong Dam, who will be responsible for this, 
provide compensation, and other things like that. But no one could 
address the issue of who would be responsible. (Interview, CG2) 
  Drawing on the perspective that participation should be considered as praxis that constitutes a 
‘terrain of contestation’ that shape[s] and reshape[s] the boundaries of action (Cornwall, 2008, p. 276), 
these community consultations reshaped the boundaries of action by supporting local communities in 
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negotiating these multiple arenas of justice. As discussed earlier in Section 7.3.1, community concerns 
about accountability constituted a ‘residual category’ within the PNPCA stakeholder consultations and 
were therefore not adequately addressed. In STM-organised participatory spaces, the notion of 
meaningful participation was closely tied to ideas from FPIC and empowerment. Participation as a 
political methodology of empowerment (Hickey & Mohan, 2005) was not only constituted by 
knowledge of the proposed hydropower dam projects, but by avenues of action through which local 
communities may seek accountability. From the perspective of participants, these events enabled what 
Coyle (2016, p. 235) has described as an ‘authentic human exchange’ characterised by respect. Overall, 
this discussion reflects how participation is a multi-scalar pursuit, which may be seen as a rescaling of 
local social struggles that reconfigure power relations in order to connect with, gain leverage against, 
and to challenge the imperatives of the national and regional levels (Glassman, 2001; Hirsch, 2001; 
Sneddon & Fox, 2007). 
7.4. Performing, enrolling, and re-centring the Mekong River  
In enacting government at a distance, the PNPCA stakeholder consultations connected 
peripheral localities to decision making centres of the nation state (see Chapter 5, Section 5.3.5), 
reflecting Hirsch's (2016) observation that contested development in the Mekong Region also should be 
seen in terms of shifting relations between centres and peripheries, which are shaped by development 
processes. It is communities along the borders of Thailand and Cambodia that will be affected by the 
transboundary impacts of mainstream dams. In Thailand, the eight Mekong provinces mostly constitute 
the Thai-Lao border. In Cambodia, it is the northeastern provinces of Stung Treng, Ratanakiri, and 
Kratie that have, and will be directly affected by current and future hydropower development on the 
Mekong River’s mainstream and tributaries. The Tonle Sap Lake, despite being known as the ‘heart’ of 
the Lower Mekong River (Campbell et al., 2009), the area of the lake extends up to 15,000 square 
kilometres during the flood season (Arias et al., 2014), is remote in its own way as much of it is only 
accessible by boat. Even though PNPCA stakeholder consultations took place in provincial centres, 
these venues could still be located a considerable distance away from potentially affected communities 
(see Chapter 5, Section 5.4.2). There is therefore a need to consider how meaningful public participation 
relates to the cultural and ecological landscapes within which riparian communities reside, especially in 
relation to considerations around place as a meaningful locale rather than just a location (discussed in 
Chapter 5, Section 5.4.2).  
The physical and discursive dislocation of the PNPCA stakeholder consultations from centres 
of decision making demonstrate Hickey & Kothari's (2009) recognition of how processes of 
decentralisation may ostensibly be played up while actually reifying processes of centralisation. This 
may also be considered a dislocation from the materiality of the Mekong River itself. Recognising that 
participatory practices are defined as heterogeneous socio-material collectives (Chilvers et al., 2018), 
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an examination of the sites of participation led by the STM Coalition in Thailand and Cambodia aid in 
expanding understandings of how these collectives emerge. Forums, workshops, and community 
consultations formed only part of the STM Coalition’s campaign against hydropower development. 
Other forms of campaigning, such as cultural events and protests, also reflect how meaningful public 
participation is perceived by local communities and what such spaces of public participation may entail. 
This further reflects the distinction between invited and popular spaces, the former being structured and 
owned by those who provide them, such as consultations, and the latter being spaces that people create 
for themselves (Cornwall, 2008) (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.3).  
The STM Coalition event of March 2017 involved activities that were closely associated with 
the materiality of the Mekong River. The public forum was followed by performances by Chiang Khong 
youth, the reading of the Chiang Khong Declaration by representatives from Thailand, Cambodia, and 
Vietnam in their respective languages (Figure 7.4), and the symbolic release of a float carrying a sign 
inscribed with the words ‘No Dam’ in bold red, which was surrounded by multi-coloured flags inscribed 
with the thoughts and sentiments of participants (Figure 7.5). The visit to Ban Huai Leuk included a 
visit to the village’s fish conservation zone and the Kaeng Pha Dai reef (Figure 7.6).  The non-technical, 
cultural elements of life along the Mekong River bring these participatory spaces into being, capturing 
key elements of the Mekong River that the PNPCA stakeholder consultations were unable to, and 
foregrounding the lived experiences of Mekong local communities. This was reflected in the Chiang 
Khong Declaration: 
The Mekong is our mother river, home to unique biodiversity and a 
lifeline for millions of people throughout the river basin. We 
recognise the efforts of Mekong communities who are working to 
protect and preserve the unique ecosystems and resources of the 
river for future generations. We are extremely concerned by large-
scale development plans, which ignore knowledge, cultures, and 
voices of the women and men in the Mekong Basin whose lives and 
beliefs are inherently intertwined with the Mekong River. Planning 
and decision-making over hydropower and other developments on 
the Mekong River have lacked public participation, transparency 
and accountability. (Save the Mekong, 2017) 
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Figure 7.4. Reading of the Chiang Khong Declaration by the Save the Mekong Coalition 
 
Figure 7.5. Release of an anti-dam float on the Mekong River  
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Figure 7.6. The Kaeng Pha Dai reef in Wiang Kaen District, Chiang Rai Province 
 
 In the case of the Xayaburi dam, there were strong, public shows of resistance against the 
proponents of the mainstream dams in Thailand carried out in the wake the Xayaburi PNPCA (see 
Chapter 2, Section 2.6.1). The Thai Mekong People’s Network conducted protests in Bangkok in April 
2012 outside the headquarters of project developer CH. Karnchang and the Siam Commercial Bank, one 
of the four banks financing the dam. Community representatives held up banners that said ‘Fish is [sic] 
our life’ and ‘No dam on the Mekong’ in English, and also raised large replicas of Mekong fish that 
were mounted onto long sticks (see Ganjanakhundee, 2012). During the flotilla protest in Nong Khai 
that coincided with the 2012 ASEM in Vientiane, banners carrying demands such as ‘Stop the Xayaburi 
Dam’ and ‘Don’t dam the Mekong River’ were mounted onto the boats which occupied the Mekong 
River. Protests were considered as part of a multi-pronged approach to gain attention from decision 
makers and support from the wider Thai public through media attention (Interview, TC1). These forms 
of resistance showed strong parallels with the direct action taken by the AOP against the Pak Mun Dam, 
which saw villagers bringing their grievances and protests to Bangkok multiple times between 1993-
2000 (Foran & Manorom, 2009; Glassman, 2001; Missingham, 2003).  
 In Cambodia, similar strategies were also evident before and after the Don Sahong PNPCA. On 
29-31 March 2014, Oxfam Australia, International Rivers, and the NGO Forum organised a three-day 
campaign to protest the Don Sahong Dam, involving about 400 people who travelled down the Mekong 
River on longboats bearing banners through the provinces of Kratie, Strung Treng, and Kampong Cham 
(Phak, 2014). WWF Cambodia also organised a boat protest in Phnom Penh in September 2014, in 
conjunction with an international petition campaign, during which protestors raised banners and cut-
outs of the Irrawaddy dolphin and Mekong fish, and another campaign held in Preah Rumkel Commune 
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in December 2015 (Crothers & Hul, 2014; WWF, 2015). Apart from the SUHAKAM complaint and a 
thumbprint petition, the events held in Stung Treng province were also mentioned by the community 
participants from Preah Rumkel Commune and the provinces surrounding the Tonle Sap Lake 
(Interviews, CC1, CC2, CC3, CC4, CC5, CC25, CC27, CC29, CC31, CG2). The protest held in Preah 
Rumkel was significant in that it took place along the border, within sight of the Don Sahong Dam site, 
and enrolled a wide range of human and nonhuman entities. This included not only NGO and community 
representatives from across Cambodia including the vast Tonle Sap Lake, but also local authorities, the 
wider public through a petition and media attention, and nonhuman entities such as the Mekong River 
and the Irrawaddy dolphin that lived in the same area (Bangkok Post, 2014; WWF, 2014).  
The carrying out of direct action had important performative effects in terms of nurturing the 
voices of participants such that they felt empowered to effect change, reflecting the considerable 
differences in power relations between invited and popular spaces (Cornwall, 2008). This also reflects 
how social movements are constituted by the intertwining of culture and politics that directly challenge 
existing power relations rather than work around them (Hickey & Mohan, 2005), which are both a key 
participatory strategy and practical action that utilises popular pressure and adversarial tactics over 
benign collaboration (Oakley, 1995). The performative expectations of conduct in the PNPCA 
stakeholder consultations were suspended or reversed in these alternative participatory spaces, 
producing new subjectivities and performative acts. Protests served as a key opportunity for community 
representatives to voice their concerns unmediated: 
For activities like the protest in Nong Khai, we can raise our voices 
directly to the government. But for the PNPCA meetings, we need 
translators, and we need a middle person to raise our concerns. I 
don’t know how they will raise this. So this is the difference. 
(Interview, TC9) 
 The performative effect of holding of protests along the Mekong River was important not just 
in terms of drawing attention to the materiality of the river, but also for representatives from potentially 
affected villages who were able to participate in a familiar physical setting that was part of their 
everyday lives. Participation serves to create identities or subjectivities (Barnes et al., 2004), and this 
process is intertwined with the performative dimensions of participatory events, where performativity 
is understood as a ‘situated convergence’ of heterogeneous entities and ‘force relations’ that facilitate 
the emergence of people, place, and things (Kaiser, 2014, p. 123). Such events served as a display of 
solidarity between participants, which emboldened community members at the time: 
I remember the campaign where there were banners and slogans 
against the Don Sahong Dam… We had no fear in joining the 
campaign, because there were many other participants as well. We 
cannot do it now because only a few people would participate. 
Others do not understand [our situation], and we don’t know how to 
explain it to them… Hundreds of people had joined the campaign 
163 
 
previously, and it seems hopeless to organise a campaign now 
because the dam is already constructed. (Interview, CC3) 
 These participatory spaces positioned the Mekong River and its entities as central, rather than 
peripheral objects of concern. Protests drew visual attention towards the materiality of the river and 
community concerns, in contrast to their abstracted, technical forms at the PNPCA stakeholder 
consultations. This is especially important when considering how such images of the protests and the 
Mekong River are disseminated through the media, which generally functioned as a key advocacy 
strategy to raise public awareness on the Xayaburi Dam (Yasuda, 2015). Even when protests took place 
in Bangkok and Phnom Penh, nonhuman entities such as fish were represented, highlighting concerns 
about the impacts of mainstream dam development on fish migration. Such visually arresting images 
(for example, see https://www.bangkokpost.com/photo/photo/290238/xayaburi-dam-protest) were later 
reproduced in media articles about Mekong mainstream dam development, even when these articles did 
not directly reference the protests.  
Participating in activities that engaged with the materiality of the Mekong River was also 
important in other ways. Some interviewees from Cambodia took part in a study trip in 2014 to Thailand 
to learn about the Pak Mun Dam, the ineffectiveness of its fish ladder11, and its impacts on communities 
in terms of water flow and fish migration (Interviews, CC25, CG2, CN7; also see Corben, 2014). These 
interactions with both the material structures of the dam and with representatives from the region 
allowed community representatives to gain a sense of the technical controversies in dam construction 
and the implications of mainstream dam development for the entire LMB:  
They said they were going to build a fish ladder [for the Don Sahong 
Dam], but I went to Thailand and saw that the fish ladder there [at 
the Pak Mun Dam] does not work. The fish cannot migrate up, so it 
doesn’t work at all for fish migration and I feel that it is not going to 
work for the Mekong fish … Vietnam is more strongly against the 
Don Sahong Dam than Cambodia, because of the Mekong Delta. 
They feel really worried and are more concerned than the 
Cambodian side, they feel they will be hurt more than us. The 
countries are connected, first because of the water flow, and second 
because of fish migration. (Interview, CG2) 
In a way, the material entities of the Mekong River were implicated in co-producing the distinct 
forms in which social struggles have been rescaled from the local to the regional level, demonstrating 
an intertwining with what Glassman (2001, p. 525) had called ‘place-specific, situational political 
economic, and sociocultural forces’. This also reflects Sneddon’s (2003, p. 187) suggestion that the 
materiality of the Mekong River’s resources could lay the grounds for ‘innovative political thinking and 
practice’. In Thailand, the historical legacy of the social movement against the Pak Mun Dam, the 
                                                          
11 A fish ladder is a type of fish pass that is utilised as a means to mitigate the impact of dams relating to the 
blocking of fish migrations (Baran, 2010).  
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complicity of the Thai state in Lao hydropower development, and the use of Thai arenas of justice to 
pursue accountability made the national arena a particularly important realm of contestation. In 
Cambodia however, it was precisely because the protests were not directly targeted at the Cambodian 
government that NGOs were given permission to hold protests at multiple sites in the country. These 
protests were possibly targeted towards a regional or international audience, for example as seen from 
the WWF’s international petition campaign and its associated events. Nonetheless, these participatory 
spaces shared a common basis in the materiality of the Mekong River, whether they were located 
physically close to the Mekong River or not. Recalling that Chilvers et al.’s (2018, p. 201) concept of 
the ecologies of participation constitutes the ‘mutual interweaving of social, normative, cognitive and 
material elements’ and comprises the three elements of subjects, objects, and models, the materiality of 
the Mekong River may be considered a fourth component in this concept when applied to the unique 
landscape of participation that has emerged within the LMB.  
7.5. Participation and power-geometries: encountering the heterogeneous state 
 Thus far, this thesis has examined public participation as events that occupy very particular 
time-spaces. However, it is necessary to emphasise the linkages between different participatory spaces. 
For community representatives aligned with the STM Coalition, the participatory spaces they perceive 
as meaningful stand in stark contrast to, and expose, the weaknesses of the PNPCA stakeholder 
consultations. This has influenced the ways in which the stakeholder consultations were perceived. This 
section examines the relational dimensions of public participation by situating them within national 
political contexts and the issue of community engagement. There is a need to recognise that participation 
is a ‘broad, multi-dimensional phenomenon with political, economic and social characteristics’, which 
should be regarded as a process rather than a one-off activity (Oakley, 1995, p. 23). The range of 
participatory spaces initiated by civil society have also led to multiple and differentiated encounters with 
the heterogeneous state, which are in turn situated within the wider political context of each country. 
These state and nonstate spaces of participation need to be studied in relation to one another to 
understand how the experiences of subjects in one participatory space shape their experiences in another.  
This relational approach towards understanding public participation draws upon Cornwall's 
(2004) proposal to understand these spaces as being embedded in unique cultural understandings and 
political configurations constituting the field of governance. These spaces are situated within 
institutional landscapes ‘as one amongst a host of other domains of association into and out of which 
actors move, carrying with them relationships, knowledge, connections, resources, [and] identities’ 
(ibid., p. 9). The participatory spaces of the STM Coalition are still situated within Massey's (1992) 
notion of a power-geometry where the elements of domination, subordination, and cooperation are 
entangled in a complex web of relations. As such, efforts to engage communities should take into 
account Oakley's (1991, p. 4) recognition of the ‘powerful, multi-dimensional and, in many instances, 
165 
 
anti-participatory forces which dominate the lives of rural people’, and that these deeply embedded 
relations of power cannot be overturned simply by invoking the concept of participation. This section 
pays closer attention to the political and authoritarian contexts of Thailand and Cambodia, where events 
such as the May 2014 coup in Thailand and Cambodian Prime Minister (PM) Hun Sen’s visit to the Don 
Sahong Dam in early-2017 had negative implications for the forms of public participation discussed in 
this chapter thus far. Different types of encounters with state authority in both countries are first set out, 
before discussing of the significance of political contexts. 
7.5.1. Thailand 
 As discussed in Chapter 6 (Section 6.5), the TNMC and CNMC secretariats and other technical 
agencies have occasionally been, to varying degrees, sympathetic to the technical concerns raised by the 
STM Coalition. However, participants in the STM Coalition’s campaign have also encountered other 
forms of state authority within the heterogeneous Thai and Cambodian nation states. In Thailand, this 
has involved encounters with the state judiciary, local governments and the state security apparatus. In 
submitting the documentation required for filing the Xayaburi lawsuit, villagers encountered the Thai 
Administrative Court staff, who were cooperative in helping to explain the court procedures to the 
community plaintiffs (Interview, TN3). This would have been important in assuaging the initial 
reservations that local community members had about using the Thai courts to hold the government 
accountable (discussed earlier in Section 7.3.3). However, such positive experiences were few. 
Following the Nong Khai protest, it was not only the TNMC Secretariat who voiced their displeasure 
with the participants (Chapter 5, Section 5.3.6). Participants from Nong Khai recalled being reprimanded 
by the provincial governor (Interview, TC2) and briefly questioned by police (Interview, TC3). A chief 
district officer in Nong Khai had apparently also told villagers in the district not to trust the NGOs who 
were campaigning against Mekong hydropower development (Interview, TC16).  
The May 2014 coup and instalment of the military government marked a turning point in 
bringing repressive performances of state authority into the intimate spaces of community consultations. 
On 11 November 201412, four military and three police officers interrupted a meeting held between the 
CRC lawyer and community members in a hotel in Udon Thani. The lawyer was made to sign a letter 
requesting permission to conduct the meeting, and the military stayed to observe the meeting and 
collected documents relating to the lawsuit (Prachatai, 2014). Some community leaders were also 
approached by the military and threatened with repercussions if they lost the lawsuit (Interview, TN3). 
TN3 said that after these incidents, meetings with communities had to be held at night to avoid detection. 
TN3 added that it was due to the prior trust established with the community representatives that they 
decided, even in the face of state intimidation, to further pursue an appeal against the Administrative 
                                                          
12 This was about five months after the Thai Supreme Administrative Court’s decision to reverse the Lower 
Court initial rejection of the case (Thai Supreme Administrative Court, 2015).  
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Court’s ruling in favour of the government in December 2015. In general, it was more difficult to 
organise campaign activities under the military government (Interviews, TC1, TN3). The 2015 public 
assembly law banned ‘political’ gatherings of five or more people and required people wanting to stage 
demonstrations to notify authorities in advance (Bangkok Post and AP, 2015; The Nation, 2018b). This 
did not mean that events were completely prohibited, especially if they did not challenge the political 
regime’s legitimacy (Interview, TN3) or where good relations existed between NGOs and the local 
authorities, such as in the case of the Rak Chiang Khong (Interview, TN4), which hosted the STM event 
in March 2017 and also conducted fierce protests at the time against a rapids blasting project.  
Relations between members of the Thai Mekong People’s Network and the DWR also extended 
beyond the PNPCA. At this point it is worth reiterating the value of knowledge and information to all 
those affiliated to the STM Coalition, as seen from their repeated calls for further studies to be conducted 
before dam construction proceeds. TC4 said that in about 2010 or 2011, the DWR had discussed with 
the Rak Chiang Khong the possibility of conducting a study about fish, but the DWR did not have a plan 
on how to get villagers involved and eventually had the Department of Fisheries conduct the study with 
the assistance of students (Interview, TC4). TC2 expressed her frustrations over the DWR’s 15-year 
study due to their decision to work with Thai universities and the DWR Volunteer Network over her 
group that was part of the Thai Mekong People’s Network. She added that ‘the DWR does not respect 
the knowledge of local people. We have the knowledge, and we have studied these issues before, but 
they just ignore our knowledge’ (Interview, TC2). TC3, who is part of the DWR Volunteer Network, 
also argued for a more participatory approach to be adopted in carrying out these studies, saying that he 
disagreed with the universities’ approaches that did not include local villagers as co-researchers, or allow 
university researchers to learn from villagers how the research could be carried out (Interview, TC3).  
This devaluation of local knowledge is elaborated on in Section 7.6.4. 
7.5.2. Cambodia  
In Cambodia, the political power wielded by the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) runs 
deep into rural areas. The majority of the communes in Cambodia are CPP communes and local 
authorities, namely commune and village officials, are also party members (Croissant, 2018). 
Permission to conduct public campaigns against the Don Sahong Dam had to be sought from the 
provincial authorities. The central government, including the CNMC Secretariat, did not overtly show 
support for or participate in these events, but the provincial governments’ approvals for the events and 
the participation of commune and village authorities indicated the central government’s tacit approval 
(Interviews, CG3, CG4). Several interviewees also recalled that Pol Ham, the chairperson of a National 
Assembly commission, also visited Preah Rumkel to hear their concerns (Interviews, CC2, CG2, CN3). 
However, Cambodian civil society also encountered obstacles from state authorities, not in the form of 
intimidation but the denial of permissions in the more central provinces of Cambodia. During the three-
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day campaign in March 2014 (discussed in Section 7.4) the Stung Treng and Kratie provincial authorities 
granted permission to carry out the campaign, but the Kampong Cham provincial authorities did not 
allow the participants to enter Kampong Cham to conduct a march in town (Phak, 2014). The Kampong 
Cham Provincial Hall administrative chief was quoted as saying ‘It is a dam in another country, and 
[this] province is not involved in it’ (ibid.). The WWF’s planned protest cruise along the Tonle Sap 
River in Phnom Penh was also disallowed by City Hall authorities who ordered the protestors to stay on 
land, leaving the protestors to protest on the docked boat (Crothers & Hul, 2014). 
Other domestic developments in Cambodia taking place around the same time as the Don 
Sahong Dam campaign had a chilling effect on advocacy efforts against hydropower development. This 
had to do with the Cambodian government’s pursuit of hydropower development, and a series of 
crackdowns on opposition elements in the runup to the 2018 general elections. In 2015, there was a high 
level of coverage by both the domestic English press (the Phnom Penh Post and the Cambodia Daily) 
and international press over the controversial LS2 Dam which had commenced construction in February 
2015 (see Chapter 2, Section 2.6.3). The issue of the LS2 dam was more politically sensitive than the 
Don Sahong Dam (mentioned in Chapter 5, Section 5.3.6), as criticism was directed towards the 
Cambodian government. This development took place concurrently with the passing of the controversial 
Law on Associations and Non-Governmental Organisations (LANGO) that was approved by the 
National Assembly in July 2015. This ‘NGO Law’ extended government oversight and control over 
registered NGOs in the country, which Baird (2016) argues had influenced the willingness of 
Cambodian NGOs to take a stronger stand on issues such as the LS2 dam. CN5 made an observation 
that reflects Dore & Lazarus's (2009) point that dissent is often unhelpfully conflated with disloyalty in 
the Mekong Region:  
Now we face a very big challenge with LANGO. It’s very 
sensitive… We give them [the government] some recommendations, 
some comments, how to do a good thing to bring benefit to the 
people. But in their minds… they feel like we are their enemies. 
There was one politician from the ruling party who said… those who 
are against development projects will be treated as traitors… This is 
what they said during the time we conducted the campaign against 
the Lower Sesan 2 project. (Interview, CN5) 
The turning point for the Don Sahong Dam came in November 2016, during a bilateral meeting 
held between Cambodian Prime Minister (PM) Hun Sen and Lao PM Thongloun Sisoulith. Hun Sen 
announced that ‘there is no issue with the [Don Sahong] project, and there is no impact in terms of lack 
of water or fish migrations’ (Down & Kang, 2016). He also thanked Laos for pledging to sell electricity 
at a low cost to the Cambodian provinces close to the dam (Vong & Maza, 2016). Hun Sen then visited 
the dam with the Lao PM in January 2017, reaffirming his support for both the project and the supply 
of cheap electricity from Laos (Van, 2017). Interviewees from Stung Treng-based NGOs agreed that 
these performative acts had an impact on their work. CN3 said that their work on the Don Sahong Dam 
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had become ‘silent’ following this development, and that it was now more sensitive and difficult to work 
on this issue (Interview, CN3). CN4, comparing the situation before and after Hun Sen’s announcement 
and visit, said: 
Communities and NGOs had the space to raise their concerns about 
the dam construction’s impacts. Local authorities also had the space, 
and at that time there was also government support. The Prime 
Minister’s support for the Don Sahong Dam was a surprise for 
everyone… after he said that they [communities and NGOs] felt that 
they could not speak out anymore. (Interview, CN4) 
 The performative force of Hun Sen’s announcement and visit to the Don Sahong Dam was a 
strong one, reflecting the unchallenged power that Hun Sen wields on decision making processes in 
Cambodia (Morgenbesser, 2018). This was also felt by interviewees from Preah Rumkel, who had not 
seen any NGOs in the area since 2017 to follow up on the issue and monitor the impacts of the dam 
(Interviews, CC1, CC2, CG2). CC2 said that because of political pressure, the NGOs that used to be 
active in the campaign, such as WWF, CEPA and CRDT, were not as active on hydropower issues 
anymore. They did not see CEPA around often, and CRDT had shifted its focus onto livelihood issues 
(Interview, CC2). CG2 said that there was nothing they could do about the issue because they needed 
the support of the RCC network to take any action, adding that ‘now it seems like our network, like the 
Tonle Sap network, or the Mekong network, we don’t have any communication with them at all. We 
seem to have lost them, and there is no talking within the network’ (Interview, CG2). This lack of action 
by the RCC may also be seen in conjunction with the loss of faith in influencing hydropower 
development through the perceived lack of successes yielded by the STM Coalition’s campaign.  
7.5.3. Situating anti-participatory forces in political context    
 To understand the STM Coalition’s lack of trust in the PNPCA stakeholder consultations, it is 
necessary to examine the ways in which different forms of state authority have inserted themselves into 
civil society-led public participation. Although there were some positive instances of engagement with 
state authority, these generally took place with lower level authorities such as technical agencies or local 
government officials who did not have much of an influence on decision making processes. This may 
be attributed to highly centralised decision-making processes in Thailand and Cambodia (Chapter 5, 
Section 5.3), and the dislocation of Mekong provinces from decision-making centres (Section 7.4). The 
distrust in the PNPCA stakeholder consultations was intertwined with and exacerbated by experiences 
of state intimidation, marginalisation of local knowledge, clampdowns on political freedom, and 
interests in Lao hydropower development. The key political events in Thailand (the May 2014 coup) 
and Cambodia (the passing of the NGO Law and Hun Sen’s visit to the Don Sahong Dam) reflect the 
need to highlight how anti-participatory forces are generated in the political context of growing 
authoritarianism in both countries. This relates to Yasuda's (2015) argument that NGO advocacy 
strategies have to be situated between formal rules and norms that may stem from the MRC, national 
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governments, and civil society themselves. This is becoming a critical issue at the national level. Even 
though government in Thailand and Cambodia have been historically characterised by authoritarian 
elements despite their ostensibly democratic facades, the developments discussed above have 
demonstrated a hardening of authoritarianism in both countries (see Baker, 2016; Croissant, 2018).  
For Thailand, Baker (2016) has argued that the 2014 coup was a history-changing coup where 
the military government positioned itself at the apex of the political system, and its actions to silence 
opposition through regulations and techniques of intimidation were more aggressive than any coup since 
1976. There are also implications arising from changes to the legal frameworks that made provisions for 
public participation, such as the 2007 Constitution and the 1992 Enhancement and Conservation of 
National Environmental Quality Act (NEQA) (see Chapter 5, Section 5.3.4). The 2017 Constitution 
contains provisions that would curtail the right to freedom of expression, for example making it easier 
for government agencies to reject public requests for information (Palatino, 2016). While Section 67 of 
the 2007 Constitution recognised the right of a person or community to ‘participate… in the conservation, 
preservation and exploitation of natural resources’ (Bureau of Technical and International Cooperation, 
2007, p. 33), in Section 43 of the 2017 Constitution this has been modified to a right to ‘manage, 
maintain and utilise natural resources, environment and biodiversity’ in accordance with the law (Office 
of the Council of State, 2017, p. 14), appearing to strip the notion of participation from its normative 
dimensions. The revised NEQA, which was passed in April 2018, was opposed by environmental groups 
which argued that it favoured investors by shortening EIA processes and that the bill was drafted without 
public participation (Prachatai, 2017; Rujivanarom, 2017b). 
In Cambodia, Hun Sen is the world’s longest serving prime minister, having served in the 
position since 1985. However, the hardening of authoritarianism in Cambodia described in Section 7.5.2 
should be contextualised in challenges to Hun Sen’s power in the past five years. At the 2013 general 
elections, the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) unexpectedly made huge gains and 
reduced the governing CPP’s majority in the 123-seat National Assembly from 90 seats to 68 seats, and 
secured 44.5 percent of the vote against the CPP’s 48.8 percent (Mccargo, 2014; Sutton, 2018). In this 
context, Curley (2018, p. 262) describes the NGO Law as carefully crafted piece of legislation that 
functioned as part of a recent trend relating to the Cambodian government’s use of legislation as a 
political tool to increase control and intimidation of its political opponents. This trend has allowed the 
government to launch a crackdown on media freedom through the forced closure of the independent and 
critical Cambodia Daily newspaper and revocation of radio station licenses, and culminated in the forced 
dissolution of the CNRP in 2017. This crackdown on political freedom also extended to the realm of 
environmental activism. Since 2015, six members of the NGO Mother Nature, which had campaigned 
against hydropower dams and illegal sand dredging, were variously jailed, given suspended sentences 
or fined (Gray, 2018); the NGO was de-registered in 2017 (Mech & Baliga, 2017). Following the 
dissolution of the CNRP, environmental activists also reported facing difficulties in carrying out their 
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work, which had been obstructed by local authorities (Lipes, 2018). According to CN5, in 2015 his 
organisation had also been accused by government officials for colluding with the CNRP, but he was 
able to refute the accusations in a respectful and firm manner (Interview, CN5).  
This purpose of this discussion is not to paint an overly-pessimistic picture about the closure of 
avenues for public participation, but to highlight the increasingly challenging political climate that civil 
society and local communities have had to contend with in the past five years and are likely to contend 
with in the future. Rather, what this thesis has demonstrated thus far is Li's (2007) observation of an 
intimate linking of openings and closures, where struggles in governance are characterised by what 
Foucault (1983) has termed a ‘permanent provocation’ situated in the heart of power relationships (see 
Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4). Despite the hardening of anti-participatory forces, civil society and local 
communities have nonetheless found openings within varied participatory spaces to challenge, or 
negotiate with, the differentiated arms of the state even if this has not fundamentally shifted the logic of 
mainstream hydropower development. This further demonstrates the need to understand participation as 
co-produced, relational, and emergent, so as not to eclipse any opportunities for resistance. Paying 
attention to these political contexts, locating participatory spaces within a power-geometry, and 
highlighting the instances where participation has been met with the repressive arms of the state serve 
to deepen an understanding of why the PNPCA stakeholder consultations, as mostly one-off events, may 
be distrusted and considered unmeaningful by participants, especially those associated with the STM 
Coalition. This is not to say that participatory events initiated by STM Coalition were without flaws, 
and the next section turns to how the one-off events initiated by these nonstate actors also must be 
situated in their wider contexts.  
7.6. Constructions of the local: the challenges of community participation 
For civil society actors, sustained community engagement remains a challenge beyond the 
events that were organised as part of the STM campaign. As long as public participation is thought of 
in terms of discrete events, there will be limitations on the extent to which a wider ‘public’ may be 
enrolled into networks of interest opposing hydropower development in the Mekong Region. While this 
chapter has thus far differentiated between kinds of participation, attention is now turned to the question 
of who participates (Cornwall, 2008). This is closely linked to the intentionality, or rationales behind 
‘doing’ participation (Stirling, 2008; Wesselink et al., 2011). Understanding participation as praxis, 
consideration is given to how a balance between depth and inclusion may be struck based on the 
circumstances to achieve optimum participation, given that most participatory processes ‘do not and 
literally cannot involve “everyone” [original emphasis]’ (Cornwall, 2008, p. 276). From a spatial 
perspective, this involves questioning how local community engagement is tied to what Mohan & 
Stokke (2000, p. 1) have termed ‘the dangers of localism’ in participation, a caution against underplaying 
local inequality, power relations, and multi-scalar political-economic forces. This relates to Massey's 
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(2005, p.140) notion of the ‘event of place’; understanding place through its relationality and negotiation 
between the here-and-now and ‘then-and-theres’ (history-geography). These elements are also closely 
tied to the politics surrounding the constructions of the public and scale that was discussed in Chapter 
5, Section 5.4. This section will delve into the myriad constructions of the local and their implications 
for public participation in the LMB.  
7.6.1. The local as a site of representation and spatial legitimacy 
 The STM Coalition has consistently called for meaningful public participation and for local 
communities to be placed at the centre of decision making around hydropower development in the 
Mekong Region. The enrolment of local communities into the STM campaign against Mekong 
mainstream dams was considered to be critical, as the legitimacy of NGOs could be undermined by 
questions about what Cornwall (2004, p. 3) has explained as ‘who speaks for whom, and how claims to 
represent are made and negotiated’.  This relates to a notion of ‘spatial legitimacy’ that draws upon 
differentiated constructions of the ‘local’ by a range of stakeholders, whereby legitimacy may be 
perceived to be dependent on place-relational factors such as spatial proximity where only ‘local’ 
residents may be conferred with a legitimate voice (Bosca & Gillespie, 2018).  
This is a line that may be drawn by state actors, especially in Cambodia, who harbour a distrust 
of NGOs and their credibility in speaking on behalf of local communities. CG1 made a distinction 
between the comments made by NGOs and community representatives during the Cambodian PNPCA 
consultations, describing the local community comments as being ‘copied from the NGOs’ without fully 
understanding what they meant, containing mistakes and lacking clarity (Interview, CG1). CN8 said that 
only a people’s movement could effect change, and added that ‘if we [NGOs] do the work for them, the 
government will not believe them and say that the concerns are from NGOs and not the local community’ 
(Interview, CN8). However, this presented a conundrum because Cambodia lacked a long a history of 
civil society movements against hydropower, and community members were unable to lead the 
campaign due to the limited experience of local NGOs with hydropower advocacy and the limited time 
spent consulting with communities (Interview, IN5). CN5 reflected: 
One lesson learnt, I think, is to mobilise the grassroots. And then 
before we can mobilise them, we have to put in more effort to train 
them, to raise awareness, to educate them about the impacts of 
hydropower development. This is something very important that we 
have to do, and we cannot do it within a short time period. We need 
to put in more effort, more resources, and more time to educate them. 
(Interview, CN5) 
In Thailand, where there has historically been a strong anti-hydropower dam movement led by 
villagers (see Chapter 2, Section 2.6.2), the campaign against the mainstream dams was largely fronted 
and led by the Thai Mekong People’s Network. This network comprised both NGOs (the Rak Chiang 
Khong in Chiang Rai Province), and in Isan, networks of community members who described 
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themselves as a ‘Council’ rather than as an organisation. TN1 noted the importance of having local 
communities front the movement against hydropower development:  
You can say that for the movement against the Xayaburi Dam, the 
main actor was the Thai local community network … I think it made 
the public understand, and made the media interested to cover the 
issue– not only in Thailand but also at the regional and international 
level – it could have made other sectors who wanted to get involved 
in decision making to come. Because if local people do not say 
something, if they didn’t voice their concerns, then other sectors, 
like NGOs or national, regional, or international organisations 
cannot say anything much, cannot put on the pressure, and cannot 
support them much. So it is very important for local people to start 
to campaign. (Interview, TN1) 
 This reflects how the issue of legitimation is intertwined with the ways in which the state uses 
the notion of the ‘local’ to disempower (Mohan & Stokke, 2000), which may be the case for Cambodian 
NGOs and local communities. Mohan & Stokke (2000) argue that it is critical to question how the ‘local’ 
is constructed in relation to other scalar categories. This provides some insight into how the STM 
movement depended on establishing the ‘local’ as a category through specific practices, which in turn 
provided the foundation for the establishment and legitimisation of other scalar categories of practices 
at the national, regional, and international level to support the campaign. This demonstrates that the local 
is far from subordinate to ‘higher’ scales in environmental governance (Bulkeley, 2005) and that the 
defence of place may be a rallying point both for theory construction and political action (Escobar, 2001). 
This also has implications for utilising a politics of place, such as the symbolic use of sites to gain 
leverage in Mekong water governance (Lebel et al., 2005) and in considering the cross-scale interactions 
that have to be factored into multi-stakeholder engagement in the Mekong Region (Dore & Lebel, 2010). 
7.6.2. Local level power geometries  
While Section 7.5 has shown that the national level political context has important implications 
for public participation, this subsection examines the influence of local state authorities on public 
participation in Mekong hydropower governance. Here, attention is paid to the subdistrict (tambon) level 
and below in Thailand, and the commune level and below in Cambodia. Unlike NGOs who deal 
specifically with environmental issues, most community representatives must consider the interests of 
their communities not only in relation to hydropower, but all other aspects of their lives. Local 
authorities play a key role in providing local public services and development projects, constituting a 
critical node within Cornwall's (2004) conceptualisation of institutional landscapes as one of the many 
‘domains of association’ through which actors move. Again reiterating that power differentials and 
participation are intricately intertwined (Berry & Mollard, 2010; Braun & Könninger, 2017) and that 
the site of the local serves as a building block for civil society’s scalar construction of legitimacy, it is 
necessary to investigate these local level power relations. This involves understanding the key role that 
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local state authorities, through direct and sustained contact with local communities, play in shaping the 
conduct of conduct. While the threat of national-level authoritarian state power (Section 7.5) shapes the 
conduct of conduct through techniques of intimidation against environmental activists, an examination 
of local-level political contexts further reflects both the nuances around the (dis)incentives for local 
community members who may consider speaking out against hydropower development, and also how 
the interactions between multi-scalar state authorities influence local-level forms and degrees of public 
participation.  
In Thailand, local authorities at the sub-district (tambon) level have responsibilities in key areas 
such as the promotion of local economic development and the provision of local public services 
(Buchenrieder et al., 2017). Community representatives may be wary of antagonising local authorities 
and may in reality pick their battles. A village chief in Thailand said that it was difficult for the heads 
of villages to lead opposition against development projects, but the Rak Chiang Khong as a community-
based NGO could do so and therefore played a useful role (Interview, TG6). This indicates that village 
representatives were held to different expectations of conduct as compared to NGO representatives. 
However, TG6 also said that he was not always aligned with the Rak Chiang Khong in opposing all 
large development projects, such as special economic zones, unless the issue would directly negatively 
impact his village, in the cases of the Pak Beng Dam or the rapids blasting issue (Interview, TG6). This 
reflected an embedded hierarchy in constructions of the ‘local’ (Bosca & Gillespie, 2018), highlighting 
the agency of local community representatives to privilege some issues over others. This also reflected 
a consideration of intentionality, a notion that pays attention to the rationales behind participation, or 
the question of ‘why do participation?’ (Wesselink et al., 2011, p. 2690). TN1 said that local people had 
to work with the tambon authorities and could not appear too aggressive or only concentrate on 
hydropower issues. This indicates that participation in the defence of constructions of place must not 
only be situated in the context of multi-scalar strategies of localisation (Escobar, 2001), but also in local-
level power-geometries involving social, political, and cultural factors:  
Local people use a cultural approach and organise cultural activities. 
But national or international NGOs may use an environmental-
political approach to campaign to directly stop the main actors with 
campaigns and pressure, which is different from the local approach. 
This is because the local people cannot only work on the issue of 
hydropower dams, but also have to consider different activities. 
(Interview, TN1) 
 In Cambodia, local authorities are usually affiliated with the CPP and some environmental 
activists have recently reported that the local authorities have obstructed their work since the dissolution 
of the CNRP (Lipes, 2018). Commune officials play a key role in terms of providing for infrastructure, 
local economic development, and public services, and it is important to highlight that community 
relationships with these authorities are not always characterised by distrust and antagonism. State 
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authorities also constitute the construction of the ‘local’ and spatial legitimacy, which could have 
implications for whether local community members may choose to ‘do’ participation. A 2005 survey 
found that the commune councils were trusted more than the provincial and national authorities, and 
that village chiefs were considered by the majority of respondents to be the best protectors of village 
interests at the commune level (Ninh & Henke, 2005). In Kampong Khleang commune in Siem Reap, 
three interviewees mentioned that their village chief had told them that there would be no impacts from 
hydropower development. Two said that they were not so worried about hydropower after hearing what 
the village chief said, while one said she still did not believe the village chief (Interviews, CC33, CC35, 
CC37).  
Local community representatives had to adapt their strategies to maintain their relationships 
with local authorities. CC22 from the Tonle Sap Lake said that their efforts to disseminate information 
about hydropower were constrained by local authorities who expressed their unhappiness with, and 
withheld permission for workshops dealing with sensitive topics relating to human rights and 
hydropower. He said, ‘We could not get permission, so we had to change our workshop topics to make 
it softer. If you talk about climate change, that is welcome, but if hydropower, no’. He added that the 
issue of hydropower development would have to be incorporated under the theme of climate change 
(Interview, CC22). In this case, CC22 had to negotiate the embedded hierarchy present in constructions 
of the ‘local’ influenced by local authorities, and make strategic choices about the issues of concern to 
be included in these participatory spaces to achieve ‘optimum’ participation (Cornwall, 2008). 
Understanding these local power-geometries is important because there is a need to critically assess the 
‘unreflecting normativity’ that characterises participatory approaches in development (Braun & 
Könninger, 2017), and to better understand the local-level constraints that communities have to navigate 
in order to ‘do’ participation. 
7.6.3. The intentionality of participation: ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ advocacy  
Different kinds of participation also influence the issue of who participates. Processes of ‘self-
fashioning’ or ‘self-formation’ whereby agents cultivate their own conduct, selves and identities 
(Huxley, 2007; Inda, 2008; Rose, 1999) within local level power-geometries reflect that relationships, 
knowledge and identities that actors carry as they move through different domains of association and 
participatory spaces (Cornwall, 2004). This intentionality behind participation may be understood by 
examining the differences between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ advocacy techniques employed by the STM 
Coalition. Protests, which are an example of hard advocacy, were not always well received by the state 
authorities and may not have contributed towards an increase in meaningful dialogue between state 
actors and participants in the campaign, despite their positive impacts on participants in terms of 
empowerment and solidarity. This is especially so in the context of the Mekong Region where state 
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actors do not respond favourably towards criticism and dissent against state projects (Dore & Lazarus, 
2009). TC3, who joined the DWR Volunteer Network with these considerations in mind, said:   
Previously our work was just against the DWR, saying that we did 
not want the dam. But right now, I’ve changed my attitude. Because 
when we were against them it did not work, so maybe we can work 
with them. At least when we work together, we can talk to them 
about what we want and what we demand. And we will know 
whether they can or cannot agree to our proposals. (Interview, TC3) 
These strong shows of resistance, despite their merits, may also have an alienating impact on 
certain segments of local communities. This relates to the crucial issue of self-exclusion (Cornwall, 
2008), especially when the threat of state intimidation is a real concern that community members have 
to contend with when contesting hydropower development. Some villagers were afraid of participating 
in protests because they feared the power of private investors to harm those who participated (Interview, 
TC13). In Nong Khai specifically, its inhabitants were characterised by two interviewees as preferring 
to keep ‘quiet’ so as to avoid trouble over being aggressive or outspoken against the state (Interviews, 
TC15, TC16). Another consideration was that public protests had come to be associated with the divisive 
and violent Red/Yellow-shirt political conflict in Thailand (Interview, TN4). There were similar 
concerns in Cambodia, where one interviewee from the Tonle Sap Lake said that they would not dare 
to join protests and campaigns (Interview, CC41). IN6 said that confrontational approaches centred on 
human rights were sometimes ‘not compatible with the political context’ of Cambodia and that NGOs 
occasionally lacked evidence-based arguments and professionalism in putting their concerns across 
(Interview, IN6).  
The idea of non-confrontational, ‘soft’ advocacy was raised by Cambodian interviewees as a 
complementary form of advocacy to confrontational ‘hard’ advocacy (Interviews, CC23, CN8, IN5). 
Soft advocacy was associated with what was termed as ‘capacity building’ for local communities, which 
involved educating them on issues, skills, and strategies such that they were empowered to advocate for 
themselves in a way that they deemed to be appropriate (Interviews, CC23, CN8). ‘Soft’ advocacy may 
be situated within perspectives on participation relating to empowerment. First, this may be seen in terms 
of developing the ‘political capabilities’ of marginalised groups by focusing on a long-term process of 
political learning, where identities and collective self-awareness become valuable political resources for 
understanding empowerment in relation to state-society relations (Hickey & Kothari, 2009). Second, 
‘soft’ advocacy can be seen in attempts to locate participation within analyses of citizenship, situating 
participation in a ‘broader range of socio-political practices’ whereby people ‘extend their status and 
rights as members of particular political communities’ (Hickey & Kothari, 2009, p. 89). This was 
especially apparent through the STM Coalition’s use of legal strategies to contest hydropower 
development. Overall, these strategies seek to engage with development ‘as an underlying process of 
social change’ rather than through discrete technocratic interventions (Hickey & Mohan, 2005, p. 237), 
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and in the context of this argument, also seek to confer legitimacy on community members who 
constitute the construction of the ‘local’.  
7.6.4. Sustaining engagement beyond events: creating environmental subjects  
Sustained engagement with Mekong local communities on a wider scale is a key challenge for 
the STM Coalition, and there were some indications that community members who were already 
regularly engaged in community-based environmental initiatives were more likely to be enrolled into 
STM activities. Thus far, the discussion on who participates has served as a critical reminder that 
participatory approaches should not assume a homogeneous community (see Cleaver, 1999; Cooke & 
Kothari, 2001; Mohan & Stokke, 2000). In Northern Thailand, the Rak Chiang Khong has been engaging 
riparian villages in a series of environmental initiatives for the past 15 years, which has contributed to 
their strong influence in the area. In Cambodia, of the eight interviewees from Preah Rumkel commune 
who participated in the Don Sahong Dam campaign, seven were members of the commune’s eco-
tourism committee, which also helped with managing the Irrawaddy dolphin conservation zone in the 
Anlong Cheuteal deep pool between Laos and Cambodia. On the Tonle Sap Lake, local authorities and 
leaders of community fisheries were relatively well informed about mainstream hydropower 
development due to their working relationships with FACT, which regularly incorporated the issue of 
hydropower into its workshops and meetings with community fishery representatives (Interview, CN5). 
These community representatives bear similar traits to what Agrawal (2005, p. 16) has described as 
‘environmental subjects’, for whom the environment ‘constitutes a critical domain of thought and action’.  
The nature of event-based activities, even non-confrontational ones, was that there are always 
limitations on the number of events held or people invited, due to budgetary or resource constraints on 
the part of the NGO organisers (Interviews, TN1, IN5). This is similar to the constraints that the NMC 
Secretariats faced in organising the national stakeholder consultations when factoring in considerations 
around publics, place, scale, and temporality (see Chapter 5, Section 5.4), which are also applicable in 
the cases of alternative consultative processes organised by civil society. As it is impossible for 
‘everyone’ to be involved in participation, it is useful to draw upon Farrington & Bebbington's (1993) 
axis to assess participatory forms according to depth of participation (deep vs shallow; akin to Arnstein's 
(1969) ladder of participation) and breadth of participants (wide vs narrow). In Cambodia, it was 
estimated that workshops and meetings on hydropower development only reached 30% of Tonle Sap 
communities (Interview, CC22). A village chief from Kampong Phluk commune said that in 2015 and 
2016 he organised two meetings to disseminate information about hydropower development, but only 
10 to 20 people could attend as the others had to attend to their livelihoods, and some complained about 
not receiving monetary compensation for their time 13  (Interview, CG6). Typically, only selected 
                                                          
13 My interpreter, who was a former NGO staff member, said that this was common NGO practice in Cambodia. 
Payment for attendance at meetings or workshops, as compensation for the day’s loss of income, has come to be 
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community representatives, or representatives from each household attended meetings where 
information was disseminated, and there was an expectation that these representatives would in turn 
disseminate the information to their villages or households (Interviews, CC22, CN3, CN5).  This was 
an issue that IN5 had reflected on regarding the community consultations that were held for the 
SUHAKAM complaint, which might have tended towards the ‘shallow’ and ‘narrow’ ends of Farrington 
& Bebbington's (1993) axis: 
We wanted to have more consultations about the complaint, but we 
could not do it too many times because we had to look into how 
much resources we had and the timeline along which the dam was 
progressing. If I think back now, it was not a good consultation 
because I did not really go to the communities to talk to the rest of 
the people. And I did not know how the participants went back and 
shared the information to other people. That is very questionable, in 
my own opinion. (Interview, IN5) 
 This concern about information dissemination appeared to be a valid one for meetings in general. 
Information was circulated unevenly as household or community representatives did not always 
disseminate the information that they obtained from attending meetings. Several interviewees said that 
their household representatives did not share information from meetings with them (Interviews, CC18, 
CC45, CC46). Some from Preah Rumkel said that they did not discuss the Don Sahong Dam with others 
in their villages (Interviews, CC17, CC18, CC21), even if they knew participants in the campaign 
(Interview, CC12). Some who attended meetings about the Don Sahong Dam had forgotten about what 
they had learnt, given that meetings may only take place a few times a year and that the campaign took 
place almost four years ago (Interviews, CC38, CC48)14. Of the interviewees in Preah Rumkel who did 
not belong to the ecotourism committee, the majority were either unaware of the campaign and the 
impacts of the dam, or only heard about the dam by word of mouth mostly from Lao residents living 
close to the dam (Interviews, CC7, CC10, CC11, CC12, CC13, CC18, CC19, CC20, CC21). Similarly, 
four interviewees from the Tonle Sap Lake said they had not heard about hydropower (CC44, CC45, 
CC46, CC49), while others said they learnt about hydropower dams through word of mouth (CC32, 
CC47) or a television programme (CC32, 33, 39, 41, 42).  
 This indicated that the organisers of the campaign events against the Don Sahong Dam have 
tried to achieve what Cornwall (2008) has called ‘optimum’ participation in trying to strike a balance 
between depth and inclusion in relation to the purposes of the campaign and constraints on their 
resources. The ‘opportunity structures’ for participation, rather than being open to the general public, 
may instead have aimed for ‘representation’ by enrolling representatives from already-existing groups 
                                                          
an expectation among local communities such that community members may even make comparisons between 
the different ‘rates’ paid by international and domestic NGOs.  
14 An interviewee from Kampong Khleang Commune said that he had never heard about hydropower 
development, at which the village’s FACT representative, who was facilitating our visit, interjected with mock 
exasperation to say that she did inform him about the issue at the time and he had since forgotten. 
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(Barnes et al., 2004). This included community representatives who worked with NGOs, were involved 
with environmental initiatives, or household representatives. While pragmatic considerations create 
such opportunity structures for participation, these considerations assumed a frictionless dissemination 
of information from representatives to their communities or households. There is a need to recognise 
this issue as one of the obstacles standing in the way of wider levels of inclusion. Overall, event-based 
forms of participation face the challenge of extending their effects beyond the spatial-temporal bounds 
of the event. As this discussion has shown, the lack of sustained community engagement on issues of 
hydropower may cause the issue to fade from memory. However, it may be worth noting the 
effectiveness of the media, especially that of television programmes, in reaching a wider audience. 
Interviewees who mentioned learning about hydropower from the television programme appeared to 
have a relatively better grasp on the issue than those who learnt about the issue by word of mouth.   
 It is also necessary to consider how community concerns about hydropower development 
differed between community members who participated in the campaign against the Don Sahong Dam, 
and those who did not. Drawing upon the data collected in Preah Rumkel, it is possible to identify key 
differences particularly in relation to the levels of concern expressed around the impacts of the Don 
Sahong Dam to fisheries and flooding. Of the 10 interviewees who participated in the campaign, six 
(60%) identified the impact of the dam to fisheries and fish migration as a key concern. This reflects the 
main concerns of the campaign, which given its wider objective to stop the construction of the dam, 
primarily focused on fisheries, livelihoods, including those derived from ecotourism, and natural 
resources (Interviews, CN3, CG2). Of the 15 interviewees who did not participate in the campaign, only 
five (33%) raised the issue of fisheries as a concern. However, interviewees who did not participate in 
the campaign were more likely to raise the issue of fear of flooding, if water was discharged from the 
dam or if the dam failed. Seven of the interviewees who did not participate in the campaign (47%) 
identified this as a key concern, as opposed to two of the interviewees who had participated in the 
campaign (20%). It is possible that the issue of flooding falls under that of dam mitigation, which would 
have sat uneasily with the campaign objective to prevent the construction of the dam in the first place. 
This uneven representation of concerns and participants in the campaign demonstrate some of the 
structural challenges that stand in the way of achieving meaningful representation and public 
participation in transboundary water governance.   
 In Thailand, the challenges relating to sustained community engagement and the formation of 
environmental subjects may be observed by contrasting the civil society networks in Chiang Khong and 
Nong Khai. Within the Thai Mekong People’s Network, the community activists based in Nong Khai 
functioned as the coordination centre for Isan (Interview, TN1). Although they had been strong in 
leading protests, two community consultants to the Nong Khai activist network said that the network 
only comprised a small number of people and did not have a strong base (Interview, TC13, TC14). My 
interpreter’s persistent efforts to identify more Nong Khai-based members of this network through 
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snowballing also ran into dead ends, which may also have indicated that there were not many people 
involved. In addition, a member of the Thai Mekong People’s Network said the Nong Khai network 
generally lacked money and resources (Interview, TC2). A former provincial government official said 
that when he had asked participants of the Nong Khai protest where they were from, not many were 
actually from Nong Khai. He also made reference to the deferential political culture of Nong Khai 
(discussed in Section 7.6.3) (Interview, TC15). These issues may therefore be linked to this political 
culture of the province and the limited resources of the Nong Khai network. It appeared that there were 
few opportunities for the wider public to participate in a process that would create environmental 
subjects whereby they would, in Agrawal's (2005, p. 16) words, ‘think about and define their actions’ 
relative to the environment.  
This contrasted with the Rak Chiang Khong in northern Thailand, which had been working in 
the districts of Chiang Khong, Chiang Saen and Wiang Kaen for the past 15 years. The Rak Chiang 
Khong and its environmental movement has its roots in rallying villagers in Chiang Khong to protest a 
China-led navigation project that would have blasted ecologically and culturally significant rapids to 
improve river trade navigation between China and Laos. They had successfully delayed the project once 
in 2002 (Southeast Asia Rivers Network, 2003), although the project has since resurfaced since 2017 
(see Deetes, 2019; Fredrickson, 2017). The Rak Chiang Khong has since engaged communities along 
the Mekong River and its tributary, the Ing River, by attempting to reshape community relationships 
with the Mekong River. This was done mainly through setting up about 70 village-based fish 
conservation zones along the Ing and Mekong rivers, which met with some degree of success in 
increasing fish catches in these areas (Interview, TC4), even garnering assistance from the Thai fisheries 
department (see Yong, 2013). This reflects the critical role that heterogeneous associations and the 
material components of the river play in assembling participatory spaces, especially in sustaining 
community engagement with the Mekong River over prolonged periods of time.  
The Rak Chiang Khong has also initiated villager-led Thai Baan Research to document the 
ecology of the Mekong River in that area, and while this has not been directly used in the Thai Mekong 
People’s Network’s campaign against mainstream dams, it was considered as a long-term project that 
has contributed towards a greater awareness of the ecological heritage of the area (Interviews, TC1, TN1) 
(see Chapter 2, Section 2.6.2 for background on Thai Baan Research). Thai Baan Research has been 
described as a ‘counter-hegemonic’ approach, and there is some appreciation of such local knowledge 
in the MRC and international organisations such as the International Union for Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN) (Käkönen & Hirsch, 2009). However, it remains marginalised from state decision making and 
has not been acknowledged by state actors such as the DWR (Interview, TC2). The Rak Chiang Khong 
also set up the Mekong School in 2016 and has collaborated with schools in Chiang Khong district to 
engage with youth on issues relating to the Mekong River and the environment (Interview, TC1). This 
sustained commitment to protecting the Mekong River was enacted through a wide network of villages 
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and by drawing upon both advocacy strategies and community initiatives. The Rak Chiang Khong’s 
higher visibility and trust established with riverine communities has led to successes in contesting 
development projects and establishing some degree of a working relationship with local authorities. 
The efforts of the Rak Chiang Khong demonstrate Escobar’s (2001) argument that the defence 
of constructions of place has become a critical object of struggle in social movements. The contrast 
between Nong Khai and Chiang Khong also reveal how the dangers of localism (Mohan & Stokke, 2000) 
must be considered to avoid uncritical applications of participatory approaches on different local 
contexts, especially when considered in relation to the political contexts at multiple scales. This politics 
of place must also be considered in terms of relational time-spaces (Massey, 2005). In addition to 
considerations around the consequences of opposing authoritarian state power, participation in the STM 
campaign was also contingent upon the unique spatial-temporal processes through which community 
members come to be established as environmental subjects. An understanding of participation and its 
inclusions/exclusions therefore has to extend beyond the participatory event itself, and take into account 
issues of everyday governance (Hirsch, 2011b). While the participatory event comes into being through 
specific time-spaces, they also exist relationally through their situatedness in a power-geometry and 
linkages to heterogeneous communities and nonhuman entities. Nonetheless, the STM Coalition has 
garnered wider and more sustained public support in comparison to most Mekong-oriented advocacy 
initiatives by focusing on a single issue (Hirsch, 2011b), indicating to some degree the success of local-
level efforts in Thailand and Cambodia in providing the foundations for the campaign.  
7.7. Conclusion 
 Overall, this chapter has argued for a relational understanding of participatory spaces. An 
understanding of the elements that constitute meaningful participation can be developed through 
contrasting the PNPCA stakeholder consultations with the participatory spaces organised by the STM 
Coalition, while also considering how a politics relating to publics, place, and scale play out in different 
ways. Drawing upon Chilvers et al.'s (2018) framework for understanding ecologies of participation, 
this chapter has pointed towards the multiple ways in which the key elements of subjects, objects and 
models had interacted to produce the participatory spaces initiated by the STM Coalition. Drawing upon 
the notion of robustness and plasticity in boundary objects (Bowker & Star, 1999), the plasticity of 
technologies of participation and technical information were demonstrated as they were been reshaped 
for the purposes of community-centred events that tilted the balance of power in favour of local 
communities. In considering the innovative participatory practices constituting these civil society-led 
events, this chapter also touched on how the materiality of the Mekong River provided the basis for the 
co-production of these participatory spaces and re-centred the Mekong River and its entities as central 
objects of concerns in hydropower governance. Through examining the elements that co-produced these 
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particular spatialities, the elements of meaningful participation revealed how the regimes of truth 
propagated through the PNPCA were challenged and avenues to seek recourse were emphasised.  
 The construction of participatory spaces as multi-scalar categories of practice was a theme that 
ran through this chapter, and this was especially apparent in considering how these participatory 
spatialities were articulated in relation to state authority and power. This meant paying close attention 
to the power relationships that permeated the wider social and political contexts of Thailand and 
Cambodia, and the power-geometry that nonstate actors had to navigate in contesting mainstream 
hydropower dams in the Mekong Region. Civil society and community actors had come up against 
repressive arms of the heterogeneous state in demonstrating resistance towards mainstream dam 
development. The PNPCA stakeholder consultations have to be situated within these experiences and 
an awareness of the diminishing spaces available for political participation in both Thailand and 
Cambodia, highlighting the permanent provocation (Foucault, 1983) in state-society relations. These 
nonstate-organised participatory spaces were also situated within multi-scalar dynamics of power, 
whereby constructions of the ‘local’ formed a building block in the regional campaign against 
mainstream hydropower development. The notion of the ‘local’ was closely tied to a politics of place, 
which had implications for the spatial legitimacy of civil society voices, issues of inclusion and 
intentionality in participation, and the potential for participation to function as a process of social change 
as opposed to one-off events. It is therefore important to establish a multi-layered understanding of 
participation that has emerged through the contestation of Mekong mainstream hydropower governance, 
which pays close attention to how all participatory events are linked and embedded in multi-scalar power 
relations that extend far beyond the time-spaces of the events themselves.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
8.1. Introduction 
 This thesis has explored the different forms of public participation arising around the 
governance of mainstream hydropower development in the Lower Mekong Basin, focusing on both the 
stakeholder consultations emerging as part of the Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation and 
Agreement and the alternative participatory spaces of the Save the Mekong Coalition. This concluding 
chapter first discusses the key contributions of this thesis. Second, a thematic overview and summary of 
the findings of this thesis is provided. Third, the implications of these findings for hydropower 
governance in the LMB are discussed, particularly in relation to the rendering technical of the PNPCA 
and local community participation in hydropower governance. Finally, the limitations of the research 
are pointed out, and finally, possible future research directions are discussed.    
8.2. Key contributions of the thesis  
 The main contribution of this thesis has been to provide an in-depth examination of public 
participation in relation to contested mainstream hydropower development in the LMB. Many studies 
have focused on contestations surrounding the PNPCA and mainstream hydropower development from 
perspectives relating to the legal and procedural contestations around the PNPCA (Boer et al., 2015; 
Rieu-Clarke, 2015) and the PNPCA stakeholder consultations (Gao, 2014), arenas for deliberation (Dore, 
2014), governance challenges (Grumbine et al., 2012; Hensengerth, 2015), and civil society advocacy 
and legal strategies (Middleton & Pritchard, 2016; Yasuda, 2015). However, apart from the work of Gao 
(2014) and Sok (2014), most studies do not consider public participation in the PNPCA in detail as it 
only forms a small component within the PNPCA and has had limited effect on decision making. While 
the advocacy campaign by the STM Coalition outside of the PNPCA had been successful to some degree, 
in terms of pressuring state actors to seriously take civil society and community into consideration, this 
has not been studied directly in relation to the concept of public participation. As such, the notion of 
public participation in mainstream hydropower governance has largely been associated with the PNPCA 
stakeholder consultations.  
 This thesis is dedicated to developing an account of how public participation has been conceived 
of, implemented and contested in mainstream hydropower governance in the LMB. This has involved 
expanding the notion of public participation to cover modes of state and nonstate participation and 
considering very different participatory events in relation to one another. This is important because local 
civil society and community members participate in both state and nonstate sites of participation, and 
their experiences in one participatory site shape their perceptions and experiences of another. As 
opposed to a cursory consideration of the PNPCA stakeholder consultations and its inadequacies, this 
183 
 
thesis delves into the nuances through which public participation under the PNPCA had been rendered 
technical and the conditions under which these inadequacies and criticisms arose. A similarly nuanced 
account of alternative participatory spaces is provided, especially as they reflect how meaningful 
participation is perceived in contrast to the PNPCA stakeholder consultations. This has involved both 
studying ‘up’ and ‘down’, and attention was paid to the subjective experiences of both state and nonstate 
actors within these differing spaces of public participation, which are situated within an examination of 
power relationships.  
Methodologically, a key contribution of this thesis has been the novel use of event ethnography 
to examine and document the performative dimensions of public participation in the PNPCA and civil 
society events. At the time of writing, this approach has only been used once in the context of Mekong 
water governance, by Lamb (2017) at the 2nd MRC International Conference in 2014. Event 
ethnography within the spaces of public participation function as a valuable way for the researcher to 
personally observe the interactions, tensions, and ephemeral alliances that take place between a variety 
of state and nonstate actors in the same space. The opportunities to observe relatively public 
performances were valuable to me as a researcher who was considered an outsider to the Mekong Region. 
This was especially so in terms of directly observing actors such as government officials and technical 
agencies who usually carry out their work in non-public settings, such as in closed technical working 
groups. In addition, reflecting on my own experiences of participating in PNPCA stakeholder 
consultations, civil society and academic events has also helped to provide insight into the similarities 
and discrepancies between these differentiated participatory sites. This provided the impetus to delve 
further into how experiences of participation were mediated and co-produced by power dynamics and 
the material-discursive dimensions of participatory spaces.  
8.3. Common themes  
8.3.1. Rendering technical: problematisation  
 One of the main findings of this thesis has related to how the PNPCA stakeholder consultations 
have been rendered technical. The participatory spaces of the PNPCA could be considered as a 
microcosm of the ways in which the LMB was rendered intelligible as a field for intervention. In 
analysing how the PNPCA stakeholder consultations were problematised and rendered intelligible as a 
field for government intervention, several dimensions were considered. First, the problematisation of 
PNPCA stakeholder consultations and the constraints of the TNMC Secretariat and the CNMC 
Secretariat were demonstrated to be dependent on several contexts relating to their institutional 
geographies, national legal frameworks for public participation, and the PNPCA itself. In organising the 
stakeholder consultations, these relatively uninfluential government agencies were caught between the 
expectations set within these multiple contexts, reflecting the intersections between multi-scalar and 
differentiated governable spaces. The contradictions and convergences between these governable spaces 
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contributed towards the emergence of contestations around public participation (e.g. the Xayaburi 
lawsuit), or some degree of state-civil society cooperation (e.g. in Cambodia). The PNPCA stakeholder 
consultations had also increasingly been problematised as the ‘proper’ channels for public input.  
 Second, the problematisation of the PNPCA stakeholder consultations was discussed in terms 
of how the public was chosen to participate, the venues chosen for the meetings (place), the multiple 
levels at which consultations were held (scale), and the timeliness of the consultations and information 
dissemination (temporal). Some of the key criticisms of the PNPCA stakeholder consultations in 
Thailand and Cambodia related to these dimensions: inadequate representation of local communities, 
inadequate number of meetings held in all potentially affected areas, the lack of a regional stakeholder 
consultation, and the lack of timeliness in disseminating invitations and information. These criticisms 
stemmed from the MRC and NMC secretariats adopting relatively uncritical assumptions relating to the 
public, place, scale, and the temporal. However, it was through examining the multi-faceted dimensions 
of these concepts that the reasons behind these criticisms became clearer, along with the reasons behind 
why these criticisms had persisted throughout the three iterations of the PNPCA despite the 
implementation of some procedural improvements to the process.  
Third, the problematisation of the PNPCA stakeholder consultations was examined within the 
spaces of the meetings themselves. This involved the discursive segmentation of the Mekong River in 
terms of hydrology, sediments, dam infrastructure, environment, fisheries, and socioeconomic issues. 
The river basin was discussed in ways that endlessly debated risks and uncertainties, did not correspond 
to the lived experiences of local communities, and provided little room to discuss the interconnectedness 
between multiple technical categories. An examination of the micro-geographies and technologies of 
participation within these participatory spaces also revealed that the dissemination of technical 
information by experts were prioritised over consultation. These three aspects of problematisation were 
studied using an analytics of government, which shed light on the ‘how’ of government. This technique 
was then reversed to carry out an analytics of resistance, which relates to a fourth area of 
problematisation within the alternative spaces of participation organised by the STM Coalition. In 
contrast to the PNPCA stakeholder consultations, these spaces problematised hydropower governance 
in terms of community voices, the pursuit of accountability, and a critical evaluation of technical 
information and narratives disseminated by the state. The notion of problematisation therefore provided 
insights into why the PNPCA stakeholder consultations have largely not been perceived as meaningful 
forms of participation by the STM Coalition.   
8.3.2. Challenging an antipolitical regime of truth  
 In examining the remaining elements of rendering technical, an antipolitics and the containment 
of challenges to the status quo, this thesis first investigated how a regime of truth around mainstream 
hydropower development was constituted by technical information and technical experts. One of the 
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mains strengths of Prior Consultation was the institutionalisation of a process for information sharing 
and the assessing of the information. However, the flow of information through participatory spaces was 
mediated through the limited capacities of the TNMC and CNMC secretariats, which faced challenges 
in understanding and translating increasingly large volumes of technical information. The co-production 
of the PNPCA stakeholder consultations as realms of technical expertise by objects (technical issues and 
technologies of government) and models (proceedings and micro-geographies) had the effect of 
rendering public participation seemingly non-political, as participants found it difficult to understand 
the technical information and NMC Secretariat officials tended to only address the technical concerns 
raised.  
The PNPCA stakeholder consultations also contained challenges to the status quo, as 
demonstrated by the subsuming of the PNPCA stakeholder consultations under the MRC Secretariat’s 
technical review. In addition, the key actors driving hydropower development, such as state energy 
utilities and private dam developers, were under no obligation to participate in Prior Consultation, which 
functioned primarily as an arena for technical interventions and remained dislocated from wider 
political-economic contexts driving hydropower development. The NMC and the MRC secretariats, who 
were responsible not only for presenting information on behalf of the project developer and Lao 
government but also facilitating the discussions with participants, perpetuated this antipolitics and 
containment of challenges of the status quo. This process of rendering technical was partially produced 
through the reassertion of the NMC secretariats’ technical responsibilities and abidance to the processes 
set out by the PNPCA.  
Nonetheless, this regime of truth has been contested by participants in the stakeholder 
consultations. One interesting outcome of rendering technical was the creation of political openings for 
both state and nonstate actors to contest hydropower development. It was precisely in its antipolitical 
nature that technical discussions served as grounds for productive dialogue. This was especially 
important as mainstream hydropower development remained a politically-charged issue that straddled 
myriad configurations, convergences and divergences between inter and intra state interests, civil society 
and local community concerns, and private sector interests. Stakeholders could therefore leverage on 
the antipolitical character of technical discussions to sidestep less-likely-negotiable state interests. Civil 
society and local communities also demonstrated differing degrees of capability to engage in this 
technical debate to influence mainstream hydropower governance.  
These technical spaces of dialogue led to greater scrutiny of the mitigation measures taken by 
mainstream dam developers and to the redesigns of the proposed mainstream dams. However, there 
were limits to which these technical spaces of dialogue could be mobilised by local communities to 
voice their concerns, as they generally lacked the capacity and expertise required to assess the complex 
project documents that were provided to them only partially-translated and at short notice. Most 
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importantly, technical discussions centred around mitigation could not address local community 
concerns around issues of accountability and ways of life. The community-centred participatory spaces 
initiated by civil society in contrast, could be considered as efforts to un-render technical mainstream 
hydropower governance and to contest these issues on their own terms.  
8.3.3. The co-produced, emergent and relational spaces of public participation 
 In scrutinising how the participatory spaces of the PNPCA and STM Coalition emerged, this 
thesis has drawn upon an understanding of public participation as co-produced, emergent and relational 
(Chilvers & Kearnes, 2016a). This involved understanding how collective participatory practices were 
co-produced by subjects (publics), objects (issues or material devices) and models (political ontologies 
or formats) (Chilvers et al., 2018). This notion of public participation was used to understand the 
intimate spaces of participatory events and the power dynamics that were generated through these 
collective participatory practices. In the PNPCA stakeholder consultations, the participatory practices 
generated power dynamics that favoured government and/or technical experts. The objects studied were 
seen in terms of the issues (technical categories such as hydrology, sediments, fisheries) and 
technologies of government (mundane tools of the expert) utilised in the PNPCA stakeholder 
consultations. The models studied related to the spatial-temporal formats, or micro-geographies of 
public participation: 1) temporal, in terms of how the event was scheduled and the time allocated to 
different groups of stakeholders, and 2) spatial, in terms of how the different stakeholder groups were 
located in relation to one another in the venue. Technologies of participation were also considered in 
terms of the question and answer and small group discussion formats. Overall, this included a 
consideration of how power dynamics reinforced state authority due to these configurations.  
 This approach was also applied to the alternative spaces of participation organised by the STM 
Coalition. The technologies of participation and spatial-temporal layouts of these spaces might have 
been similar, but the public and issues discussed were very different. The material entities of the Mekong 
River were also included in these alternative spaces. These participatory practices and spatialities re-
centred local communities as opposed to government and/or technical experts, demonstrating the 
differences between state-sponsored participatory spaces that had been rendered technical, and 
alternative participatory spaces that were not. This thesis demonstrated that these time-spaces of public 
participation not only had to be considered in relation to one another, but also placed in their wider 
social, economic, cultural and political contexts. This means that participatory spaces should always be 
understood within Massey’s (1992) conceptualisation of a multi-scalar power geometry that is 
constituted by webs of domination and subordination. This has involved a consideration of the issues 
raised in Sections 8.3.1 and 8.3.2, and how these multi-scalar political contexts that had real impacts on 
public participation in the Mekong Region.  
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Another key implication for thinking about public participation as co-produced, relational, and 
emergent, was the need to develop a wider, yet more nuanced understanding of what the notion of public 
participation encompassed. While the PNPCA stakeholder consultations were viewed by state actors as 
the legitimate channels for public participation on the issue of mainstream hydropower dams, the 
participatory spaces initiated by the STM Coalition were perceived by some local community members 
to be more legitimate, especially in terms of the critical information provided and the closer engagement 
with their lived experiences. Apart from developing a more nuanced understanding of participatory 
spaces, a relational understanding of public participation highlighted the challenges for participation in 
the LMB. A loss of faith in the PNPCA stakeholder consultations did not only arise through the 
consultations themselves, but also in encounters with other repressive arms of the state. Civil society’s 
challenge in sustaining the mobilisation of local communities against mainstream dam development 
must therefore be situated in a critical interrogation of how the notion of the ‘local’ is discursively 
constructed by multiple stakeholders, why it matters for the movement against hydropower, and how 
environmental subjects come into being through participatory practices and spaces extending beyond 
the issue of hydropower development.  
8.3.4. The performative dimensions of public participation  
 In examining the power dynamics that have been generated within the intimate spaces of 
participatory events, this thesis has drawn upon the notion performativity, relating to the reiterative and 
citational practices that reproduce or subvert discourses, and which also both enable and discipline 
subjects and their performances (Gregson & Rose, 2000). In the case of the PNPCA stakeholder 
consultations, the authoritative force generated by government officials and technical experts was 
understood through the notion of sovereignty as a material-discursive effect of performativity. As the 
meetings constituted physical spaces in which state actors, nonstate actors and material-discursive 
elements physically occupied the same space, they served as ideal sites to observe how state authority 
was enacted and challenged through performativity. The collective participatory practices that were co-
produced through subjects, objects and models played a role in generating power dynamics and enabling 
various actors to exert a performative force of authority. A key focus was placed on the performance 
and performativity of the state actors, particularly the NMC Secretariat officials. This was done through 
considering how their subjectivities were intertwined with the notion of conduct of conduct, in the sense 
that there were particular things they could or could not say or do as technical government officials. 
Crucially, the reassertions of such performances reproduced the processes of rendering technical in LMB 
mainstream hydropower governance.  
Yet, the reiterated performances of these state actors in PNPCA stakeholder consultations, 
especially given that Prior Consultation has been repeated thrice for the Xayaburi, Don Sahong and Pak 
Beng dams, revealed performative slippages. These slippages coincided with lines of tension that 
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emerged between state actors and participants: when repeated calls for accountability were not directly 
answered, when state actors hedged their responses, or when participants directly called state actors out 
for not taking their concerns into account. While the conduct of these nonstate actors was constrained 
in the face of state authority at the PNPCA stakeholder consultations, the performative dimensions of 
community-centred participatory spaces were different. Local community members were re-construed 
as voices of authority when they addressed an audience at length from the front of a room. Spaces of 
community consultations and direct action (e.g. protests) had the performative effect of reshaping the 
boundaries of action and subverting the discourses perpetuated by state technical rendering. The Mekong 
River and its nonhuman entities (e.g. water, fish), which were rendered abstract through the PNPCA, 
were also re-centred as they played a key role in these performances, functioning as integral elements 
in the co-production of these participatory sites.  
8.3.5. Reconciling these themes  
 As this thesis has shown, these themes are very closely intertwined. The notion of 
problematisation was a key element within the process of rendering technical, which also comprised the 
elements of antipolitics and the containment of challenges to the status quo. The incorporation of a 
performative lens and a relational perspective of participation made it possible to tangibly observe how 
the processes of rendering technical were performed, re-enacted, perpetuated, and challenged as they 
encountered friction within these participatory spaces. These perspectives, when combined, also 
provided nuanced insight into the multiplicity of heterogeneous associations that give rise to these 
participatory spaces and their (un)intended effects, and the ways in which subjects are enabled or 
disciplined through their performances. Rendering technical and performativity do not take place in a 
vacuum, and it was a relational understanding of participatory spaces that situated these processes in a 
wider web of power relations, and the participatory spaces in relation to one another. Together, these 
four themes demonstrated how the participatory spaces of the LMB came into being through specific 
pathways and were constituted by the ‘ecologies of participation’ conceptualised by Chilvers et al. 
(2018).   
 It is perhaps apt to draw an analogy between the Mekong River and the way these themes have 
formed the uneven landscape of public participation in the LMB. In Siphandon (translated as ‘Four 
Thousand Islands’) in Southern Laos, where the Don Sahong Dam is located, the Mekong River splits 
into braided channels, interweaving around a labyrinth of islands, sand bars, rocky rapids, and flooded 
forests. Siphandon is an ecologically unique area that has been described as a microcosm of the entire 
Lower Mekong River (Mather et al., 2009). Similarly, the spaces of public participation discussed in 
this thesis have been treated as a microcosm of mainstream hydropower governance in the LMB. Like 
the many islands, sand bars, rocky rapids, and flooded forests that are interspersed within this section of 
the Mekong River, these ‘ecologies’ of participation are distinct from one another yet each shaped by 
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the waters of the Mekong River, albeit in different ways. The processes that underlie the themes 
discussed above are akin to the braided channels of the Mekong River, which diverge and converge at 
unpredictable points and in a multiplicity of configurations. Some channels are larger than others, while 
some flow at higher speeds, force, and turbulence than others. Together, these ecological features co-
produce one another and create the ecologically unique landscape of Siphandon, while also being just 
one part of a massive river system stretching thousands of kilometres upstream and downstream. 
Similarly, the multiplicity of participatory spaces, along with the processes and dynamics that underlie 
the four major themes co-produce one another to produce a unique and uneven landscape of participation, 
which ultimately has to be situated within part of the wider, diverse context of the LMB.  
8.4. Implications for hydropower governance in the Mekong Region  
8.4.1. Rendering technical, rendering legitimacy   
 Despite the contestations around the PNPCA, the main cost to the Lao government had only 
been in relation to the costly redesigns of the dams to mitigate their potentially negative impacts. Prior 
Consultation and its politics of the technical have been subsumed in a wider narrative dominated by 
mitigation, as opposed to whether the dams should go ahead in the first place. Technical aspects of the 
dam remained the central issue of concern at regional, national and community stakeholder consultations. 
These developments should be contextualised in the legacy of the World Bank-funded Nam Theun 2 
(NT2) Dam, whereby the neoliberal development paradigm underlying the NT2 Dam has been described 
as having ‘failed forward’ into its successor, the Xayaburi Dam (Johns, 2015). Drawing upon 
Middleton's (2018b) argument that the NT2 Dam was branded as a ‘model’ that reproduced a discourse 
of sustainable hydropower, the Xayaburi Dam, despite lacking the reform agenda and standards attached 
to the NT2 Dam (Boer et al., 2015), could be perceived in a similar way. Given the national, regional 
and international stakeholders that participated in the Prior Consultation process, it is critical not to 
underestimate the role of the PNPCA in perpetuating and legitimising such a discourse through technical 
rendering.  
8.4.2. Increasing disconnect between local communities and the PNPCA  
 This brings the discussion back to the idea of the intentionality behind public participation, in 
considering the question of ‘why do participation?’ in the context of the PNPCA. As Prior Consultation 
increasingly becomes centred around the technical evaluation of proposed mainstream dam projects, the 
role that local communities play in stakeholder consultations becomes increasingly unclear. While local 
community concerns may be included in the member countries’ official reply forms and the MRC 
Secretariat’s technical review, this takes place at the discretion of state actors and may not necessarily 
be addressed once these documents have been forwarded to the Lao government. One of the key 
emphasis of this thesis has been to highlight the disconnect between public consultations carried out 
under the PNPCA and local level stakeholder expectations of meaningful public consultations. The 
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PNPCA and its stakeholder consultations, while being key sites for disclosing information and for 
concerns to be raised, may continue to fall short of community expectations tied to meaningful public 
participation that are centred around seeking accountability.  
8.4.3. Reflecting on PNPCA community stakeholder consultations 
 Nonetheless, an awareness of how the participatory spaces of the PNPCA are problematised and 
rendered technical serves to highlight several areas in which PNPCA stakeholder consultations in 
Thailand and Cambodia could be addressed. First, as the community stakeholder consultations currently 
function as an information sharing arena and several participants have voiced an appreciation of the 
information shared, improvements could be made in this area. These are not new suggestions, but 
persistent issues that were brought up in previous iterations of the PNPCA. Information could be 
distributed in advance with sufficient time for participants to study the information prior to the meetings. 
Technical information in documents and presentations could be further simplified for a layperson. It 
may be worth paying attention to the interface where scientific and local knowledge overlap, to consider 
how technical information can be made accessible to such an audience. While it is understandable that 
the NMC Secretariats might be unable to translate the project documents in full, the justifications for 
the selected portions to be translated could be made clearer. Critically, the possible impacts of the project 
on participants could be addressed more clearly.  
Second, more thought could be given to creating settings in which local communities feel 
comfortable and empowered in expressing their views and concerns. This could mean paying greater 
attention to the venues chosen for the meetings, and the power imbalances emerging from the 
stakeholder consultations in terms of its micro geographies, facilitators, and formats. For example, the 
MRC’s use of independent facilitators from SEI at the February 2017 regional stakeholder forum was 
effective in creating a more open and balanced discussion. Trusted community or civil society 
representatives who work closely with communities could also be scheduled to present their concerns 
during the meetings, especially if information is disseminated in advance. However, acknowledging the 
constraints of the NMC Secretariats and that there are few avenues for the public to follow up on the 
project after the six-month Prior Consultation period, there might be limitations to which truly 
meaningful changes can be made to the PNPCA community stakeholder consultations. This will be the 
case unless stakeholder engagement is recognised as a bigger priority or obligation by the not just the 
Thai and Cambodian governments, but also project developers and the Lao government. 
8.4.4. Polarisation of narratives  
Another implication of rendering technical is that it may contribute towards a polarisation of 
narratives between civil society/local communities and actors who engage in technical debates. While 
some local-level actors have demonstrated their ability to engage in technical discussions during the 
PNPCA stakeholder discussions, it is likely that most will continue to raise their concerns in terms that 
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are incompatible with the parameters of the PNPCA. In addition, these relatively consistent concerns 
relating to their livelihoods, ways of life and accountability stand in contrast with technical discussions 
that are constantly advancing in terms of new scientific methodologies used to quantify impacts from 
hydropower development. This is not to downplay the importance of local community narratives, but to 
highlight a concern that debates around hydropower development in the Mekong Region are possibly 
proceeding in a direction that leaves local communities behind and delegitimises their narratives.  
Rendering technical is also reinforced by the rise of the somewhat vague and pliable concept of 
the water-energy-food nexus in the Mekong Region, which focuses on the trade-offs within this nexus 
(Lebel & Lebel, 2017; Middleton et al., 2015). This concept has been mobilised by different stakeholders 
to support and oppose hydropower development (Lebel & Lebel, 2017), and features prominently at 
forums such as the annual Greater Mekong Forum on Water, Food and Energy organised by the 
CGIAR’s Water, Land and Ecosystems program involving state actors, think tanks, academics, 
practitioners, civil society and international donor agencies. However, local community representatives 
are often not present at such forums.   
8.4.5. Decreasing opportunities for local community mobilisation 
 Therefore, another major implication is the decreasing opportunities and spaces for local 
communities and local civil society organisations to participate in hydropower governance in the LMB, 
even though a multi-scalar movement against hydropower development hinges on local level 
mobilisation. Hydropower governance in the LMB has always been characterised by multi-track 
governance forums, but locally-led governance processes (Track 4) (Dore, 2007) risk being side-lined 
due to the effects of rendering technical, the hardening of authoritarianism in Thailand and Cambodia, 
and a loss of hope and optimism among several civil society and local community representatives in 
being able to stop hydropower development. Foran & Manorom (2009, p. 62) note that in the case of 
the Pak Mun Dam, the persistent challenge to the state by the community-based movement could be 
attributed to a ‘tantalising and frustrating dance of concession and denial’. But in the case of the Mekong 
mainstream dams, there have been few to no concessions made to local communities in Thailand and 
Cambodia who will bear the transboundary impacts of mainstream dam development. As such, the 
resources of the STM Coalition had instead largely been redirected towards engaging with the energy 
sector and the MRC’s Development Partners.  
8.4.6. Engaging local communities in place  
 This leads to the final implication for local communities, in considering alternative ways to 
engage communities in place. Event-based public participation has its limitations in reaching the wider 
population especially in rural areas. While the media has largely been used as a medium to bring 
attention outwards from the locality to a national or international audience, it is possibly useful to also 
consider how media has the potential reach into the myriad localities that riparian communities reside 
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in. Community consultations tend to depend on a verbal transmission of information, but as mentioned 
in Chapter 7 (Section 7.6.4), a television programme on Mekong hydropower dams appeared to have 
left an impression on Cambodian community members who had watched it. In addition, while certain 
segments of civil society and local communities might have lost hope in campaigning against 
hydropower dams, it is important to remember that the STM campaign has had an impact in creating 
and shaping environmental subjects. This is a long-term investment that should not be underestimated, 
as seen from how the environmental subjects who participated in the STM campaign were involved in 
local conservation initiatives that were put in place much earlier.  
8.5. Limitations of the study 
8.5.1. Uneven data sets  
 One of the limitations of this study has been the uneven primary data sets collected between 
Thailand and Cambodia, which was discussed in Chapter 4 (Section 4.6). These centred around first, 
my attendance of PNPCA stakeholder consultations in Thailand but not Cambodia, and second, being 
able to interview more local community members in Cambodia than Thailand. Therefore, there were 
limitations to which direct comparisons could be made between Thailand and Cambodia in these two 
areas. Nonetheless, I have attempted to illustrate the different issues, aspects, and challenges 
encountered in the PNPCA stakeholder consultations and community engagement in both countries 
using available primary and secondary data. This could therefore be a future area of research not just in 
Thailand and Cambodia but across the Mekong Region, in terms of collaborative event ethnography 
(Section 8.5.3), and further research on local-level information dissemination and community 
engagement through carrying out systematic surveys at the village level.  
8.5.2. Gender specific issues and intersectionality 
 There has also been a lack of consideration towards gender specific issues in this thesis. 
Seventy-three percent of the interviewees were male, and this study did not make any differentiation 
between the experiences of men and women who engaged in public participation in the Mekong Region. 
However, it is especially important to consider gender specific issues at the local level. Women play 
important roles in water management, but are likely to be disproportionately disadvantaged by the 
negative impacts of hydropower development due to the gendered differences in livelihood strategies 
and women’s’ marginalisation from decision making processes (IUCN & Oxfam, 2018; Manorom et al., 
2017).  Women also play critical roles in activism in the Mekong Region, although it is also necessary 
to pay attention to how these roles and actions unfold within the power structures that still tend to 
marginalise women (Brickell, 2014; Lebel, et al., 2018). While women tend to be better represented at 
the local level, participation decreases at higher levels (IUCN & Oxfam, 2018).  
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As such, a study of public participation and mainstream hydropower governance in the LMB 
would benefit from a productive engagement with the gendered dynamics of public participation. This 
would involve developing a sensitivity towards the conditions that function as enablers or barriers to 
women’s participation in the different types of multi-scalar participatory spaces discussed in this thesis. 
There is also a need to understand women’s experiences within these spaces to add further nuance to the 
power dynamics generated in these spaces. Lastly, paying attention to the ways in which women have 
come into being as environmental subjects will have implications for considerations of sustained 
community engagement and the role that women may have to play in hydropower governance in the 
Mekong Region. Beyond gender and a simplistic male/female binary, there is also usefulness in applying 
an intersectional or identity-based perspective to any further analysis (Gillespie & Perry, 2018).  
8.5.3. Working alone and event ethnography   
 Another limitation of this study relates to event ethnography. As mentioned in Chapter 6, there 
were up to four parallel sessions held at the MRC regional stakeholder forum. As a solo researcher I was 
only able to attend one session, even though the issues raised in the other sessions would have also been 
critical towards understanding how mainstream hydropower governance had been rendered technical. 
The field of Mekong water governance is dotted with events like the MRC regional stakeholder forums 
for proposed mainstream dam projects, the annual Greater Mekong Forum, and the quadrennial MRC 
International Conference and Summit, all of which are conducted in English. All these events feature 
multiple parallel sessions, which present an opportunity for collaborative event ethnography (CEE) to 
further delve into the multiple themes, narrative strands and discourses that have come to constitute 
Mekong River water governance. CEE is a collaborative effort between a team of researchers who would 
attend different sessions within a major event to overcome the methodological limits of working alone 
(Campbell et al., 2014). This could involve drawing on the multidisciplinary strengths of the team, while 
being situated within shared understandings of politics and theoretical frameworks (ibid.). An 
ethnographic understanding of water governance in the Mekong River could therefore be pieced together 
in a similar way using CEE. At the Thai PNPCA stakeholder consultations, I had to work through an 
interpreter, but CEE including local researchers could possibly also be extended towards an examination 
of the PNPCA community stakeholder consultations across the region.  
8.6. Future research directions 
8.6.1. Longer term impacts of the Save the Mekong campaign 
 One possible future research direction could be to examine the longer-term effects of the STM 
campaign on the civil society organisations and local communities in the region. While the campaign 
had not achieved its main objective of halting mainstream hydropower development, this should not be 
taken to mean that the campaign had failed. The campaign was successful in terms of creating a regional 
network of civil society organisations, re-scaling the visibility of the issue to higher levels, enrolling 
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wider public support (Hirsch, 2011b) and engaging in novel ways of seeking accountability in the region 
(Middleton & Pritchard, 2016). This formation and reshaping of environmental subjectivities through 
the STM campaign may therefore be an interesting line of inquiry to pursue as these may have 
implications for civil society and community action in the future. For example, several Cambodian 
interviewees had expressed concern about the 1,800MW Sambor Dam in Cambodia, which had been 
identified as a priority energy project for the Cambodian government (Esterman, 2017) although a 
leaked government-commissioned report noted that the proposed site was the ‘worst possible place’ for 
hydropower and that the dam could ‘literally kill’ the Mekong River (Fawthrop, 2018). There could also 
be further study into cross-fertilisation of ideas and subjectivities between the STM campaign and 
domestic campaigns, such as the rapids blasting issue in Chiang Khong, or the LS2 Dam in Cambodia. 
8.6.2 Impacts of the PNPCA on institutions, private sector actors and ‘sustainable’ hydropower 
development 
 The final suggested areas for further research relate to the future of the PNPCA and the shifting 
discourses of hydropower development in the Mekong Region, now that the inevitability of mainstream 
dams and hydropower development has become clearer. First, there are more opportunities for an 
institutional ethnography of the NMC or the MRC secretariats to be carried out, especially on the 
continuing relevance and/or marginalisation of these institutions in relation to ‘competing’ institutional 
frameworks such as the ASEAN Cooperation on Water Resources Management or the China-led 
Lancang-Mekong Cooperation mechanism. An institutional ethnography focusing on the changing 
dynamics within and beyond the NMC and MRC secretariats may also provide further insight into how 
these agencies view the implications of Prior Consultation for future projects such as Thailand’s 
longstanding plan to channel water from the Mekong River to green Isan and Cambodia’s proposed 
Sambor Dam. Given that the MRC has argued that its role has been misunderstood by critics and that it 
perceives the improvement of the PNPCA to be a critical component in strengthening its water 
diplomacy framework (see Kittikhoun & Staubli, 2018), such agencies may be amenable to having their 
perspectives heard and understood.  
Second, an increasingly antipolitical, or less political prior consultation process may provide 
opportunities for more research to be done on private dam developers and their perceptions of their 
responsibilities in relation to hydropower dam development in the Mekong Region. In the case of the 
Mekong mainstream dams, this could be done in terms of how they have navigated their relations with 
differentiated stakeholders despite not being obligated to participate in the PNPCA. For example, 
Chinese dam developer Datang chose to participate in the MRC regional forums for the Pak Beng Dam 
and also initiated meetings with the Thai Mekong People’s Network. Such a study could be located 
within the discourses of sustainable hydropower and dam mitigation, trace the network of relations these 
dam developers are enmeshed in, shed light on how they perceive their responsibilities, and whether the 
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PNPCA had played a role in influencing any shifts in these perceptions. Overall, such studies could 
contribute towards an understanding of the role that the PNPCA had played in shifting discourses and 
narratives towards that of ‘sustainable’ hydropower.  
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APPENDIX A: XAYABURI DAM TIMELINE 
May 2007 Lao government signed MOU with CH. Karnchang to conduct a 
survey and study of the Xayaburi Dam.  
September 2007-  
April 2008 
Thai consultancy firm TEAM Consulting Engineering and 
Management Company Limited conducted an Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) and Social Impact Assessment (SIA). 
March 2010 TEAM Consulting and Swiss firm Colenco finalised the Xayaburi 
Dam feasibility study. 
June 2010  Xayaburi Power Co. Ltd. Was incorporated with CH. Karnchang 
and Lao state utility Électricité du Laos (EDL) as major 
shareholders. 
August 2010 TEAM finalised the Xayaburi Dam’s EIA and SIA.  
July 2010 MOU signed between Lao government and EGAT for a power 
purchase agreement (PPA) 
20 September 2010 Lao National Mekong Committee (LNMC) submitted project 
documents for Xayaburi Dam to MRC Secretariat.  
22 October 2010 Xayaburi Prior Consultation officially began after the last MRC 
country received the project documents.  
26 October 2010 At the first meeting of the PNPCA Joint Committee Working 
Group (JCWG), a roadmap for Prior Consultation was agreed on, 
and an agreement was made to include public stakeholder 
consultations in Prior Consultation. 
29 October 2010 Lao government and Xayaburi Power Co. Ltd signed concession 
agreement.  
January 2011 –  
February 2011 
A total of eight public stakeholder consultations carried out in 
Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam by their respective National 
Mekong Committees (NMC). 
14 February 2011 Xayaburi Dam EIA and feasibility study released to public for the 
first time.  
24 March 2011 The MRC Secretariat released its technical review of the project 
documents, which was carried out by the MRC Secretariat Task 
Group (TG). The technical review noted that there were many areas 
of uncertainty that ‘required further information to address fully the 
extent of the transboundary impacts and mitigation measures 
required’ for the Xayaburi Dam, and also identified negative 
impacts of the Xayaburi Dam to fish migration and hydrology.  
19 April 2011 At a special MRC Joint Committee (JC) meeting, MRC JC 
members were unable to come to an agreement on whether Prior 
Consultation had been finalised. Laos insisted that the concerns 
raised would be taken into consideration and that Prior 
Consultation should be over, while Thailand, Cambodia and 
Vietnam suggested that further impact assessments and wider 
consultations should be carried out. The MRC JC deferred and 
elevated the decision to the ministerial level of the MRC Council.  
8 December 2011 At the MRC Council meeting, the four ministers were unable to 
reach a compromise and a decision was made to commission a 
study to further investigate the sustainable development and 
management of the Mekong River, which would include the impact 
of mainstream hydropower dam projects.  
7 November 2012 The Lao government held a ground breaking ceremony for the 
Xayaburi Dam.  
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APPENDIX B: DON SAHONG DAM TIMELINE 
March 2006 The Lao government signed MOU with Mega First Corporation Berhad 
(MFCB) to prepare feasibility study for the Don Sahong Dam project. 
June 2007 The final draft of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report 
was submitted to the Lao government for evaluation.  
September 2007 The Lao government took unprecedented step of formally inviting the 
MRC Secretariat to contribute to its internal process of reviewing the 
EIA, and the MRC Secretariat response found deficiencies in the EIA 
especially in relation to the impacts and proposed mitigation measures 
on fish migration.  
November 2007 Cambodian government representatives raised their concerns about the 
dam at the annual MRC Donor Consultative Group Meeting in 
November 2007. 
February 2008 The Lao government and MFCB signed a project development 
agreement and the Lao government announced that its studies showed 
the project to be viable.  
July 2013 The Lao government confirmed that it had begun clearing land for 
workers’ housing in preparation for the Don Sahong Dam 
30 September 2013 The Lao government initially submitted the Don Sahong Dam project 
documents in September 2013 under the PNPCA process of notification, 
based on the justification that the Don Sahong Dam was situated in one 
of the many channels of the Mekong River and does not block the entire 
river mainstream.  
December 2013 The Thai, Cambodia and Vietnam National Mekong Committees 
(NMC) had each sent a letter calling for Laos to honour the cooperation 
pledged in the 1995 Mekong Agreement and to submit the Don Sahong 
project under Prior Consultation. 
16 January 2014 A special session of the MRC Joint Committee (JC) was held to discuss 
the Don Sahong Dam. JC members were unable to reach an agreement 
and referred the matter to the MRC Council.  
26 June 2014 The Lao government reluctantly agreed to submit the project under 
Prior Consultation.  
25 July 2014 Prior Consultation for the Don Sahong Dam officially started. 
September 2014 The technical review for the project began. 
Early October 2014 Start date of Prior Consultation was publicly confirmed for the first 
time.  
September – December 
2014 
A total of 14 stakeholder consultations were held in Thailand, 
Cambodia and Vietnam by their respective NMCs between September 
to December, and one regional stakeholder consultation was held in 
Laos on 12 December 2014. 
December 2014 The technical review was completed. It identified ‘significant gaps’ in 
the project information submitted, particularly in relation to the dam’s 
transboundary impacts, and also highlighted ambiguity surrounding the 
proposed mitigation measures. The technical review also made a 
recommendation to the MRC JC to consider an extension to the Prior 
Consultation period for additional data to be analysed, and to provide 
opportunity for a further round of public consultations. 
January 2015 Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam recommended in their submitted 
reply forms for an extension of Prior Consultation for further studies to 
be conducted. However, Laos announced that it considered the process 
to be complete and its intention of commencing with dam construction 
in the early 2015 dry season.  
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The MRC JC deferred the decision on the Don Sahong Prior 
Consultation to the MRC Council.  
January 2016 The Lao government held a ground breaking ceremony for the Don 
Sahong Dam, following what Vietnamese media Thanh Nien News 
noted as ‘months of silence’ on the status of the prior consultation 
process. 
June 2016 Construction on the Don Sahong Dam had rapidly progressed to the 
point where the Hou Sahong Channel had been completely blocked 
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APPENDIX C: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
 
Thailand: Community Representatives  
Code 
Date of 
Interview Place of Residence  Affiliation 
TC1 
14 Mar 2017 
19 May 2017 
Chiang Khong District, Chiang Rai Province, 
Thailand STM Coalition 
TC2 
17 Mar 2017 
18 Jun 2017 Nong Khai Province, Thailand DWR Volunteer Network 
TC3 18 May 2017 Nong Khai Province, Thailand STM Coalition 
TC4 20 May 2017 
Chiang Khong District, Chiang Rai Province, 
Thailand STM Coalition 
TC5 23 May 2017 
Wiang Kaen District, Chiang Rai Province, 
Thailand Nil 
TC6 24 May 2017 
Wiang Kaen District, Chiang Rai Province, 
Thailand Nil 
TC7 24 May 2017 
Wiang Kaen District, Chiang Rai Province, 
Thailand Nil 
TC8 24 May 2017 
Wiang Kaen District, Chiang Rai Province, 
Thailand DWR Volunteer Network 
TC9 26 May 2017 
Chiang Khong District, Chiang Rai Province, 
Thailand STM Coalition 
TC10 15 Jun 2017 
Nong Khai Province, Thailand 
DWR Volunteer Network 
TC11 15 Jun 2017 DWR Volunteer Network 
TC12 15 Jun 2017 DWR Volunteer Network 
TC13 19 Jun 2017 STM Coalition 
TC14 20 Jun 2017 STM Coalition 
TC15 23 Jun 2017 DWR Volunteer Network 
TC16 24 Jun 2017 Nil 
 
Cambodia: Community Representatives 
Code Date of Interview Place of Residence 
CC1 5 Oct 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
Preah Rumkel Commune, Thala Barivat District, Stung Treng 
Province 
CC2 5 Oct 2017 
CC3 6 Oct 2017 
CC4 6 Oct 2017 
CC5 6 Oct 2017 
CC6 6 Oct 2017 
CC7 6 Oct 2017 
CC8 6 Oct 2017 
CC9 6 Oct 2017 
CC10 7 Oct 2017 
CC11 7 Oct 2017 
CC12  7 Oct 2017 
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CC13 7 Oct 2017 
CC14 7 Oct 2017 
CC15 7 Oct 2017 
CC16 7 Oct 2017 
CC17 10 Oct 2017 
CC18 10 Oct 2017 
CC19 10 Oct 2017 
CC20 10 Oct 2017 
CC21 10 Oct 2017 
CC22 8 Nov 2017 
Kampong Phluk Commune, Prasat Bakong District, Siem Reap 
Province 
CC23 9 Nov 2017 Tonle Sap Lake 
CC24 9 Nov 2017 Kampong Thom Province 
CC25 9 Nov 2017 Kampong Cham Province 
CC26 9 Nov 2017 Stung Treng Province 
CC27 10 Nov 2017 Kampong Chnang Province 
CC28 10 Nov 2017 Pursat Province 
CC29 10 Nov 2017 Kampong Cham Province 
CC30 10 Nov 2017 Battambang Province  
CC31 10 Nov 2017 Siem Reap Province 
CC32 11 Nov 2017 
Kampong Khleang Commune, Sout Nikom District, Siem Reap 
Province 
CC33 11 Nov 2017 
CC34 11 Nov 2017 
CC35 11 Nov 2017 
CC36 11 Nov 2017 
CC37 11 Nov 2017 
CC38 11 Nov 2017 
CC39 12 Nov 2017 
Kampong Phluk Commune, Prasat Bakong District, Siem Reap 
Province 
CC40 12 Nov 2017 
CC41 12 Nov 2017 
CC42 12 Nov 2017 
CC43 12 Nov 2017 
CC44 13 Nov 2017 
CC45 13 Nov 2017 
CC46 13 Nov 2017 
CC47 13 Nov 2017 
CC48 13 Nov 2017 
CC49 13 Nov 2017 
CC50 13 Nov 2017 
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Thailand: Civil Society Representatives 
Code Date of interview Organisation Type Level 
TN1 8-9 Feb 2017 Thai NGO  Local 
TN2 14 Feb 2017 Thai NGO  National 
TN3 14 Mar 2017 Thai NGO  National 
TN4 20 Mar 2017 Regional NGO Regional 
 
Cambodia: Civil Society Representatives 
Code 
Date of 
Interview Organisation Type Level 
CN1 15 Aug 2017 Cambodian NGO National 
CN2 3 Oct 2017 Cambodian NGO Local 
CN3 8 Oct 2017 Cambodian NGO Local 
CN4 16 Oct 2017 Cambodian NGO National 
CN5 23 Oct 2017 Cambodian NGO National 
CN6 8 Nov 2017 Cambodian NGO National 
CN7 8 Nov 2017 Cambodian NGO National 
CN8 8 Nov 2017 Cambodian NGO National 
 
Thailand: Government Representatives  
Code 
Date of 
Interview Institution or Place 
Level of 
Government  
TG1 
28 Feb 2017 
9 May 2017 Thai National Mekong Committee Secretariat National 
TG2 7 Mar 2017 Department of Fisheries Thailand National 
TG3  17 Mar 2017  Thai National Mekong Committee Secretariat National 
TG4 18 May 2017 Wiang Kaen District, Chiang Rai Province, Thailand District 
TG5 23 May 2017 Wiang Kaen District, Chiang Rai Province, Thailand Local 
TG6 24 May 2017 Wiang Kaen District, Chiang Rai Province, Thailand Local 
TG7 25 May 2017 Chiang Saen District, Chiang Rai Province, Thailand Local 
TG8 16 Jun 2017 Nong Khai Provincial Office Provincial 
TG9 16 Jun 2017 
Nong Khai Provincial Office of Natural Resources and 
Environment Provincial 
TG10 16 Jun 2017 
Nong Khai Provincial Office of Natural Resources and 
Environment Provincial 
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Cambodia: Government Representatives  
Code 
Date of 
Interview Institution or Place Level 
CG1 14 Sep 2017 Cambodia National Mekong Committee Secretariat National 
CG2 8 Oct 2017 Preah Rumkel Commune, Thala Barivat District, Stung Treng 
Province 
Local 
CG3 11 Oct 2017 Local 
CG4 11 Oct 2017 Local 
CG5 17 Oct 2017 Fisheries Administration  National 
CG6 13 Nov 2017 
Kampong Phluk Commune, Prasat Bakong District, Siem Reap 
Province Local 
CG7 13 Nov 2017 Local  
 
International Civil Society Representatives 
Code 
Date of 
Interview Location of international organisation  
IN1 13 Feb 2017 
Thailand 
IN2 24 Apr 2017 
IN3 9 Aug 2017 
Cambodia 
IN4 7 Sep 2017 
IN5 8 Sep 2017 
IN6 12 Sep 2017 
 
MRC Representatives 
Code 
Date of 
Interview Relation to MRC 
MRC1 
15 Sep 2017 
30 Oct 2017 Consultant 
MRC2 31 Oct 2017 Consultant 
MRC3 5 May 2017 MRC Secretariat Official 
MRC4 6 Nov 2017 MRC Secretariat Official 
 
Academics 
Code Date of 
interview 
Expertise  
A1 9 Feb 2017 Southeast Asia natural resource management and political ecology, including 
hydropower development 
A2 20 Mar 2017 Mekong water governance expert 
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APPENDIX D: HUMAN ETHICS PROTOCOL APPROVAL 
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APPENDIX E: PNPCA REPLY FORM  
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APPENDIX F: MRC REGIONAL STAKEHOLDER FORUM SCHEDULE 
 
1st MRC Regional Stakeholder Forum for the Pak Beng Hydropower Project (22 February 2017, 
Luang Prabang) 
Session 1A: Welcome and Objectives 
0830 Welcome 
0840 Opening Remarks (Lao Minister of Natural Resources and Environment) 
0850 Rationale, objectives, and agenda of the forum 
0900 MRC stakeholder engagement principles, mechanisms, and processes 
Session 1B: Prior Consultation in brief, Lessons Learned and Objectives of the Pak Beng Consultation  
0915 Overview of PNPCA 
  Implementation of previous Prior Consultation processes, including lessons learned 
  
Objectives and Roadmap for Prior Consultation of the Pak Beng Hydropower Project and post-
consultation 
0945 Clarifying questions and answers 
Session 1C: Lao Sustainable Hydropower Strategy and the Pak Beng Project in Brief 
1035 
Pak Beng Hydropower Project within the context of Lao national sustainable development and 
poverty reduction strategy and Basin Development Strategy 
1045 Clarifying questions and answers (10 min) 
1100 Pak Beng Hydropower Project 
1200 Lunch 
Session 2C1: Planned technical review of the project: hydrology, dam safety and navigation 
1330 Overall approach and methodology for MRCS technical review of Pak Beng Hydropower Project 
1340 Hydrology and sediment 
1350 1-2 Clarifying questions (10 min) 
1400  Dam safety 
1405 Navigation 
1410 1-2 Clarifying questions (10 min) 
1430 Coffee break 
1500 
Reflection groups; split into 1) Hydrology/Sediment, and 2) Dam safety/Navigation. Specialists to 
answer more questions in each area, and rapporteurs will document concerns and recommendations  
Session 2C2: Planned technical review of the project: environment and socio-economic issues 
1330 Overall approach and methodology for MRCS technical review of Pak Beng Hydropower Project 
1340 Environment, Fisheries 
1350 1-2 Clarifying questions (10 min) 
1400 Socio-economic 
1410 1-2 Clarifying questions (10 min) 
1430  Coffee break 
1500  
Reflection groups; split into 1) Environment/Fisheries, and 2) Socio-economic. Specialists to answer 
more questions in each area, and rapporteurs will document concerns and recommendations  
Session 3D: Key messages and recommendations for review of the Pak Beng project and PNPCA 
process 
1600 Report back on key messages and action to be taken (5 min per topic) 
1630 Reflection from audience on key messages and actions 
1700  Next steps for Pak Beng PNPCA 
 
